Autonomous System
AS200781
Last fetched
AS200781 is operated by TAMPNET-AS - Tampnet AS, registered in NO, and announces 9 prefixes to 10 BGP neighbours. AS200781 has a reputation score of 7.3 (REPUTABLE); 0 of its 2,048 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 9
- BGP neighbours
- 10
- RPKI ROAs
- 11
- MOAS conflicts
- 0
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 2,117
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 14
- Facilities
- 50
- Internet exchanges
- 8
- Customer degree
- 7
- Peer degree
- 9
- Provider degree
- 2
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (8 total)
Facilities (50 total)
- Digital Realty London LHR19
- Telehouse - London (Docklands East)
- Digital Realty London LHR20
- Telehouse - London (Docklands North)
- NIKHEF Amsterdam
- Equinix SK1 - Stockholm, Bromma
- Global Switch Amsterdam
- Digital Realty AMS3/5/7/8/10 - Amsterdam
- Digital Realty AMS17 - Amsterdam
- Equinix AM7 - Amsterdam, Kuiperberweg
- Equinix LD8 - London, Docklands
- Digital Realty London LON1-3
- Digital Realty AMS9 - Amsterdam
- Digital Realty London LHR21 (closed)
- Digital Realty Stockholm STO1-6
- Equinix AM1/AM2 - Amsterdam, Luttenbergweg
- Iron Mountain Data Center - Amsterdam (AMS-1)
- Equinix LD4 - London, Slough
- Vaultica Data Centers | OSL01
- Equinix LD9 - London, Powergate
- Equinix SK2 - Stockholm, Sköndal
- Telehouse - London (Docklands West)
- Equinix LD5 - London, Slough
- Smartdc Rotterdam
- STOKAB KN7, Östermalm
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 11 ROAs.
- 185.96.40.0/22 · max length /22
- 185.96.40.0/23 · max length /23
- 185.96.42.0/23 · max length /23
- 2a03:fd80::/29 · max length /29
- 2a03:fd80::/32 · max length /32
- 2a03:fd83::/32 · max length /48
- 2a03:fd84:200::/48 · max length /48
- 45.13.124.0/22 · max length /22
- 45.13.124.0/23 · max length /23
- 45.13.126.0/23 · max length /23
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS200781.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 2,048
- Threat-listed addresses
- 0
- Threat density
- 0.0000 %
- Routed prefixes
- 6
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: clean.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 10 of this network’s 10 BGP neighbours.
- COGENT-174 - Cogent Communications, LLC · AS174
- TWELVE99 - Arelion Sweden AB · AS1299
- HURRICANE - Hurricane Electric LLC · AS6939
- RETN-AS - RETN Limited · AS9002
- PPCO-US - ConocoPhillips Company · AS18701
- EQUINOR-AS - Equinor ASA · AS42175
- TKSWF-AS - Stadtwerke Feldkirch · AS48362
- NORDEF - IKT-KAPASITETER · AS49278
- HEIMNETT-AS - Heimnett AS · AS204224
- ASN-NO-AKERBP - AKER BP ASA · AS209293
Reputation
7.3reputation score (REPUTABLE)
AS200781 (TAMPNET-AS - Tampnet AS, NO) has a reputation score of 78.3 (REPUTABLE).
- Threat density
- 90.0/100
- Graph metrics
- 90.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 85.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- Tampnet AS
- RIR
- RIPE
- Registered
- Thu, 16 Apr 2015 12:19:03 GMT
- Abuse contact
- abuse@tampnet.com
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS200781 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.