Autonomous System
AS25400
Last fetched
AS25400 is operated by TELIA-NORWAY-AS - Telia Norge AS, registered in NO, and announces 134 prefixes to 30 BGP neighbours. AS25400 has a reputation score of 8.7 (REPUTABLE); 65 of its 1,633,280 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 134
- BGP neighbours
- 30
- RPKI ROAs
- 95
- MOAS conflicts
- 0
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 886
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 46
- Facilities
- 9
- Internet exchanges
- 3
- Customer degree
- 36
- Peer degree
- 5
- Provider degree
- 2
- 5.83.224.0/21
- 5.153.104.0/21
- 37.44.160.0/19
- 46.15.0.0/16
- 46.212.0.0/17
- 46.212.128.0/17
- 62.73.192.0/18
- 62.97.160.0/19
- 62.113.128.0/19
- 62.141.128.0/19
- 78.156.0.0/19
- 79.174.16.0/24
- 79.174.18.0/24
- 79.174.19.0/24
- 80.232.0.0/17
- 80.239.0.0/17
- 80.254.32.0/20
- 83.243.128.0/19
- 83.243.160.0/19
- 83.243.192.0/20
- 83.243.208.0/20
- 83.243.224.0/19
- 84.38.144.0/20
- 84.208.0.0/17
- 84.208.128.0/17
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (3 total)
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 95 ROAs.
- 109.108.192.0/19 · max length /19
- 109.163.0.0/17 · max length /17
- 109.163.124.0/24 · max length /24
- 158.58.152.0/21 · max length /21
- 158.58.152.0/23 · max length /23
- 176.11.0.0/16 · max length /16
- 176.74.208.0/21 · max length /21
- 178.17.144.0/20 · max length /20
- 178.232.0.0/16 · max length /16
- 185.138.32.0/22 · max length /22
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS25400.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 1,633,280
- Threat-listed addresses
- 65
- Threat density
- 0.0040 %
- Routed prefixes
- 128
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: computed.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 25 of this network’s 30 BGP neighbours.
- TWELVE99 - Arelion Sweden AB · AS1299
- TDC - TDC Holding A/S · AS3292
- NET-CPRK - Speedcast Communications, Inc · AS4913
- HURRICANE - Hurricane Electric LLC · AS6939
- MIMER - Tafjord Connect AS · AS15765
- Schibsted - Schibsted Media AS · AS21171
- ASN-NRK - Norsk Rikskringkasting AS · AS21293
- LOGNO-AS - CGI Norge AS · AS25225
- STIM-COMPUTING-AS - ADVANIA NORGE AS · AS31264
- Telia-Lietuva - Telia Lietuva, AB · AS43811
- BITPRO - Bitpro · AS44764
- Zones-AS - ZONES AS · AS49082
- NORDEF - IKT-KAPASITETER · AS49278
- UPC-AS - Telia Norge AS · AS49455
- NPT - Nasjonal kommunikasjonsmyndighet · AS50270
- BLIX - Blix Solutions AS · AS50304
- E-CO - Hafslund Kraft AS · AS59978
- RISSAKRAFTLAG-AS - Rissa Kraftlag SA · AS62002
- NETSCENARIO - ADVANIA NORGE AS · AS197519
- PHONERO - Telia Norge AS · AS198309
- INFRAGREEN - Bulk Infrastructure Holding AS · AS199339
- STATENS-VEGVESEN - Statens Vegvesen · AS200139
- Nordfiber - NORDFIBER AS · AS203779
- AGDER-ENERGI-NORWAY - A ENERGI AS · AS206993
- VIPPS-AS - STO AS · AS207674
Reputation
8.7reputation score (REPUTABLE)
AS25400 (TELIA-NORWAY-AS - Telia Norge AS, NO) has a reputation score of 73.9 (REPUTABLE).
- Threat density
- 84.6/100
- Graph metrics
- 80.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 85.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- Telia Norge AS
- RIR
- RIPE
- Registered
- Tue, 12 Nov 2002 14:06:12 GMT
- Abuse contact
- abuse@telia-isp.no
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS25400 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.