Autonomous System
AS6327
Last fetched
AS6327 is operated by SHAW - Shaw Communications, registered in CA, and announces 4,705 prefixes to 235 BGP neighbours. AS6327 has a reputation score of 11.5 (NEUTRAL); 392 of its 5,345,280 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 4,705
- BGP neighbours
- 235
- RPKI ROAs
- 98
- MOAS conflicts
- 4
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 162
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 338
- Facilities
- 34
- Internet exchanges
- 4
- Customer degree
- 199
- Peer degree
- 73
- Provider degree
- 5
- 23.247.196.0/22
- 24.64.34.0/23
- 24.64.36.0/23
- 24.64.39.0/24
- 24.64.40.0/23
- 24.64.46.0/24
- 24.64.47.0/24
- 24.64.49.0/24
- 24.64.52.0/23
- 24.64.54.0/23
- 24.64.56.0/23
- 24.64.64.0/22
- 24.64.68.0/22
- 24.64.72.0/22
- 24.64.76.0/22
- 24.64.80.0/22
- 24.64.84.0/22
- 24.64.88.0/22
- 24.64.92.0/22
- 24.64.96.0/22
- 24.64.100.0/22
- 24.64.104.0/22
- 24.64.108.0/22
- 24.64.112.0/22
- 24.64.116.0/22
Routing posture
- Hijack posture score
- 0.14
- Route leaks
- 9
Leak types observed: TYPE2_LATERAL_PEER_TO_PEER, TYPE3_PROVIDER_TO_PEER, TYPE4_PEER_TO_PROVIDER.
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (4 total)
Facilities (34 total)
- Equinix SV8 - Silicon Valley, Palo Alto
- Equinix SV1/SV5/SV10 - Silicon Valley, San Jose
- Equinix CH1/CH2/CH4 - Chicago
- Digital Realty Seattle SEA10
- Equinix SE2/SE3 - Seattle
- Harbour Centre Vancouver
- KOMO Plaza Seattle (Formerly Fisher Plaza)
- Equinix SV2 - Silicon Valley, Santa Clara
- Equinix SV3 - Silicon Valley, San Jose
- Digital Realty CHI (350 E Cermak)
- Equinix SV4 - Silicon Valley, Sunnyvale
- Intergate West / Digital.forest / Fortress
- Cologix MIN1
- Equinix CH3 - Elk Grove
- Cologix VAN1
- Cologix VAN2
- Cologix MIN2
- Centersquare Seattle (SEA1-B)
- H5 Data Centers Seattle
- Cologix MIN3
- Cologix MIN4
- Sabey Intergate East Building 4
- WowRack
- eStruxture VAN-1
- eStruxture VAN-2
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 98 ROAs.
- 174.0.0.0/13 · max length /24
- 184.64.0.0/13 · max length /24
- 2001:4e8::/32 · max length /48
- 204.209.208.0/21 · max length /24
- 24.108.0.0/15 · max length /24
- 24.244.0.0/18 · max length /24
- 24.64.0.0/13 · max length /24
- 24.76.0.0/14 · max length /24
- 24.80.0.0/16 · max length /24
- 24.82.0.0/15 · max length /24
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS6327.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 5,345,280
- Threat-listed addresses
- 392
- Threat density
- 0.0073 %
- Routed prefixes
- 3,848
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: computed.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 25 of this network’s 235 BGP neighbours.
- COGENT-174 - Cogent Communications, LLC · AS174
- BCNET-AS - BCNET · AS271
- BACOM - Bell Canada · AS577
- APPLE-ENGINEERING - Apple Inc. · AS714
- ROGERS-COMMUNICATIONS - Rogers Communications Canada Inc. · AS812
- ASN852 - TELUS Communications Inc. · AS852
- WAA - WAA · AS900
- HUT8-EAST - Hut 8 Mining Corp. · AS912
- COGENT-1239 - Cogent Communications, LLC · AS1239
- TWELVE99 - Arelion Sweden AB · AS1299
- EBOX - EBOX · AS1403
- UNITAS - Unitas Global · AS1828
- WISCNET1-AS - WiscNet · AS2381
- IIJ - Internet Initiative Japan Inc. · AS2497
- KDDI - KDDI CORPORATION · AS2516
- EASTE-46-AS - Eastern Irrigation District · AS2735
- AS-SSI - Netflix Streaming Services Inc. · AS2906
- GTT-BACKBONE - GTT Communications Inc. · AS3257
- SWISSCOM - Swisscom (Schweiz) AG · AS3303
- LEVEL3 - Level 3 Parent, LLC · AS3356
- U-ALBERTA - University of Alberta · AS3359
- PCCWG-APAC-HK - PCCW Global (HK) Ltd. · AS3491
- PROVINCE-OF-BRITISH-COLUMBIA - Province of British Columbia · AS3633
- CHINANET-BACKBONE - No.31,Jin-rong Street · AS4134
- ASN-TELSTRA-GLOBAL - Telstra Global · AS4637
MOAS / hijack watch
4 announced prefixes conflict with AS6327 — another network announces the same address space. A sample:
Reputation
11.5reputation score (NEUTRAL)
AS6327 (SHAW - Shaw Communications, CA) has a reputation score of 67.0 (NEUTRAL).
- Threat density
- 75.6/100
- Graph metrics
- 90.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 60.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- Shaw Communications
- RIR
- ARIN
- Registered
- Fri, 08 Mar 1996 05:00:00 GMT
- Abuse contact
- internet.abuse@sjrb.ca
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS6327 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.