Autonomous System
AS2500
Last fetched
AS2500 is operated by WIDE-BB - WIDE Project, registered in JP, and announces 4 prefixes to 14 BGP neighbours. AS2500 has a reputation score of 7.3 (REPUTABLE); 1 of its 65,536 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 4
- BGP neighbours
- 14
- RPKI ROAs
- 6
- MOAS conflicts
- 0
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 319
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 163
- Facilities
- 25
- Internet exchanges
- 4
- Customer degree
- 18
- Peer degree
- 307
- Provider degree
- 2
Routing posture
- Hijack posture score
- 0.04
- Route leaks
- 2
Leak types observed: TYPE2_LATERAL_PEER_TO_PEER, TYPE4_PEER_TO_PROVIDER.
Signals
- critical-infrastructureServes infrastructure the internet depends on operationally.
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (4 total)
Facilities (25 total)
- Telehouse – TOKYO Otemachi (KDDI Otemachi)
- Equinix SG1 - Singapore
- Global Switch Singapore
- Equinix TY2 - Tokyo
- Digital Edge TYO2 (ComSpace 1) - Tokyo
- NTT DATA Otemachi Bldg
- Equinix SG2 - Singapore
- AT TOKYO (CC1/CC2)
- COLT in Asia Tokyo Data Center 1 (TDC1)
- Equinix TY4 - Tokyo
- Equinix SG3 - Singapore
- FRT iDC Okinawa
- Colt DC Tokyo II
- STT Singapore 5
- Otemachi Place West Tower (BBTower Shin-Otemachi)
- NTT DOCOMO BUSINESS Tokyo (NW1)
- NTT DOCOMO BUSINESS TK1 - Tokyo (NTT Otemachi)
- Equinix TY11 - Tokyo
- Digital Realty Tokyo - NRT10
- SCSK netXDC (SI1/SI2/SI3)/NEC Inzai DC
- Maruyama Cable Landing Station
- 仙台中央データセンター
- Equinix SG5 - Singapore
- SoftBank Tokyo No. 4
- AT TOKYO (CC3)
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 6 of this network’s 6 ROAs.
- 2001:200::/32 · max length /32
- 202.249.0.0/17 · max length /18
- 203.178.128.0/17 · max length /17
- 203.178.128.0/18 · max length /18
- 203.178.128.0/19 · max length /19
- 203.178.136.0/21 · max length /21
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS2500.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 65,536
- Threat-listed addresses
- 1
- Threat density
- 0.0015 %
- Routed prefixes
- 3
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: computed.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 14 of this network’s 14 BGP neighbours.
- SINET-AS - Research Organization of Information and Systems, National Institute of Informatics · AS2907
- NTT-DATA-2914 - NTT America, Inc. · AS2914
- WIDE-SFO - WIDE Project · AS4690
- OCN - NTT DOCOMO BUSINESS,Inc. · AS4713
- AI3 - WIDE Project · AS4717
- HURRICANE - Hurricane Electric LLC · AS6939
- BBTower-Lab - BroadBand Tower, Inc. · AS7530
- GIGAINFRA - SoftBank Corp. · AS17676
- JAIST - Japan Advanced Institute of Science and Technology · AS17932
- NDA - National Defense Academy · AS23799
- JAIST-EXP - Japan Advanced Institute of Science and Technology · AS55384
- CUC - Chiba University of Commerce · AS63783
- NAIST-AS - Nara Institute of Science and Technology, National University Corporation · AS131158
- AIPL-AS-AP - APIDT Infrastructure Pty Ltd · AS141682
Reputation
7.3reputation score (REPUTABLE)
AS2500 (WIDE-BB - WIDE Project, JP) has a reputation score of 78.3 (REPUTABLE).
- Threat density
- 90.0/100
- Graph metrics
- 90.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 85.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- WIDE Project
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS2500 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.