Autonomous System
AS3292
Last fetched
AS3292 is operated by TDC - TDC Holding A/S, registered in DK, and announces 174 prefixes to 107 BGP neighbours. AS3292 has a reputation score of 8.1 (REPUTABLE); 61 of its 5,185,024 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 174
- BGP neighbours
- 107
- RPKI ROAs
- 140
- MOAS conflicts
- 0
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 386
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 135
- Facilities
- 207
- Internet exchanges
- 22
- Customer degree
- 98
- Peer degree
- 70
- Provider degree
- 5
- 2.104.0.0/14
- 2.108.0.0/15
- 2.110.0.0/20
- 2.110.16.0/22
- 2.110.32.0/20
- 2.111.0.0/16
- 5.44.136.0/24
- 5.44.136.0/21
- 45.65.84.0/22
- 62.80.203.0/24
- 62.80.205.0/24
- 62.135.128.0/17
- 62.242.0.0/15
- 80.62.0.0/15
- 80.91.128.0/20
- 80.160.0.0/13
- 80.196.0.0/14
- 80.245.100.0/22
- 81.31.80.0/20
- 83.88.0.0/14
- 83.92.0.0/15
- 83.94.0.0/18
- 83.94.96.0/19
- 83.94.128.0/17
- 83.95.0.0/16
Routing posture
- Hijack posture score
- 0.05
- Route leaks
- 2
Leak types observed: TYPE2_LATERAL_PEER_TO_PEER.
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (22 total)
- LINX LON1
- Equinix New York
- AMS-IX
- DE-CIX Frankfurt
- NL-ix
- DE-CIX Helsinki
- DE-CIX Copenhagen
- DE-CIX Oslo
- DE-CIX New York
- Netnod Stockholm GREEN -- MTU4470
- Netnod Stockholm BLUE -- MTU1500
- Netnod Stockholm BLUE -- MTU4470
- Netnod Copenhagen BLUE -- MTU9K
- Equinix Palo Alto
- Equinix San Jose
- Equinix Ashburn
- DE-CIX Stockholm
- Peering.cz
- Netnod Copenhagen GREEN -- MTU9K
- 1-IX EU
- Netnod Stockholm GREEN -- MTU1500
- DE-CIX Hamburg
Facilities (207 total)
- Equinix DC1-DC15,DC21-DC22 - Ashburn
- Equinix SV8 - Silicon Valley, Palo Alto
- Equinix SV1/SV5/SV10 - Silicon Valley, San Jose
- Equinix NY1 - New York, Newark
- Digital Realty NYC (60 Hudson)
- Digital Realty NYC (111 8th Ave)
- NIKHEF Amsterdam
- Telehouse - London (Docklands North)
- Equinix NY2/NY4/NY5/NY6 - New York, Secaucus
- Telehouse - London (Docklands East)
- Equinix NY9 - New York, 111 8th Avenue
- Digital Realty London LHR20
- Digital Realty London LHR19
- Equinix LD8 - London, Docklands
- Digital Realty London LON1-3
- Telehouse - Paris 2 (Voltaire - Léon Frot)
- ITENOS Frankfurt (FRA1)
- Digital Realty Frankfurt FRA1-27
- Digital Realty AMS17 - Amsterdam
- Equinix FR5 - Frankfurt, KleyerStrasse
- Global Switch Amsterdam
- Equinix AM7 - Amsterdam, Kuiperberweg
- Digital Realty AMS3/5/7/8/10 - Amsterdam
- Digital Realty VIE1/2 - Vienna
- Digital Realty BRU1 - Brussels
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 140 ROAs.
- 104.77.212.0/22 · max length /22
- 136.238.207.0/24
- 192.23.171.0/24
- 192.66.124.0/23
- 193.163.136.0/23
- 199.229.140.0/22
- 199.229.178.0/24
- 128.76.0.0/18 · max length /18
- 128.76.128.0/17 · max length /17
- 128.77.128.0/17 · max length /17
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS3292.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 5,185,024
- Threat-listed addresses
- 61
- Threat density
- 0.0012 %
- Routed prefixes
- 170
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: computed.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 25 of this network’s 107 BGP neighbours.
- DK-CUROTEC - CuroTec ApS · AS692
- TWELVE99 - Arelion Sweden AB · AS1299
- NEXTLAYER-AS - Next Layer Telekommunikationsdienstleistungs- und Beratungs GmbH · AS1764
- GREEN - green.ch AG · AS1836
- GTT-BACKBONE - GTT Communications Inc. · AS3257
- DTAG - Deutsche Telekom AG · AS3320
- Cibicom-IP-Network - Cibicom A/S · AS3342
- ASN-TELSTRA-GLOBAL - Telstra Global · AS4637
- AS6453 - TATA COMMUNICATIONS (AMERICA) INC · AS6453
- HURRICANE - Hurricane Electric LLC · AS6939
- TELENOR-SE - Telenor Sverige AB · AS8434
- RETN-AS - RETN Limited · AS9002
- M247 - M247 Europe SRL · AS9009
- WEBPARTNER - Norlys Telco A/S · AS9167
- DanskeBank-AS - Den Danske Bank A/S · AS12483
- GOTANET - Gotalandsnatet AB · AS12597
- DK-DANSKKABELTV - DKTV A/S · AS15516
- HANSEN-AU - Hansen Technologies Doncaster · AS24008
- AEGIS - Dentsu Danmark A/S · AS24584
- BORNFIBER - BornFiber Service Provider ApS · AS24800
- MYLOC-AS - WIIT AG · AS24961
- TELIA-NORWAY-AS - Telia Norge AS · AS25400
- AS29156 - DXC Technology Danmark A/S · AS29156
- DANMARKS-RADIO-AS - DR · AS29266
- GRUNDFOS-AS - Grundfos Holding A/S · AS31131
Reputation
8.1reputation score (REPUTABLE)
AS3292 (TDC - TDC Holding A/S, DK) has a reputation score of 75.8 (REPUTABLE).
- Threat density
- 90.0/100
- Graph metrics
- 90.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 75.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- TDC Holding A/S
- RIR
- RIPE
- Registered
- Fri, 20 Sep 2002 11:14:32 GMT
- Abuse contact
- postmaster@abuse.mail.dk
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS3292 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.