Autonomous System
AS23910
Last fetched
AS23910 is operated by CNGI-CERNET2-AS-AP - China Next Generation Internet CERNET2, registered in CN, and announces 6 prefixes to 38 BGP neighbours. AS23910 has a reputation score of 12.5 (NEUTRAL); 0 of its 0 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 6
- BGP neighbours
- 38
- RPKI ROAs
- 4,099
- MOAS conflicts
- 0
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 81,055
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 1
- Facilities
- 0
- Internet exchanges
- 0
- Customer degree
- 0
- Peer degree
- 0
- Provider degree
- 0
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 4,099 ROAs.
- 2001:253::/32 · max length /32
- 2001:da8:20d::/48 · max length /48
- 240a:a000::/32 · max length /32
- 240a:a001::/32 · max length /32
- 240a:a002::/32 · max length /32
- 240a:a003::/32 · max length /32
- 240a:a004::/32 · max length /32
- 240a:a005::/32 · max length /32
- 240a:a006::/32 · max length /32
- 240a:a007::/32 · max length /32
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS23910.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 0
- Threat-listed addresses
- 0
- Threat density
- 0.0000 %
- Routed prefixes
- 0
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: no-routed-space.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 25 of this network’s 38 BGP neighbours.
- CHINANET-BACKBONE - No.31,Jin-rong Street · AS4134
- ERX-CERNET-BKB - China Education and Research Network Center · AS4538
- CNGI-BJIX-AS-AP - China Next Generation Internet Beijing IX · AS23911
- CNGI-BJ-IX2-AS-AP - CERNET2 IX at Tsinghua University · AS24348
- CNGI-BJ-IX3-AS-AP - CERNET2 IX at Peking University · AS24349
- CNGI-BJ-IX4-AS-AP - CERNET2 IX at Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications · AS24350
- CNGI-BJ-IX5-AS-AP - CERNET2 IX at Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics · AS24351
- CNGI-TJN-IX-AS-AP - CERNET2 IX at Tianjin University · AS24352
- CNGI-XA-IX-AS-AP - CERNET2 IX at Xi'an Jiaotong University · AS24353
- CNGI-LZH-IX-AS-AP - CERNET2 IX at Lanzhou University · AS24354
- CNGI-CD-IX-AS-AP - CERNET2 IX at University of Electronic Science and Technology of China · AS24355
- CNGI-CHQ-IX-AS-AP - CERNET2 IX at Chongqing University · AS24356
- CNGI-GZ-IX-AS-AP - CERNET2 IX at South China University of Technology · AS24357
- CNGI-WH-IX-AS-AP - CERNET2 IX at Huazhong University of Science and Technology · AS24358
- CNGI-CHS-IX-AS-AP - CERNET2 IX at Central South University · AS24359
- CNGI-ZHZ-IX-AS-AP - CERNET2 IX at Zhengzhou University · AS24360
- CNGI-NJ-IX-AS-AP - CERNET2 IX at Southeast University · AS24361
- CNGI-HEF-IX-AS-AP - CERNET2 IX at University of Science and Technology of China · AS24362
- CNGI-JNN-IX-AS-AP - CERNET2 IX at Shandong University · AS24363
- CNGI-SH-IX-AS-AP - CERNET2 IX at Shanghai Jiaotong University · AS24364
- CNGI-HZH-IX-AS-AP - CERNET2 IX at Zhejiang University · AS24367
- CNGI-SY-IX-AS-AP - CERNET2 IX at Northeast University · AS24369
- CNGI-DLN-IX-AS-AP - CERNET2 IX at Dalian University of Technology · AS24370
- CNGI-CHC-IX-AS-AP - CERNET2 IX at Jilin University · AS24371
- CNGI-HRB-IX-AS-AP - CERNET2 IX at Harbin Institute of Technology · AS24372
Reputation
12.5reputation score (NEUTRAL)
AS23910 (CNGI-CERNET2-AS-AP - China Next Generation Internet CERNET2, CN) has a reputation score of 65.0 (NEUTRAL).
- Threat density
- 50.0/100
- Graph metrics
- 80.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 85.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- China Next Generation Internet CERNET2
- RIR
- APNIC
- Registered
- Thu, 04 Sep 2008 06:40:35 GMT
- Abuse contact
- abuse@cernet.edu.cn
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS23910 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.