Autonomous System
AS20764
Last fetched
AS20764 is operated by RASCOM-AS - CJSC RASCOM, registered in RU, and announces 9 prefixes to 472 BGP neighbours. AS20764 has a reputation score of 13.1 (NEUTRAL); 0 of its 13,312 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 9
- BGP neighbours
- 472
- RPKI ROAs
- 22
- MOAS conflicts
- 0
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 30
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 2,988
- Facilities
- 336
- Internet exchanges
- 16
- Customer degree
- 263
- Peer degree
- 1,374
- Provider degree
- 7
Routing posture
- Hijack posture score
- 0.04
- Route leaks
- 1
Leak types observed: TYPE2_LATERAL_PEER_TO_PEER.
Signals
- ddos-mitigationProvides DDoS scrubbing or absorption for its customers.
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (16 total)
Facilities (336 total)
- Equinix SV8 - Silicon Valley, Palo Alto
- Equinix DA1 - Dallas
- Equinix CH1/CH2/CH4 - Chicago
- Equinix SV1/SV5/SV10 - Silicon Valley, San Jose
- Equinix NY1 - New York, Newark
- Equinix LA1 - Los Angeles
- Digital Realty NYC (60 Hudson)
- Equinix DC1-DC15,DC21-DC22 - Ashburn
- Equinix TR1 - Toronto
- Equinix MI1 - Miami, NOTA
- Digital Realty NYC (111 8th Ave)
- NIKHEF Amsterdam
- Equinix NY2/NY4/NY5/NY6 - New York, Secaucus
- Telehouse - London (Docklands East)
- Equinix NY9 - New York, 111 8th Avenue
- Digital Realty London LHR20
- Digital Realty London LHR19
- Telehouse - London (Docklands North)
- Telehouse - Paris 2 (Voltaire - Léon Frot)
- Telehouse - Paris 1 (Jeûneurs)
- ITENOS Frankfurt (FRA1)
- Digital Realty Frankfurt FRA1-27
- Equinix LD8 - London, Docklands
- Global Switch London East
- Digital Realty London LON1-3
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 22 ROAs.
- 185.121.71.0/24 · max length /32
- 185.5.160.0/22 · max length /22
- 2a00:1c28::/29 · max length /29
- 2a00:1c28::/32 · max length /32
- 2a00:1c2b:8::/48 · max length /48
- 79.141.208.0/20 · max length /20
- 79.141.213.0/24 · max length /24
- 80.64.102.0/24 · max length /24
- 80.64.103.0/24 · max length /24
- 80.64.104.0/24 · max length /24
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS20764.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 13,312
- Threat-listed addresses
- 0
- Threat density
- 0.0000 %
- Routed prefixes
- 7
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: clean.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 25 of this network’s 472 BGP neighbours.
- DFN - Verein zur Foerderung eines Deutschen Forschungsnetzes e.V. · AS680
- APPLE-ENGINEERING - Apple Inc. · AS714
- PEER1-1031 - PEER 1031 LLC · AS1031
- SURFNET-NL - SURF B.V. · AS1103
- NV-ASN - Cellcom Fixed Line Communication L.P · AS1680
- NEXTLAYER-AS - Next Layer Telekommunikationsdienstleistungs- und Beratungs GmbH · AS1764
- GREEN - green.ch AG · AS1836
- Tertiary Education and Research Network of South Africa - Tertiary Education and Research Network of South Africa · AS2018
- TELENOR-NORGE-AS - Telenor Norge AS · AS2119
- NORDUNET - NORDUnet · AS2603
- RoEduNet - Agentia de Administrare a Retelei Nationale de Informatica pentru Educatie si Cercetare · AS2614
- ATGS-MMD-AS - AT&T Enterprises, LLC · AS2686
- CESNET2 - CESNET z.s.p.o. · AS2852
- ROSPRINT-AS - LLC Orange Business Services · AS2854
- TELEMACH - Telemach Slovenija d.o.o. · AS3212
- SOVAM-AS - PJSC "Vimpelcom" · AS3216
- UARNET-AS - LLC EKSINTECH · AS3255
- SWISSCOM - Swisscom (Schweiz) AG · AS3303
- Datagroup - PRIVATE JOINT STOCK COMPANY "DATAGROUP" · AS3326
- RIPE-NCC-AS - Reseaux IP Europeens Network Coordination Centre (RIPE NCC) · AS3333
- LEVEL3 - Level 3 Parent, LLC · AS3356
- HINET - Data Communication Business Group · AS3462
- PCCWG-APAC-HK - PCCW Global (HK) Ltd. · AS3491
- LGDACOM-KR - LG DACOM Corporation · AS3786
- AS4230 - CLARO S.A. · AS4230
Reputation
13.1reputation score (NEUTRAL)
AS20764 (RASCOM-AS - CJSC RASCOM, RU) has a reputation score of 63.9 (NEUTRAL).
- Threat density
- 48.9/100
- Graph metrics
- 90.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 85.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- CJSC RASCOM
- RIR
- RIPE
- Registered
- Fri, 23 Aug 2002 12:30:38 GMT
- Abuse contact
- abuse@rascom.ru
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS20764 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.