Autonomous System
AS4538
Last fetched
AS4538 is operated by ERX-CERNET-BKB - China Education and Research Network Center, registered in CN, and announces 5,161 prefixes to 37 BGP neighbours. AS4538 has a reputation score of 8.5 (REPUTABLE); 95 of its 17,170,432 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 5,161
- BGP neighbours
- 37
- RPKI ROAs
- 8,269
- MOAS conflicts
- 22
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 1,985
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 15
- Facilities
- 0
- Internet exchanges
- 0
- Customer degree
- 13
- Peer degree
- 29
- Provider degree
- 12
- 1.51.3.0/24
- 1.51.16.0/20
- 1.51.32.0/20
- 1.51.48.0/21
- 1.51.112.0/24
- 1.51.120.0/21
- 1.51.0.0/16
- 1.51.144.0/21
- 1.51.144.0/20
- 1.51.152.0/21
- 1.51.160.0/21
- 1.51.168.0/21
- 1.51.176.0/20
- 1.51.192.0/18
- 1.184.192.0/18
- 1.184.0.0/15
- 1.185.0.0/18
- 1.185.64.0/19
- 1.185.192.0/18
- 42.244.0.0/18
- 42.244.64.0/20
- 42.244.0.0/16
- 42.245.0.0/16
- 42.246.0.0/15
- 42.247.1.0/24
Routing posture
- Hijack posture score
- 0.29
- Origin mismatches
- 2
Signals
- critical-infrastructureServes infrastructure the internet depends on operationally.
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 8,269 ROAs.
- 1.51.112.0/24 · max length /24
- 1.51.3.0/24 · max length /24
- 1.51.48.0/21 · max length /21
- 1.51.54.0/24 · max length /24
- 101.4.128.0/24 · max length /24
- 101.4.140.0/24 · max length /24
- 101.4.156.0/24 · max length /24
- 101.4.2.0/24 · max length /24
- 101.4.56.0/24 · max length /24
- 101.4.63.0/24 · max length /24
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS4538.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 17,170,432
- Threat-listed addresses
- 95
- Threat density
- 0.0006 %
- Routed prefixes
- 5,151
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: computed.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 25 of this network’s 37 BGP neighbours.
- COGENT-174 - Cogent Communications, LLC · AS174
- TWELVE99 - Arelion Sweden AB · AS1299
- NTT-DATA-2914 - NTT America, Inc. · AS2914
- PCCWG-APAC-HK - PCCW Global (HK) Ltd. · AS3491
- CHINANET-BACKBONE - No.31,Jin-rong Street · AS4134
- HKIX-RS1 - Hong Kong Internet Exchange--Route Server 1 · AS4635
- CHINA169-Backbone - CHINA UNICOM China169 Backbone · AS4837
- AS6453 - TATA COMMUNICATIONS (AMERICA) INC · AS6453
- HURRICANE - Hurricane Electric LLC · AS6939
- CSTNET-AS-AP - Computer Network Information Center of Chinese Academy of Sciences (CNIC-CAS) · AS7497
- APAN-JP - Asia Pacific Advanced Network - Japan · AS7660
- MTS - MTS PJSC · AS8359
- TPS-CN-AS - Test platform Service Center · AS9405
- GEANT - GEANT Vereniging · AS20965
- CTGNet - CTGNet · AS23764
- CNGI-CERNET2-AS-AP - China Next Generation Internet CERNET2 · AS23910
- CNGI-BJIX-AS-AP - China Next Generation Internet Beijing IX · AS23911
- NGDC-AS-AP - Net-Glyph Data Center · AS24310
- CNGI-BJ-IX2-AS-AP - CERNET2 IX at Tsinghua University · AS24348
- CNGI-BJ-IX3-AS-AP - CERNET2 IX at Peking University · AS24349
- CNGI-TJN-IX-AS-AP - CERNET2 IX at Tianjin University · AS24352
- CNGI-XA-IX-AS-AP - CERNET2 IX at Xi'an Jiaotong University · AS24353
- CNGI-GZ-IX-AS-AP - CERNET2 IX at South China University of Technology · AS24357
- CNGI-NJ-IX-AS-AP - CERNET2 IX at Southeast University · AS24361
- CNGI-SH-IX-AS-AP - CERNET2 IX at Shanghai Jiaotong University · AS24364
MOAS / hijack watch
22 announced prefixes conflict with AS4538 — another network announces the same address space. A sample:
Reputation
8.5reputation score (REPUTABLE)
AS4538 (ERX-CERNET-BKB - China Education and Research Network Center, CN) has a reputation score of 74.6 (REPUTABLE).
- Threat density
- 86.8/100
- Graph metrics
- 90.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 75.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- China Education and Research Network Center
- RIR
- APNIC
- Registered
- Thu, 04 Sep 2008 06:40:34 GMT
- Abuse contact
- abuse@cernet.edu.cn
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS4538 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.