Autonomous System
AS23884
Last fetched
AS23884 is operated by PROENNET-AS - Proen Corp Public Company Limited., registered in TH, and announces 157 prefixes to 12 BGP neighbours. AS23884 has a reputation score of 9.9 (REPUTABLE); 14 of its 39,936 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 157
- BGP neighbours
- 12
- RPKI ROAs
- 189
- MOAS conflicts
- 0
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 3,816
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 6
- Facilities
- 10
- Internet exchanges
- 3
- Customer degree
- 4
- Peer degree
- 3
- Provider degree
- 6
- 43.255.60.0/24
- 43.255.61.0/24
- 43.255.60.0/22
- 43.255.62.0/24
- 43.255.63.0/24
- 45.112.64.0/24
- 45.112.65.0/24
- 45.112.66.0/24
- 45.112.67.0/24
- 49.50.232.0/24
- 49.50.233.0/24
- 49.50.232.0/22
- 49.50.234.0/24
- 49.50.235.0/24
- 78.142.244.0/22
- 103.13.228.0/23
- 103.13.230.0/23
- 103.51.10.0/24
- 103.51.11.0/24
- 103.76.180.0/22
- 103.80.216.0/24
- 103.80.217.0/24
- 103.80.216.0/22
- 103.80.218.0/24
- 103.80.219.0/24
Routing posture
- Hijack posture score
- 0.08
- Route leaks
- 4
Leak types observed: TYPE1_HAIRPIN_TURN, TYPE4_PEER_TO_PROVIDER.
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (3 total)
Facilities (10 total)
- CS LoxInfo Data Center - The Cloud
- TCC Technology Data Center- Bangkok,Thailand (TCC BNDC,TCC Bangna,TCCtech)
- NT Nonthaburi Telecommunication Center
- NT Bangrak Tower
- Arise IDC - Bangkok North 1, Thailand
- Arise IDC - Bangkok Central 1, Thailand
- Arise IDC - Bangkok Central 2, Thailand
- Tellus Data Center
- ETIX Bangkok #1
- Telehouse – Bangkok
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 189 ROAs.
- 103.13.228.0/22 · max length /24
- 103.246.188.0/22 · max length /24
- 103.76.180.0/22 · max length /24
- 103.80.216.0/22 · max length /24
- 111.223.32.0/21 · max length /21
- 111.223.32.0/24 · max length /24
- 111.223.33.0/24 · max length /24
- 111.223.34.0/24 · max length /24
- 111.223.35.0/24 · max length /24
- 111.223.36.0/24 · max length /24
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS23884.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 39,936
- Threat-listed addresses
- 14
- Threat density
- 0.0351 %
- Routed prefixes
- 151
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: computed.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 12 of this network’s 12 BGP neighbours.
- NTPCL-AS-AP - National Telecom Public Company Limited · AS4651
- TRUEINTERNET-AS-AP - TRUE INTERNET Co.,Ltd. · AS7470
- NETWAY-AS-AP - Netway Communication Co.,Ltd. · AS18362
- SGGS-AS-AP - SG.GS · AS24482
- IIT-TIG-AS-AP - True International Gateway Co., Ltd. · AS38082
- SBN-AWN-IIG-AS-AP - SBN-IIG/AWN-IIG transit provider · AS45430
- SBN-AWN-AS-02-AP - SBN-ISP/AWN-ISP and SBN-NIX/AWN-NIX · AS45458
- NEXUSGUARD-AS-AP - Nexusguard Pte. Ltd. · AS45474
- GARENA-SG - Garena Online Pte Ltd · AS58521
- ShopeeThailandCoLtd-AS-AP - Shopee (Thailand) Co., Ltd. · AS134592
- SHOPEE-AS-AP - SEA IX · AS137831
- MCL-AS-AP - Maxnito Company Limited · AS152734
Reputation
9.9reputation score (REPUTABLE)
AS23884 (PROENNET-AS - Proen Corp Public Company Limited., TH) has a reputation score of 70.2 (REPUTABLE).
- Threat density
- 67.0/100
- Graph metrics
- 90.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 85.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- Proen Corp Public Company Limited
- RIR
- APNIC
- Registered
- Thu, 04 Sep 2008 06:40:35 GMT
- Abuse contact
- APNIC@proen.co.th
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS23884 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.