Autonomous System
AS27984
Last fetched
AS27984 is operated by AS27984 - Ver Tv S.A., registered in AR, and announces 21 prefixes to 6 BGP neighbours. AS27984 has a reputation score of 15.9 (NEUTRAL); 16 of its 76,800 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 21
- BGP neighbours
- 6
- RPKI ROAs
- 9
- MOAS conflicts
- 0
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 8,168
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 2
- Facilities
- 31
- Internet exchanges
- 1
- Customer degree
- 1
- Peer degree
- 3
- Provider degree
- 3
- 138.117.20.0/23
- 138.117.20.0/22
- 138.117.22.0/23
- 168.90.84.0/22
- 168.194.232.0/23
- 168.194.232.0/22
- 168.194.234.0/23
- 181.16.0.0/18
- 181.16.64.0/18
- 181.192.32.0/19
- 181.192.59.0/24
- 181.192.61.0/24
- 190.105.0.0/24
- 190.105.1.0/24
- 190.105.0.0/18
- 190.105.32.0/20
- 190.105.80.0/20
- 190.105.64.0/18
- 190.105.104.0/24
- 190.105.105.0/24
- 2800:af0::/32
Routing posture
- Hijack posture score
- 0.02
- Route leaks
- 1
Leak types observed: TYPE4_PEER_TO_PROVIDER.
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (1 total)
Facilities (31 total)
- Cirion Buenos Aires - BUE1
- Cabase BUE
- Metrotel - CPS Comunicaciones
- EdgeConneX Buenos Aires (EDCBUE01)
- Cabase SLU
- Cabase SZP
- Cabase JUN
- Cabase POS
- Cabase MDQ
- Cabase PMY
- Cabase BRC
- Cabase DLC
- Cabase SFE
- Cabase LPL
- Cabase COR
- Cabase ROS
- Cabase NQN
- Cabase MZA
- Cabase BHB
- Cabase NGB
- Cabase PER
- Cabase SLT
- Cabase VDM
- Cabase RCU
- Cabase RGL
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 9 of this network’s 9 ROAs.
- 138.117.20.0/22 · max length /24
- 168.194.232.0/22 · max length /24
- 168.90.84.0/22 · max length /24
- 181.16.0.0/18 · max length /24
- 181.16.64.0/18 · max length /24
- 181.192.32.0/19 · max length /24
- 190.105.0.0/18 · max length /24
- 190.105.64.0/18 · max length /24
- 2800:af0::/32 · max length /48
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS27984.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 76,800
- Threat-listed addresses
- 16
- Threat density
- 0.0208 %
- Routed prefixes
- 20
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: computed.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 6 of this network’s 6 BGP neighbours.
- COGENT-174 - Cogent Communications, LLC · AS174
- LEVEL3 - Level 3 Parent, LLC · AS3356
- HURRICANE - Hurricane Electric LLC · AS6939
- AS11014 - CPS · AS11014
- AS52339 - Lima Video Cable S.A. (Cabletel) · AS52339
- AS52376 - CABASE Camara Arg de Base de Datos y Serv en Linea · AS52376
Reputation
15.9reputation score (NEUTRAL)
AS27984 (AS27984 - Ver Tv S.A., AR) has a reputation score of 58.1 (NEUTRAL).
- Threat density
- 64.7/100
- Graph metrics
- 55.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 75.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- Ver Tv S.A.
- RIR
- LACNIC
- Registered
- Wed, 16 Jul 2008 18:35:07 GMT
- Abuse contact
- telered.lacnic@gmail.com
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS27984 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.