Autonomous System
AS200044
Last fetched
AS200044 is operated by stackgroup - Stack Group, LLC, registered in RU, and announces 17 prefixes to 16 BGP neighbours. AS200044 has a reputation score of 12.5 (NEUTRAL); 3 of its 11,264 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 17
- BGP neighbours
- 16
- RPKI ROAs
- 23
- MOAS conflicts
- 0
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 2,269
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 13
- Facilities
- 25
- Internet exchanges
- 3
- Customer degree
- 12
- Peer degree
- 12
- Provider degree
- 5
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (3 total)
Facilities (25 total)
- Moscow M9
- Linxdatacenter (Moscow)
- Moscow CSS MPS
- Moscow M10
- CSS MPS Moscow
- NewTelco Kiev
- LVRTC TV Tower
- Bolshaya Morskaya 18
- IVC ORW Saint-Petersburg
- Digita Helsinki Pasila Broadcasting Tower
- Telia Telehouse KJJ
- Moscow TehnoGorod
- Tsvetochnaya Data Center
- Raduga-2
- StoreData
- IXcellerate MOS1
- M100 datacenter Moscow, Varshavskoe 125
- DataSpace Moscow
- Miran-1
- DataLine Moscow DC OST
- DataLine Moscow DC NORD
- KIAEHOUSE
- INFONET DC
- Data-Center IMAQLIQ
- BONCH-IT
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 23 ROAs.
- 109.238.240.0/20 · max length /24
- 109.238.246.0/24 · max length /24
- 185.159.64.0/22 · max length /24
- 185.159.64.0/24 · max length /24
- 195.22.123.0/24 · max length /24
- 2a00:eb8::/32 · max length /32
- 2a00:eb9::/32 · max length /48
- 2a0d:380::/29 · max length /29
- 89.249.16.0/20 · max length /24
- 89.249.31.0/24 · max length /24
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS200044.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 11,264
- Threat-listed addresses
- 3
- Threat density
- 0.0266 %
- Routed prefixes
- 15
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: computed.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 16 of this network’s 16 BGP neighbours.
- ROSTELECOM-AS - PJSC Rostelecom · AS12389
- STACK-AS - StackNet Service, LLC · AS16083
- RASCOM-AS - CJSC RASCOM · AS20764
- SGGS-AS-AP - SG.GS · AS24482
- ASN-SFT - SFT Company LLC · AS25530
- Virtual Technologies & Solutions - Virtual Technologies & Solutions · AS37721
- INFOBIP-AS - Infobip Limited · AS43009
- StormNetworks - Storm Networks LLC · AS43298
- MEDIS-AS - MEDIS LLC · AS56671
- RETNRU-AS - JSC "RetnNet" · AS57304
- ASTPK - JSC Oil Processing Company · AS57671
- SEVENTECH - SevenTech LLC · AS59513
- TSK-AS - Technical Services Company Ltd · AS197808
- A101 - LLC Specialized Developer A101 · AS199582
- ADVGROUP - ADV Launchpad Limited Liability Company · AS210726
- ORSAVIA - JSC "Online Reservation System" · AS211078
Reputation
12.5reputation score (NEUTRAL)
AS200044 (stackgroup - Stack Group, LLC, RU) has a reputation score of 65.0 (NEUTRAL).
- Threat density
- 64.3/100
- Graph metrics
- 90.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 75.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- Stack Group, LLC
- RIR
- RIPE
- Registered
- Thu, 24 Oct 2013 06:12:28 GMT
- Abuse contact
- abuse@stackgroup.ru
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS200044 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.