Autonomous System
AS210
Last fetched
AS210 is operated by WEST-NET-WEST - Utah Education Network, registered in US, and announces 30 prefixes to 14 BGP neighbours. AS210 has a reputation score of 8.1 (REPUTABLE); 3 of its 1,423,872 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 30
- BGP neighbours
- 14
- RPKI ROAs
- 17
- MOAS conflicts
- 1
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 3,082
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 8
- Facilities
- 6
- Internet exchanges
- 2
- Customer degree
- 7
- Peer degree
- 1
- Provider degree
- 6
- 23.135.208.0/24
- 134.250.0.0/16
- 137.190.0.0/16
- 137.190.224.0/20
- 137.190.240.0/22
- 140.197.0.0/16
- 144.17.0.0/16
- 144.38.0.0/16
- 146.86.0.0/17
- 146.86.192.0/18
- 158.91.0.0/16
- 160.7.0.0/17
- 160.7.128.0/18
- 160.7.192.0/19
- 160.7.224.0/21
- 161.28.0.0/16
- 163.6.0.0/16
- 163.248.0.0/17
- 163.248.128.0/17
- 192.80.27.0/24
- 192.107.180.0/23
- 198.60.2.0/24
- 198.60.4.0/23
- 198.60.8.0/21
- 198.60.16.0/24
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (2 total)
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 17 ROAs.
- 134.250.0.0/16 · max length /16
- 137.190.0.0/16 · max length /24
- 140.197.0.0/16 · max length /24
- 144.17.0.0/16 · max length /16
- 146.86.0.0/17 · max length /17
- 146.86.192.0/18 · max length /18
- 161.28.0.0/16 · max length /16
- 163.6.0.0/16 · max length /24
- 192.80.27.0/24 · max length /24
- 192.84.171.0/24 · max length /24
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS210.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 1,423,872
- Threat-listed addresses
- 3
- Threat density
- 0.0002 %
- Routed prefixes
- 29
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: computed.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 14 of this network’s 14 BGP neighbours.
- COGENT-174 - Cogent Communications, LLC · AS174
- CENTURYLINK-US-LEGACY-QWEST - CenturyLink Communications, LLC · AS209
- ZAYO-6461 - Zayo Bandwidth · AS6461
- BYU - Brigham Young University · AS6510
- HURRICANE - Hurricane Electric LLC · AS6939
- INTERNET2-I2PX - Internet2 · AS11164
- INTERNET2-RESEARCH-EDU - Internet2 · AS11537
- SUG-1 - State of Utah · AS11663
- SYRINGANETWORKS - Syringa Networks, LLC · AS15305
- UTAH - University of Utah · AS17055
- SLCC - Salt Lake Community College · AS18800
- USU-EDU - Utah State University · AS26046
- UTA-1 - Utah Transit Authority · AS30425
- PEERING-RESEARCH-TESTBED-USC-UFMG-AS47065 - USC / UFMG PEERING Research Testbed · AS47065
MOAS / hijack watch
1 announced prefix conflict with AS210 — another network announces the same address space. A sample:
Reputation
8.1reputation score (REPUTABLE)
AS210 (WEST-NET-WEST - Utah Education Network, US) has a reputation score of 75.8 (REPUTABLE).
- Threat density
- 90.0/100
- Graph metrics
- 90.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 75.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- Utah Education Network
- RIR
- ARIN
- Registered
- Tue, 01 Oct 1996 04:00:00 GMT
- Abuse contact
- abuse@uen.org
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS210 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.