Autonomous System
AS197473
Last fetched
AS197473 is operated by STUFU-AS - Studio Funk GmbH & Co. KG, registered in DE, and announces 2 prefixes to 4 BGP neighbours. AS197473 has a reputation score of 10.2 (NEUTRAL); 0 of its 1,280 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 2
- BGP neighbours
- 4
- RPKI ROAs
- 0
- MOAS conflicts
- 0
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 31,905
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 1
- Facilities
- 24
- Internet exchanges
- 5
- Customer degree
- 0
- Peer degree
- 16
- Provider degree
- 3
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (5 total)
Facilities (24 total)
- EdgeConneX Munich (EDCMUC01)
- Digital Realty Dusseldorf DUS1-3
- WIIT Datacenter DUS1, DUS2, DUS3, DUS4, DUS6, DUS7
- NorthC Hamburg
- Equinix DU1 - Dusseldorf
- Equinix MU1/MU3 - Munich
- n@work Hamburg Wendenstraße
- Portus/IPHH HH2 (Wendenstrasse 408)
- euNetworks Colocation Hamburg
- SpaceNet (LA)
- Artfiles w408
- GlobalConnect Hamburg (HAM2)
- EMC Home of Data MUC I/II - MuCon-X
- NTT Munich 2 Data Center (MUC2)
- WIIT Datacenter DUS5
- noris network datacenter.de MUC5
- AtlasEdge DC Hamburg HAM001
- AtlasEdge DC Berlin BER001
- AtlasEdge DC Leverkusen LEV001
- Portus/IPHH HH3 (Wendenstrasse 251)
- STACKIT Ostermiething (DC10)
- Equinix HH1 - Hamburg
- Equinix MU4 - Munich, Dornach
- Nordwest-IX
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS197473.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 1,280
- Threat-listed addresses
- 0
- Threat density
- 0.0000 %
- Routed prefixes
- 2
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: clean.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 4 of this network’s 4 BGP neighbours.
Reputation
10.2reputation score (NEUTRAL)
AS197473 (STUFU-AS - Studio Funk GmbH & Co. KG, DE) has a reputation score of 69.5 (NEUTRAL).
- Threat density
- 90.0/100
- Graph metrics
- 55.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 85.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- Studio Funk GmbH & Co. KG
- RIR
- RIPE
- Registered
- Wed, 15 Dec 2010 12:07:26 GMT
- Abuse contact
- abuse@studiofunk.de
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS197473 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.