Autonomous System
AS199860
Last fetched
AS199860 is operated by Xelent-AS - ATOMDATA JSC, registered in RU, and announces 16 prefixes to 11 BGP neighbours. AS199860 has a reputation score of 12.3 (NEUTRAL); 4 of its 8,448 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 16
- BGP neighbours
- 11
- RPKI ROAs
- 12
- MOAS conflicts
- 0
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 4,044
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 6
- Facilities
- 54
- Internet exchanges
- 4
- Customer degree
- 5
- Peer degree
- 9
- Provider degree
- 5
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (4 total)
Facilities (54 total)
- NIKHEF Amsterdam
- Telehouse - London (Docklands North)
- Equinix SK1 - Stockholm, Bromma
- Speedbone Berlin
- Moscow M9
- Digital Realty VIE1/2 - Vienna
- Equinix FR5 - Frankfurt, KleyerStrasse
- Digital Realty Frankfurt FRA1-27
- Telehouse - Paris 2 (Voltaire - Léon Frot)
- Digital Realty AMS9 - Amsterdam
- Dataplex Budapest
- Digital Realty Stockholm STO1-6
- Digital Realty Marseille MRS1/2/3/4
- CE Colo Prague
- NewTelco Kiev
- Linxdatacenter (Moscow)
- Equinix WA1 - Warsaw, Centrum LIM
- Sitel Bratislava
- LIM Warsaw
- NXDATA-1 Bucharest (BUH1)
- Ucomline Kiev
- Bolshaya Morskaya 18
- Equinix SK2 - Stockholm, Sköndal
- TELEPOINT Sofia Centre
- Digita Helsinki Pasila Broadcasting Tower
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 12 ROAs.
- 185.44.12.0/22 · max length /22
- 185.44.12.0/23 · max length /23
- 185.44.14.0/23 · max length /23
- 193.43.41.0/24 · max length /24
- 2a01:6520::/32 · max length /32
- 5.188.104.0/22 · max length /22
- 5.188.104.0/23 · max length /23
- 5.188.106.0/23 · max length /23
- 91.132.228.0/22 · max length /22
- 91.132.228.0/23 · max length /23
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS199860.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 8,448
- Threat-listed addresses
- 4
- Threat density
- 0.0473 %
- Routed prefixes
- 15
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: computed.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 11 of this network’s 11 BGP neighbours.
- HURRICANE - Hurricane Electric LLC · AS6939
- RETN-AS - RETN Limited · AS9002
- LINKEY-CLOUD - Linkey Ltd · AS13302
- RASCOM-AS - CJSC RASCOM · AS20764
- REKSOFT-AS - Reksoft Co. Ltd. · AS34574
- ESTP-AS - Unified system of trade procedures Ltd. · AS48277
- Serverius-as - Serverius Holding B.V. · AS50673
- RETNRU-AS - JSC "RetnNet" · AS57304
- Koda-AS - Mobicon CJSC · AS200935
- AS-SERVICEPIPE - SERVICEPIPE LLC · AS201706
- GLIPTIKA-AS - Gliptika LLC · AS213329
Reputation
12.3reputation score (NEUTRAL)
AS199860 (Xelent-AS - ATOMDATA JSC, RU) has a reputation score of 65.3 (NEUTRAL).
- Threat density
- 60.2/100
- Graph metrics
- 90.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 75.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- ATOMDATA JSC
- RIR
- RIPE
- Registered
- Mon, 30 Dec 2013 08:37:12 GMT
- Abuse contact
- abuse@atomdata.ru
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS199860 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.