Autonomous System
AS271
Last fetched
AS271 is operated by BCNET-AS - BCNET, registered in CA, and announces 127 prefixes to 22 BGP neighbours. AS271 has a reputation score of 9.1 (REPUTABLE); 0 of its 428,544 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 127
- BGP neighbours
- 22
- RPKI ROAs
- 148
- MOAS conflicts
- 0
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 1,673
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 19
- Facilities
- 11
- Internet exchanges
- 1
- Customer degree
- 17
- Peer degree
- 3
- Provider degree
- 4
- 104.128.240.0/20
- 128.189.4.0/23
- 128.189.5.0/24
- 128.189.6.0/24
- 128.189.0.0/16
- 134.87.0.0/24
- 134.87.1.0/24
- 134.87.2.0/24
- 134.87.3.0/24
- 134.87.4.0/23
- 134.87.6.0/24
- 134.87.7.0/24
- 134.87.24.0/22
- 134.87.112.0/23
- 134.87.0.0/16
- 140.161.224.0/24
- 140.161.225.0/24
- 142.231.1.0/24
- 142.231.2.0/24
- 142.231.4.0/24
- 142.231.7.0/24
- 142.231.16.0/24
- 142.231.106.0/23
- 142.231.109.0/24
- 142.231.110.0/24
Routing posture
- Hijack posture score
- 0.29
- Origin mismatches
- 2
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (1 total)
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 148 ROAs.
- 104.128.240.0/20 · max length /20
- 128.189.4.0/23 · max length /23
- 128.189.5.0/24 · max length /24
- 128.189.6.0/24 · max length /24
- 134.87.0.0/24 · max length /24
- 134.87.1.0/24 · max length /24
- 134.87.112.0/23 · max length /23
- 134.87.112.0/24 · max length /24
- 134.87.2.0/24 · max length /24
- 134.87.24.0/22 · max length /22
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS271.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 428,544
- Threat-listed addresses
- 0
- Threat density
- 0.0000 %
- Routed prefixes
- 91
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: clean.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 22 of this network’s 22 BGP neighbours.
- TWELVE99 - Arelion Sweden AB · AS1299
- BCIT - British Columbia Institute of Technology · AS4476
- SHAW - Shaw Communications · AS6327
- CANARIE-NTN - CANARIE Inc · AS6509
- HURRICANE - Hurricane Electric LLC · AS6939
- SFU-AS - Simon Fraser University · AS11105
- KPU-CA-AS-1 - Kwantlen Polytechnic University · AS13764
- UVIC-AS - University of Victoria · AS16462
- FIBRENOIRE-INTERNET - Videotron Ltee · AS22652
- VCC - Vancouver Community College · AS33314
- NHA-ASN1 - Northern Health Authority · AS36000
- TRIUMF - TRIUMF INC. · AS36391
- CAMOSUN - Camosun College · AS62692
- UBC - University of British Columbia · AS393249
- UNBC - The University of Northern British Columbia · AS393981
- CLOUDSINGULARITY - Tech Futures Interactive Inc. · AS394256
- OKANAG-1-ASN - Okanagan College · AS394971
- DOUGLASCOLLEGE - Douglas College · AS395064
- AS-SELKIR - Selkirk College · AS395807
- COTR-AS - College of the Rockies · AS395991
- PHSA-INTERNET - PROVINCIAL HEALTH SERVICES AUTHORITY · AS397375
- RRU-VIC-01 - Royal Roads University · AS397543
Reputation
9.1reputation score (REPUTABLE)
AS271 (BCNET-AS - BCNET, CA) has a reputation score of 72.8 (REPUTABLE).
- Threat density
- 81.4/100
- Graph metrics
- 90.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 75.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- BCNET
- RIR
- ARIN
- Registered
- Fri, 24 Feb 1989 05:00:00 GMT
- Abuse contact
- bcnet-arin-abuse@bc.net
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS271 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.