Autonomous System
AS198622
Last fetched
AS198622 is operated by ADFORM - Adform A/S, registered in DK, and announces 27 prefixes to 6 BGP neighbours. AS198622 has a reputation score of 14.8 (NEUTRAL); 0 of its 4,096 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 27
- BGP neighbours
- 6
- RPKI ROAs
- 14
- MOAS conflicts
- 0
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 21,547
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 1
- Facilities
- 20
- Internet exchanges
- 3
- Customer degree
- 0
- Peer degree
- 37
- Provider degree
- 7
- 37.157.2.0/24
- 37.157.2.0/23
- 37.157.0.0/21
- 37.157.4.0/24
- 37.157.4.0/23
- 37.157.6.0/24
- 37.157.6.0/23
- 37.157.7.0/24
- 89.117.184.0/24
- 185.84.62.0/23
- 185.84.63.0/24
- 185.167.164.0/23
- 185.167.165.0/24
- 185.167.166.0/23
- 185.167.167.0/24
- 213.252.255.0/24
- 2602:80e:c002::/48
- 2602:80e:c002::/47
- 2602:80e:c003::/48
- 2602:80e:c004::/48
- 2602:80e:c004::/47
- 2602:80e:c005::/48
- 2a0b:7e00:100::/40
- 2a0b:7e00:200::/40
- 2a0b:7e00:300::/40
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (3 total)
Facilities (20 total)
- CoreSite - Los Angeles (LA1) One Wilshire
- CoreSite - San Jose (SV1)
- Equinix NY1 - New York, Newark
- Equinix NY9 - New York, 111 8th Avenue
- Equinix NY2/NY4/NY5/NY6 - New York, Secaucus
- Equinix SG1 - Singapore
- CoreSite - Los Angeles (LA2)
- Equinix NY7 - New York, North Bergen
- Coresite - Milpitas (SV2)
- Equinix SG2 - Singapore
- CoreSite - Santa Clara (SV4)
- Equinix SG3 - Singapore
- CoreSite - Santa Clara (SV3)
- CoreSite - Santa Clara (SV7)
- Equinix SG4 - Singapore
- CoreSite - Santa Clara (SV8)
- CoreSite - Los Angeles (LA3)
- Equinix SG5 - Singapore
- CoreSite - Santa Clara (SV9)
- Equinix NY3 - New York, Secaucus
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 14 ROAs.
- 2602:80e:c000::/44 · max length /48
- 2602:80e:c002::/47
- 2602:80e:c002::/48
- 2602:80e:c003::/48
- 2602:80e:c004::/47
- 2602:80e:c004::/48
- 2602:80e:c005::/48
- 185.167.164.0/22 · max length /24
- 185.84.60.0/22 · max length /24
- 213.252.255.0/24 · max length /24
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS198622.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 4,096
- Threat-listed addresses
- 0
- Threat density
- 0.0000 %
- Routed prefixes
- 16
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: clean.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 6 of this network’s 6 BGP neighbours.
- COGENT-174 - Cogent Communications, LLC · AS174
- NTT-DATA-2914 - NTT America, Inc. · AS2914
- ASN-TELSTRA-GLOBAL - Telstra Global · AS4637
- BITE - UAB "Bite Lietuva" · AS13194
- GlobalConnect-AS31027 - GlobalConnect A/S · AS31027
- SENTIA - Sentia Denmark A/S · AS47292
Reputation
14.8reputation score (NEUTRAL)
AS198622 (ADFORM - Adform A/S, DK) has a reputation score of 60.4 (NEUTRAL).
- Threat density
- 56.8/100
- Graph metrics
- 65.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 85.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- Adform A/S
- RIR
- RIPE
- Registered
- Tue, 27 Mar 2012 07:55:15 GMT
- Abuse contact
- net-abuse@adform.com
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS198622 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.