Autonomous System
AS214481
Last fetched
AS214481 is operated by wczapkowicz-as - Wojciech Czapkowicz, registered in PL, and announces 14 prefixes to 21 BGP neighbours. AS214481 has a reputation score of 17.3 (NEUTRAL); 44 of its 2,560 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 14
- BGP neighbours
- 21
- RPKI ROAs
- 17
- MOAS conflicts
- 0
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 3,368
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 8
- Facilities
- 77
- Internet exchanges
- 4
- Customer degree
- 6
- Peer degree
- 1
- Provider degree
- 4
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (4 total)
Facilities (77 total)
- NIKHEF Amsterdam
- Telehouse - London (Docklands North)
- Moscow M9
- Equinix SK1 - Stockholm, Bromma
- Speedbone Berlin
- Equinix EN1 - Enschede
- Digital Realty AMS9 - Amsterdam
- BIT-1
- Telehouse - Paris 2 (Voltaire - Léon Frot)
- Equinix AM7 - Amsterdam, Kuiperberweg
- Digital Realty AMS17 - Amsterdam
- Digital Realty AMS3/5/7/8/10 - Amsterdam
- Digital Realty Frankfurt FRA1-27
- Equinix FR5 - Frankfurt, KleyerStrasse
- Digital Realty VIE1/2 - Vienna
- Equinix AM8 - Amsterdam, Gyroscoopweg
- Dataplex Budapest
- InterDC Doetinchem
- CE Colo Prague
- Digital Realty Marseille MRS1/2/3/4
- Digital Realty Stockholm STO1-6
- BIT-2
- Iron Mountain Data Center - Amsterdam (AMS-1)
- Equinix AM1/AM2 - Amsterdam, Luttenbergweg
- Linxdatacenter (Moscow)
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 17 ROAs.
- 141.11.62.0/24 · max length /24
- 143.20.64.0/24 · max length /24
- 143.20.97.0/24 · max length /24
- 191.96.11.0/24 · max length /24
- 2a0d:d940:200c::/48 · max length /48
- 2a0f:85c1:840::/48 · max length /48
- 2a12:bec4:12a2::/48 · max length /48
- 2a14:1ec7:1000::/36 · max length /48
- 2a14:67c3:2ac::/48 · max length /48
- 2a14:67c3:2af::/48 · max length /48
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS214481.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 2,560
- Threat-listed addresses
- 44
- Threat density
- 1.7188 %
- Routed prefixes
- 10
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: computed.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 21 of this network’s 21 BGP neighbours.
- HURRICANE - Hurricane Electric LLC · AS6939
- QC-NET - Qin Cloud Networks · AS7721
- NL-BIT - BIT BV · AS12859
- IMPUT - imput · AS16909
- SGGS-AS-AP - SG.GS · AS24482
- TUBE-HOSTING - Ferdinand Zink trading as Tube-Hosting · AS49581
- DIEDERIK-AS - Diederik Focko de Zee · AS50917
- RADZI - MOHD RAFIQ FITRI BIN ABDUL RADZI · AS198679
- SKYPASS-AS - SkyPass Solutions Sp. z o.o. · AS202520
- On1x - Erik Omarov · AS203534
- RAPDODGENET-ID - Rifqi Arief Pamungkas · AS203868
- zGato - Marc Gomez · AS205563
- IPPNOC - YAMAMOTO Hiroshi · AS213471
- Honeybank-Studios - Honeybank Studios LTD · AS213515
- JONRADEL - Jon Radel · AS213550
- ISPLABS - ISPLABS LIMITED · AS213905
- HORIZON-IT - Gijs van de Sande · AS214371
- Centerfield - Centerfield Ltd · AS214566
- WIRAPORTISPSERVICES-AS - Christian Wolfseher · AS214999
- Summerhosting - SummerHosting sp. z o. o. · AS215437
- PONENET - Z Plus LLC · AS399266
Reputation
17.3reputation score (NEUTRAL)
AS214481 (wczapkowicz-as - Wojciech Czapkowicz, PL) has a reputation score of 55.5 (NEUTRAL).
- Threat density
- 32.1/100
- Graph metrics
- 90.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 75.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- Wojciech Czapkowicz
- RIR
- RIPE
- Registered
- Tue, 23 Jul 2024 13:57:47 GMT
- Abuse contact
- abuse@chunkserve.pl
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS214481 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.