Autonomous System
AS200010
Last fetched
AS200010 is operated by OLFE - Olfe Veri Merkezi Anonim Sirketi, registered in TR, and announces 3 prefixes to 24 BGP neighbours. AS200010 has a reputation score of 50.0 (HIGHLY_SUSPICIOUS); 0 of its 512 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 3
- BGP neighbours
- 24
- RPKI ROAs
- 3
- MOAS conflicts
- 0
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 2,798
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 10
- Facilities
- 45
- Internet exchanges
- 3
- Customer degree
- 9
- Peer degree
- 2
- Provider degree
- 8
Signals
- bulletproof-hostingHosts content other providers routinely take down.
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (3 total)
Facilities (45 total)
- Equinix FR7 - Frankfurt, Gutleutstrasse
- Digital Realty Madrid MAD1-2
- Equinix NY2/NY4/NY5/NY6 - New York, Secaucus
- NIKHEF Amsterdam
- Equinix AM7 - Amsterdam, Kuiperberweg
- Equinix FR5 - Frankfurt, KleyerStrasse
- Digital Realty Frankfurt FRA1-27
- Telehouse - Paris 2 (Voltaire - Léon Frot)
- Equinix LD8 - London, Docklands
- CE Colo Prague
- Equinix HK1 - Hong Kong
- Equinix AM1/AM2 - Amsterdam, Luttenbergweg
- Sitel Bratislava
- LIM Warsaw
- Equinix WA1 - Warsaw, Centrum LIM
- euNetworks Amsterdam
- NXDATA-1 Bucharest (BUH1)
- TELEPOINT Sofia Centre
- Equinix FR4 - Frankfurt, West
- Equinix PA6 - Paris, Condorcet
- Equinix AM5 - Amsterdam, Schepenbergweg
- Equinix AM11 - Amsterdam, Lemelerbergweg
- Equinix AM3 - Amsterdam, Science Park
- Equinix SO1 - Sofia
- 4 Data Center
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 3 of this network’s 3 ROAs.
- 194.62.118.0/24 · max length /24
- 2a14:9401:8000::/36 · max length /36
- 95.214.174.0/24 · max length /24
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS200010.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 512
- Threat-listed addresses
- 0
- Threat density
- 0.0000 %
- Routed prefixes
- 2
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: clean.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 24 of this network’s 24 BGP neighbours.
- COGENT-174 - Cogent Communications, LLC · AS174
- S3Company - S3 Company Ltd · AS4849
- INTERDOTLINK - Inter.link GmbH · AS5405
- TR-3C1B-TELEKOM - 3C1B Telekomunikasyon ve Internet Hiz. San. ve Tic. A.S. · AS6823
- HURRICANE - Hurricane Electric LLC · AS6939
- TTNet - Turk Telekomunikasyon Anonim Sirketi · AS9121
- BORUSANTELEKOM-AS - Vodafone Net Iletisim Hizmetler AS · AS15924
- TURKIX - TurkIX Communications Ltd. · AS34565
- belcloud - Belcloud LTD · AS44901
- YIGITHOSTING - Yigit Hosting Bilisim E-Ticaret Gida Sanayi Ticaret Limited Sirketi · AS47585
- SPD-Net - SPDNet Telekomunikasyon Hizmetleri Bilgi Teknolojileri Taahhut Sanayi Ve Ticaret A.S. · AS57844
- INOXWEB-LLC - Inoxweb LLC · AS198015
- Serverora - Cagri Topuz · AS201407
- nety - Burak GULDOGAN · AS201741
- EtkinHost - Eray Maden trading as Etkin Host Bilisim ve Internet Hizmetleri · AS203114
- VPSROBOT - Bayram Coskun · AS206668
- HostLAB - HostLAB Bilisim Teknolojileri A.S. · AS207326
- GUARDY - Guardy Limited · AS210387
- POYRAZ - PH Bilisim Teknolojileri Limited Sirketi · AS210574
- PEERYX - PEERYX NETWORK SAS · AS213382
- INOXWEB - Mustafa Gunes trading as Inoxweb Datacenter ve Hosting Bilisim Teknolojileri · AS213488
- OLFE-DATA-CENTER - AE Olfe Teknoloji ve Ticaret Limited Sirketi · AS213708
- YALNIZ - YALNIZ BILISIM TEKNOLOJILERI TIC. LTD.STI. · AS213751
- Olfe - AE Olfe Teknoloji ve Ticaret Limited Sirketi · AS214466
Reputation
50.0reputation score (HIGHLY_SUSPICIOUS)
AS200010 (OLFE - Olfe Veri Merkezi Anonim Sirketi, TR) has a reputation score of 25.0 (HIGHLY_SUSPICIOUS). This ASN shows suspicious characteristics.
- Threat density
- 32.6/100
- Graph metrics
- 90.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 75.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- Olfe Veri Merkezi Anonim Sirketi
- RIR
- RIPE
- Registered
- Mon, 06 Feb 2023 15:22:29 GMT
- Abuse contact
- abuse@olfe.net.tr
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS200010 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.