Autonomous System
AS20161
Last fetched
AS20161 is operated by TRGO - TeraGo Networks Inc., registered in CA, and announces 224 prefixes to 11 BGP neighbours. AS20161 has a reputation score of 10.1 (NEUTRAL); 2 of its 141,056 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 224
- BGP neighbours
- 11
- RPKI ROAs
- 0
- MOAS conflicts
- 1
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 2,518
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 11
- Facilities
- 24
- Internet exchanges
- 2
- Customer degree
- 10
- Peer degree
- 9
- Provider degree
- 3
- 64.201.160.0/21
- 64.201.168.0/24
- 64.201.169.0/24
- 64.201.170.0/24
- 64.201.170.0/23
- 64.201.171.0/24
- 64.201.172.0/23
- 64.201.174.0/24
- 64.201.175.0/24
- 64.201.160.0/19
- 64.201.177.0/24
- 64.201.180.0/23
- 64.201.181.0/24
- 64.201.182.0/23
- 64.201.184.0/23
- 64.201.187.0/24
- 64.201.188.0/24
- 66.11.64.0/22
- 66.11.68.0/24
- 66.11.69.0/24
- 66.11.70.0/24
- 66.11.71.0/24
- 66.11.72.0/23
- 66.11.74.0/24
- 66.11.75.0/24
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (2 total)
Facilities (24 total)
- Equinix TR1 - Toronto
- Digital Realty Seattle SEA10
- Equinix SE2/SE3 - Seattle
- Neutral Data Toronto
- Telehouse Toronto (151 Front St West)
- KOMO Plaza Seattle (Formerly Fisher Plaza)
- Intergate West / Digital.forest / Fortress
- Cologix TOR1
- Cologix MIN1
- Equinix TR2 - Toronto
- Telehouse Toronto (250 Front St West)
- Cologix MIN2
- Cologix TOR2
- Centersquare Seattle (SEA1-B)
- H5 Data Centers Seattle
- Cologix MIN3
- Cologix MIN4
- Sabey Intergate East Building 4
- WowRack
- Telehouse Toronto (905 King Street West)
- Coloware YTZ1
- 1530 SWIFT - NOCIX
- Arrow Calgary DC2
- DataBank Minneapolis (MSP4)
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS20161.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 141,056
- Threat-listed addresses
- 2
- Threat density
- 0.0014 %
- Routed prefixes
- 220
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: computed.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 11 of this network’s 11 BGP neighbours.
- HUT8-EAST - Hut 8 Mining Corp. · AS912
- SHAW - Shaw Communications · AS6327
- ZAYO-6461 - Zayo Bandwidth · AS6461
- HURRICANE - Hurricane Electric LLC · AS6939
- AARNET-AS-AP - Australian Academic and Research Network (AARNet) · AS7575
- NEIGHBOURHOOD-CONNECT - Neighbourhood Connect · AS22873
- AS-IHS - Internet Hosting Servers · AS29883
- SANDC-CA - S&C Electric Canada Ltd. · AS31790
- GDSCI - Giesecke & Devrient Systems Canada, Inc. · AS47102
- UMICORE - Umicore NV · AS203849
- TRITECH - Tritech Financial Systems Inc. · AS395741
MOAS / hijack watch
1 announced prefix conflict with AS20161 — another network announces the same address space. A sample:
Reputation
10.1reputation score (NEUTRAL)
AS20161 (TRGO - TeraGo Networks Inc., CA) has a reputation score of 69.7 (NEUTRAL).
- Threat density
- 80.0/100
- Graph metrics
- 80.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 75.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- TeraGo Networks Inc.
- RIR
- ARIN
- Registered
- Fri, 30 Mar 2001 05:00:00 GMT
- Abuse contact
- ipnoc@terago.ca
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS20161 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.