Autonomous System
AS137831
Last fetched
AS137831 is operated by SHOPEE-AS-AP - SEA IX, registered in SG, and announces 5 prefixes to 38 BGP neighbours. AS137831 has a reputation score of 7.3 (REPUTABLE); 0 of its 1,280 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 5
- BGP neighbours
- 38
- RPKI ROAs
- 24
- MOAS conflicts
- 0
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 1,855
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 17
- Facilities
- 97
- Internet exchanges
- 14
- Customer degree
- 16
- Peer degree
- 62
- Provider degree
- 15
Routing posture
- Hijack posture score
- 0.20
- Origin mismatches
- 1
- Route leaks
- 1
Leak types observed: TYPE4_PEER_TO_PROVIDER.
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (14 total)
Facilities (97 total)
- Equinix DA1 - Dallas
- Equinix MI1 - Miami, NOTA
- Equinix DA3 - Dallas
- Equinix SP4 - São Paulo
- Biznet Jakarta
- Global Switch Singapore
- Equinix SG1 - Singapore
- AIMS Kuala Lumpur
- Equinix DA4 - Dallas
- Equinix SG2 - Singapore
- PIX Telium
- PIX Samm Florida
- Cirion Sao Paulo - SAO1
- Equinix MI3 - Miami, Boca Raton
- CSF CX1 / TelcoHub1 Kuala Lumpur
- Equinix SP2 - São Paulo
- TIVIT Sao Paulo
- PIX ALGAR-VRAO
- CX2 / MY01 Cyberjaya Malaysia
- CJ1 CYBERJAYA
- Equinix SP1 - São Paulo
- NTT Cyberjaya Data Center (CBJ)
- Eletronet - Sao Paulo
- Equinix SG3 - Singapore
- Equinix DA6 - Dallas
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 24 ROAs.
- 103.115.76.0/22 · max length /22
- 103.115.79.0/24 · max length /24
- 143.92.100.0/23 · max length /23
- 143.92.108.0/23 · max length /23
- 143.92.108.0/24 · max length /24
- 143.92.64.0/19 · max length /19
- 143.92.71.0/24 · max length /24
- 143.92.92.0/24 · max length /24
- 143.92.93.0/24 · max length /24
- 143.92.96.0/24 · max length /24
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS137831.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 1,280
- Threat-listed addresses
- 0
- Threat density
- 0.0000 %
- Routed prefixes
- 5
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: clean.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 25 of this network’s 38 BGP neighbours.
- TWELVE99 - Arelion Sweden AB · AS1299
- NTT-DATA-2914 - NTT America, Inc. · AS2914
- LEVEL3 - Level 3 Parent, LLC · AS3356
- ASN-TELSTRA-GLOBAL - Telstra Global · AS4637
- STARHUB-INTERNET - StarHub Ltd · AS4657
- INDOSAT-INP-AP - INDOSAT Internet Network Provider · AS4761
- ZAYO-6461 - Zayo Bandwidth · AS6461
- HURRICANE - Hurricane Electric LLC · AS6939
- VIETEL-AS-AP - Viettel Group · AS7552
- CONVERGE-AS - Converge ICT Solutions Inc. · AS17639
- NAPINFO-AS-AP - PT. NAP Info Lintas Nusa · AS17727
- INCAPSULA - Incapsula Inc · AS19551
- ZEN-ECN - Zenlayer Inc · AS21859
- PROENNET-AS - Proen Corp Public Company Limited. · AS23884
- SGGS-AS-AP - SG.GS · AS24482
- F5 - F5 Networks SARL · AS35280
- NEWMEDIAEXPRESS-AS-AP - NewMedia Express Pte Ltd · AS38001
- SBN-AWN-IIG-AS-AP - SBN-IIG/AWN-IIG transit provider · AS45430
- SBN-AWN-AS-02-AP - SBN-ISP/AWN-ISP and SBN-NIX/AWN-NIX · AS45458
- AS52468 - UFINET PANAMA S.A. · AS52468
- PGAS-AS-ID - PT. PGAS TELEKOMUNIKASI NUSANTARA · AS56258
- GARENA-SG - Garena Online Pte Ltd · AS58521
- IDNIC-GARENA-AS-ID - PT Garena Indonesia · AS58816
- CDSC-AS1 - CDS Global Cloud Co., Ltd · AS63199
- HOATHAI-VN - Hoa Thai Software Services Company Limited · AS63733
Reputation
7.3reputation score (REPUTABLE)
AS137831 (SHOPEE-AS-AP - SEA IX, SG) has a reputation score of 78.3 (REPUTABLE).
- Threat density
- 90.0/100
- Graph metrics
- 90.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 85.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- SHOPEE SINGAPORE PRIVATE LIMITED
- RIR
- APNIC
- Registered
- Mon, 14 May 2018 04:34:24 GMT
- Abuse contact
- noc@sea.com
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS137831 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.