Autonomous System
AS60326
Last fetched
AS60326 is operated by DEADBEEF-AS - 0xDEADBEEF LTD, registered in SC, and announces 16 prefixes to 6 BGP neighbours. AS60326 has a reputation score of 9.3 (REPUTABLE); 0 of its 1,024 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 16
- BGP neighbours
- 6
- RPKI ROAs
- 9
- MOAS conflicts
- 0
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 31,837
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 1
- Facilities
- 139
- Internet exchanges
- 13
- Customer degree
- 0
- Peer degree
- 47
- Provider degree
- 5
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (13 total)
Facilities (139 total)
- Telehouse - London (Docklands North)
- NIKHEF Amsterdam
- Digital Realty BRU1 - Brussels
- Equinix AM7 - Amsterdam, Kuiperberweg
- Global Switch Amsterdam
- Digital Realty AMS3/5/7/8/10 - Amsterdam
- Digital Realty Frankfurt FRA1-27
- ITENOS Frankfurt (FRA1)
- Equinix FR5 - Frankfurt, KleyerStrasse
- Digital Realty AMS17 - Amsterdam
- Telehouse - Paris 2 (Voltaire - Léon Frot)
- Equinix LD8 - London, Docklands
- Telehouse - London (Docklands East)
- Digital Realty London LHR20
- Equinix SE2/SE3 - Seattle
- Equinix AM8 - Amsterdam, Gyroscoopweg
- Digital Realty Zurich ZUR1
- Equinix FR7 - Frankfurt, Gutleutstrasse
- Digital Realty Seattle SEA10
- Equinix EN1 - Enschede
- Digital Realty Frankfurt FRA28 (Closed)
- Digital Realty Dusseldorf DUS1-3
- Telehouse - Frankfurt
- EdgeConneX Munich (EDCMUC01)
- Digital Realty AMS9 - Amsterdam
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 9 of this network’s 9 ROAs.
- 208.73.213.0/24 · max length /24
- 208.73.214.0/24 · max length /24
- 2602:fb92::/38 · max length /48
- 177.177.224.0/24 · max length /24
- 177.177.225.0/24 · max length /24
- 2a06:a005:8f0::/44 · max length /48
- 2a0c:e642::/32 · max length /48
- 2a0e:aa07:f080::/44 · max length /48
- 2a0e:aa07:f090::/44 · max length /48
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS60326.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 1,024
- Threat-listed addresses
- 0
- Threat density
- 0.0000 %
- Routed prefixes
- 4
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: clean.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 6 of this network’s 6 BGP neighbours.
- MISAKA - Misaka Network, Inc. · AS917
- XTOM-V-PS - xTom OU · AS3204
- HURRICANE - Hurricane Electric LLC · AS6939
- RETN-AS - RETN Limited · AS9002
- MNI-AS-AP - Misaka Network, Inc. · AS23961
- NETONE-NL - Peter-Paul Maria Kurstjens · AS200132
Reputation
9.3reputation score (REPUTABLE)
AS60326 (DEADBEEF-AS - 0xDEADBEEF LTD, SC) has a reputation score of 72.0 (REPUTABLE).
- Threat density
- 90.0/100
- Graph metrics
- 65.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 85.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- 0xDEADBEEF LTD
- RIR
- RIPE
- Registered
- Wed, 20 Apr 2022 11:43:01 GMT
- Abuse contact
- abuse@deadbeef.foo
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS60326 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.