Autonomous System
AS23961
Last fetched
AS23961 is operated by MNI-AS-AP - Misaka Network, Inc., registered in US, and announces 19 prefixes to 26 BGP neighbours. AS23961 has a reputation score of 15.9 (NEUTRAL); 3 of its 3,328 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 19
- BGP neighbours
- 26
- RPKI ROAs
- 652
- MOAS conflicts
- 4
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 1,299
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 28
- Facilities
- 4
- Internet exchanges
- 0
- Customer degree
- 21
- Peer degree
- 3
- Provider degree
- 6
- 45.11.104.0/24
- 45.150.242.0/24
- 45.150.242.0/23
- 156.0.200.0/23
- 156.0.202.0/23
- 194.104.146.0/24
- 194.104.146.0/23
- 194.104.147.0/24
- 194.114.138.0/23
- 194.114.139.0/24
- 194.156.162.0/24
- 194.156.162.0/23
- 194.156.163.0/24
- 2407:b9c0:b000::/36
- 2407:b9c0:e000::/36
- 2407:b9c0:e800::/40
- 2407:b9c0:f000::/44
- 2407:b9c0:fa00::/44
- 2407:b9c0:ffb0::/48
Routing posture
- Hijack posture score
- 0.05
- Route leaks
- 2
Leak types observed: TYPE1_HAIRPIN_TURN.
Infrastructure presence
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 652 ROAs.
- 2407:b9c0::/32 · max length /48
- 2407:b9c0:b000::/36 · max length /48
- 2407:b9c0:f000::/36 · max length /48
- 156.0.200.0/23
- 156.0.202.0/23
- 2407:b9c0:6100::/40
- 2407:b9c0:6100::/41
- 2407:b9c0:6100::/42
- 2407:b9c0:6100::/43
- 2407:b9c0:6100::/44
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS23961.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 3,328
- Threat-listed addresses
- 3
- Threat density
- 0.0901 %
- Routed prefixes
- 13
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: computed.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 25 of this network’s 26 BGP neighbours.
- IPXO - IPXO LLC · AS834
- MISAKA - Misaka Network, Inc. · AS917
- MISAKA3 - Misaka Network, Inc. · AS969
- BSL-AS-AP - Beyotta Services LLP · AS997
- nextdns - NextDNS, Inc. · AS34939
- MISAKA-BIZNET-AS - Misaka Network, Inc. · AS36260
- OWL - Owl Limited · AS43357
- KOSAKA - Xiaodong Qi · AS49904
- MISAKA - Misaka Network, Inc. · AS57695
- MARIA-AS - MARIA STYLE LTD · AS58339
- CDN77 - Datacamp Limited · AS60068
- DEADBEEF-AS - 0xDEADBEEF LTD · AS60326
- AS-49NET - Jie Zheng · AS62230
- PNI-AS-TW - Pittqiao Network Information Co.,Ltd. · AS131642
- SDCL-AS-AP - Sky Digital Co., Ltd. · AS134823
- IPIP-CN - Beijing Tiantexin Tech. Co., Ltd. · AS136180
- GSLNETWORKS-AS-AP - GSL Networks Pty LTD · AS137409
- MNI-AS-AP - Misaka Network, Inc. · AS142616
- HARUUE-AS-AP - Haruue Network Limited · AS146950
- CATOFES - Hao Qiao · AS205651
- AS_ZZ - Zhang Zongyu · AS207338
- DJVG - Daan van Gorkum · AS209792
- WALS5H-AS - Licheng MAO · AS210041
- TW-DANNY-AS - WeiXuan Chang · AS212358
- SECUREPEAK - Alex Terrats Ciberseguretat SLU · AS216096
MOAS / hijack watch
4 announced prefixes conflict with AS23961 — another network announces the same address space. A sample:
Reputation
15.9reputation score (NEUTRAL)
AS23961 (MNI-AS-AP - Misaka Network, Inc., US) has a reputation score of 58.1 (NEUTRAL).
- Threat density
- 32.5/100
- Graph metrics
- 90.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 85.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- Misaka Network, Inc.
- RIR
- APNIC
- Registered
- Tue, 15 Mar 2022 01:05:57 GMT
- Abuse contact
- abuse-sg@misaka.email
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS23961 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.