Autonomous System
AS3267
Last fetched
AS3267 is operated by IDDQD-AS - IDDQD-AS, registered in RU, and announces 96 prefixes to 66 BGP neighbours. AS3267 has a reputation score of 11.8 (NEUTRAL); 6 of its 119,552 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 96
- BGP neighbours
- 66
- RPKI ROAs
- 61
- MOAS conflicts
- 4
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 656
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 69
- Facilities
- 65
- Internet exchanges
- 7
- Customer degree
- 62
- Peer degree
- 33
- Provider degree
- 3
- 80.250.162.0/23
- 80.250.164.0/24
- 80.250.166.0/24
- 80.250.168.0/24
- 80.250.169.0/24
- 80.250.170.0/23
- 80.250.172.0/23
- 80.250.175.0/24
- 80.250.176.0/20
- 82.137.128.0/18
- 82.137.176.0/22
- 82.137.180.0/22
- 82.137.184.0/22
- 82.137.188.0/22
- 82.179.32.0/21
- 82.179.63.0/24
- 82.179.64.0/19
- 82.179.140.0/23
- 82.179.160.0/20
- 82.179.192.0/19
- 83.149.192.0/18
- 85.142.8.0/21
- 85.142.18.0/24
- 85.142.19.0/24
- 85.142.20.0/24
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (7 total)
Facilities (65 total)
- NIKHEF Amsterdam
- Telehouse - London (Docklands North)
- Telehouse - Paris 2 (Voltaire - Léon Frot)
- Digital Realty Frankfurt FRA1-27
- Equinix FR5 - Frankfurt, KleyerStrasse
- Digital Realty VIE1/2 - Vienna
- Digital Realty AMS9 - Amsterdam
- Moscow M9
- Equinix SK1 - Stockholm, Bromma
- Speedbone Berlin
- Digital Realty Stockholm STO1-6
- CE Colo Prague
- Digital Realty Marseille MRS1/2/3/4
- Dataplex Budapest
- Linxdatacenter (Moscow)
- NewTelco Kiev
- CSS MPS Moscow
- NXDATA-1 Bucharest (BUH1)
- LIM Warsaw
- Sitel Bratislava
- Ucomline Kiev
- Moscow CSS MPS
- Moscow M10
- Equinix WA1 - Warsaw, Centrum LIM
- Bolshaya Morskaya 18
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 61 ROAs.
- 185.141.124.0/22 · max length /22
- 185.71.96.0/22 · max length /22
- 188.93.107.0/24 · max length /24
- 193.27.214.0/23 · max length /24
- 194.149.64.0/24 · max length /24
- 194.149.70.0/23 · max length /24
- 194.190.232.0/21 · max length /24
- 194.190.240.0/23 · max length /24
- 194.190.247.0/24 · max length /24
- 194.190.249.0/24 · max length /24
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS3267.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 119,552
- Threat-listed addresses
- 6
- Threat density
- 0.0050 %
- Routed prefixes
- 88
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: computed.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 25 of this network’s 66 BGP neighbours.
- RADIO-MSU - Federal State Budgetary Educational Institution of Higher Education Lomonosov Moscow State University · AS2683
- MSU - Federal State Budgetary Educational Institution of Higher Education Lomonosov Moscow State University · AS2848
- SOVAM-AS - PJSC "Vimpelcom" · AS3216
- IOFFE-PHYSICAL-THECHICAL-INSTITUTE-AS - Ioffe Physical-Technical Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences · AS3351
- NSC - "Computational technologies - consulting" LLC · AS5387
- R61NET - State Educational institution for High professional education 'Southern Federal University' · AS5480
- NETROUTING-AS - Netrouting B.V. · AS6206
- BMSTU-AS - Federal State Autonomous Educational Institution of Higher Education "Bauman Moscow State Technical University" · AS6868
- PSTU-AS - Perm National Research Polytechnic University · AS6874
- HURRICANE - Hurricane Electric LLC · AS6939
- TVERSU - Tver Region Center of Informatization at Tver State University · AS8398
- IITP-AS - Institute for Information Transmission Problems of the Russian Academy of Sciences of A.A. Kharkevich · AS8409
- A1TELEKOM-AT - A1 Telekom Austria AG · AS8447
- USATU-AS - USATU-AS · AS8480
- CHUVSU - Fedaral State Educational Institution of higher professional Education 'Chuvash State University' · AS8630
- KUBANNET - Federal State Budgetary Educational Institution of Higher Education "Kuban State University" · AS8663
- PSU-AS - Federal State Autonomous Educational Institution of Higher Education "Perm State National Research University" · AS8684
- ICMM-UB-RAS - Perm Federal Research Center of the Ural Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences · AS8775
- PETRSU-AS - PETRSU-AS · AS8790
- MRSU-AS - MRSU-AS · AS8941
- TSTU - The State Educational Institution of Higher Vocational Education "Tambov State Technical University" · AS9162
- ROSTELECOM-AS - PJSC Rostelecom · AS12389
- LASERNET-AS - LASERNET-AS · AS12724
- KHB1 - Federal State Budgetary Educational University of Higher Education "Pacific National University named after M.P.Danilovskiy" · AS12770
- IBCH - Shemyakin-Ovchinnikov Institute of Bioorganic Chemistry of the Russian Academy of Sciences · AS12938
MOAS / hijack watch
4 announced prefixes conflict with AS3267 — another network announces the same address space. A sample:
Reputation
11.8reputation score (NEUTRAL)
AS3267 (IDDQD-AS - IDDQD-AS, RU) has a reputation score of 66.5 (NEUTRAL).
- Threat density
- 63.5/100
- Graph metrics
- 90.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 75.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- AS3058-MNT
- RIR
- RIPE
- Registered
- Mon, 09 Sep 2002 08:24:32 GMT
- Abuse contact
- abuse@rasnet.ru
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS3267 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.