Autonomous System
AS24187
Last fetched
AS24187 is operated by KIRZ-AS-TH - KIRZ Service Provider, registered in TH, and announces 86 prefixes to 7 BGP neighbours. AS24187 has a reputation score of 12.3 (NEUTRAL); 2 of its 21,504 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 86
- BGP neighbours
- 7
- RPKI ROAs
- 166
- MOAS conflicts
- 0
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 6,464
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 3
- Facilities
- 14
- Internet exchanges
- 5
- Customer degree
- 2
- Peer degree
- 2
- Provider degree
- 4
- 27.131.128.0/24
- 27.131.129.0/24
- 27.131.130.0/24
- 27.131.131.0/24
- 27.131.132.0/24
- 27.131.133.0/24
- 27.131.134.0/24
- 27.131.135.0/24
- 27.131.136.0/24
- 27.131.137.0/24
- 27.131.138.0/24
- 27.131.139.0/24
- 27.131.140.0/24
- 27.131.141.0/24
- 27.131.142.0/24
- 27.131.143.0/24
- 27.131.144.0/24
- 27.131.145.0/24
- 27.131.146.0/24
- 27.131.147.0/24
- 27.131.148.0/24
- 27.131.149.0/24
- 27.131.150.0/24
- 27.131.151.0/24
- 27.131.152.0/24
Routing posture
- Hijack posture score
- 0.04
- Route leaks
- 2
Leak types observed: TYPE4_PEER_TO_PROVIDER.
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (5 total)
Facilities (14 total)
- AIMS Kuala Lumpur
- TCC Technology Data Center - Bangkok,Thailand (TCC ETDC , TCCtech)
- CS LoxInfo Data Center - The Cloud
- TCC Technology Data Center- Bangkok,Thailand (TCC BNDC,TCC Bangna,TCCtech)
- NT Nonthaburi Telecommunication Center
- NT Bangrak Tower
- Arise IDC - Bangkok North 1, Thailand
- Arise IDC - Bangkok Central 1, Thailand
- Arise IDC - Bangkok Central 2, Thailand
- Tellus Data Center
- ETIX Bangkok #1
- AIMS Bangkok 44 N Sathon Rd
- Telehouse – Bangkok
- STT Bangkok 3
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 166 ROAs.
- 103.109.60.0/22 · max length /24
- 202.173.208.0/20 · max length /24
- 2407:7a00::/32 · max length /40
- 27.131.128.0/18 · max length /24
- 103.109.60.0/23
- 103.109.60.0/24
- 103.109.61.0/24
- 103.109.62.0/23
- 103.109.62.0/24
- 103.109.63.0/24
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS24187.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 21,504
- Threat-listed addresses
- 2
- Threat density
- 0.0093 %
- Routed prefixes
- 85
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: computed.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 7 of this network’s 7 BGP neighbours.
- NTPCL-AS-AP - National Telecom Public Company Limited · AS4651
- HUTCHISON-AS-AP - HGC Global Communications Limited · AS9304
- NTPCL-AS-AP - National Telecom Public Company Limited · AS9931
- IIT-TIG-AS-AP - True International Gateway Co., Ltd. · AS38082
- BOONTHAVORN-TH-AS-AP - Boonthavorn Co., Ltd. · AS45197
- SBN-AWN-IIG-AS-AP - SBN-IIG/AWN-IIG transit provider · AS45430
- UOB-AS-AP - UOB Asset Management (Thailand) Co., Ltd. · AS136158
Reputation
12.3reputation score (NEUTRAL)
AS24187 (KIRZ-AS-TH - KIRZ Service Provider, TH) has a reputation score of 65.5 (NEUTRAL).
- Threat density
- 78.5/100
- Graph metrics
- 55.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 85.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- KIRZ Company Limited
- RIR
- APNIC
- Registered
- Thu, 04 Sep 2008 06:40:38 GMT
- Abuse contact
- gun@kirz.com
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS24187 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.