Autonomous System
AS17625
Last fetched
AS17625 is operated by BLAZENET-IN-AP - BlazeNet's Network, registered in IN, and announces 253 prefixes to 27 BGP neighbours. AS17625 has a reputation score of 9.9 (REPUTABLE); 54 of its 58,624 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 253
- BGP neighbours
- 27
- RPKI ROAs
- 337
- MOAS conflicts
- 0
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 1,508
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 23
- Facilities
- 67
- Internet exchanges
- 5
- Customer degree
- 22
- Peer degree
- 4
- Provider degree
- 6
- 14.102.160.0/24
- 14.102.161.0/24
- 14.102.162.0/24
- 14.102.163.0/24
- 27.109.0.0/24
- 27.109.1.0/24
- 27.109.2.0/24
- 27.109.3.0/24
- 27.109.4.0/24
- 27.109.5.0/24
- 27.109.6.0/24
- 27.109.7.0/24
- 27.109.8.0/24
- 27.109.9.0/24
- 27.109.10.0/24
- 27.109.11.0/24
- 27.109.12.0/24
- 27.109.13.0/24
- 27.109.14.0/24
- 27.109.15.0/24
- 27.109.16.0/24
- 27.109.17.0/24
- 27.109.18.0/24
- 27.109.19.0/24
- 27.109.20.0/24
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (5 total)
Facilities (67 total)
- TATA Communications Mumbai
- CtrlS Mumbai DC1
- TATA Communications Delhi
- Web Werks Mumbai 1
- TATA Communications GK1
- Equinix MB1 - Mumbai (GPX Mumbai 1)
- Sify Greenfort - Noida
- Sify Rabale - Mumbai
- Sify Vashi - Mumbai
- Sify Airoli-DC- Mumbai
- Nxtra Data Mumbai DC 2
- CtrlS Noida DC1
- Netmagic Chandivali - MUM-DC05
- Netmagic Noida
- STT Delhi 1
- STT Delhi 2
- STT Delhi 3
- STT Mumbai 2
- STT Mumbai 3
- STT Ahmedabad 1
- Equinix MB2 - Mumbai (GPX Mumbai 2)
- Web Werks NCR 2
- CtrlS Mumbai DC2
- Netmagic Chandivali - MUM DC06
- Netmagic Chandivali - MUM DC07
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 337 ROAs.
- 103.173.122.0/23 · max length /24
- 103.19.132.0/24 · max length /24
- 103.19.133.0/24 · max length /24
- 103.19.134.0/24 · max length /24
- 103.19.135.0/24 · max length /24
- 103.19.196.0/22 · max length /24
- 103.206.209.0/24 · max length /24
- 103.206.210.0/24 · max length /24
- 103.206.211.0/24 · max length /24
- 103.206.56.0/22 · max length /24
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS17625.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 58,624
- Threat-listed addresses
- 54
- Threat density
- 0.0921 %
- Routed prefixes
- 228
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: computed.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 25 of this network’s 27 BGP neighbours.
- TATACOMM-AS - TATA Communications formerly VSNL is Leading ISP · AS4755
- BBIL-AP - BHARTI Airtel Ltd. · AS9498
- SIFY-AS-IN - Sify Limited · AS9583
- HTIL-TTML-IN-AP - Tata Teleservices Maharashtra Ltd · AS17762
- F5 - F5 Networks SARL · AS35280
- NEESATECH-AS-AP - Neesa Technologies Pvt. Ltd. · AS38053
- TTSL-MEISISP - Tata Teleservices ISP AS · AS45820
- VIL-AS-AP - Vodafone Idea Ltd · AS55410
- Diadem-AS - Diadem Technologies Pvt. Ltd. · AS132937
- ENOW-AS - ENOW · AS132952
- INFIBEAM-AS - Infibeam Avenues Limited · AS133242
- SANGHVIINFO-AS-IN - Sanghvi Infotech Pvt Ltd · AS134001
- TGBCL-AS - Bennett Coleman And Co Ltd · AS135245
- CYGNET2-AS-AP - Cygnet Infotech Private Limited · AS141406
- CYBERTAL-AS-IN - CYBERTALOS PRIVATE LIMITED · AS141843
- MATALIA-AS-IN - Matalia Stock Broking Pvt Ltd · AS149542
- PROMPTPL-AS-IN - PROMPT EQUIPMENTS PVT LTD · AS150076
- IIBXGJ-AS-IN - India International Bullion Exchange Ifsc Ltd · AS150653
- DDPL-AS-AP - DEVPETER DATACENTER PRIVATE LIMITED · AS150694
- AEROSOLIO-AS-IN - Aerosol Io Ltd · AS151166
- NSL-AS-AP - Navaera Sciences LLC · AS151982
- IRINN-ETECH-AS-IN - EFFECTIVE TELE SERVICES PRIVATE LIMITED · AS152157
- VAGARO-AS-AP - VAGARO TECHNOLOGIES PRIVATE LIMITED · AS153045
- LNLAB-IN - LINTEL LABS PRIVATE LIMITED · AS153799
- IRINN-SPEROTEL-AS-IN - SPEROTEL TECHNOLOGIES LLP · AS153956
Reputation
9.9reputation score (REPUTABLE)
AS17625 (BLAZENET-IN-AP - BlazeNet's Network, IN) has a reputation score of 70.3 (REPUTABLE).
- Threat density
- 67.4/100
- Graph metrics
- 90.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 85.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- Blazenet Pvt Ltd
- RIR
- APNIC
- Registered
- Thu, 04 Sep 2008 06:40:30 GMT
- Abuse contact
- rajeev@blazenet.biz
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS17625 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.