Autonomous System
AS32787
Last fetched
AS32787 is operated by PROLEXIC-TECHNOLOGIES-DDOS-MITIGATION-NETWORK - Akamai Technologies, Inc., registered in US, and announces 386 prefixes to 767 BGP neighbours. AS32787 has a reputation score of 9.4 (REPUTABLE); 0 of its 95,744 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 386
- BGP neighbours
- 767
- RPKI ROAs
- 542
- MOAS conflicts
- 1
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 86
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 705
- Facilities
- 505
- Internet exchanges
- 66
- Customer degree
- 685
- Peer degree
- 276
- Provider degree
- 25
- 2.17.108.0/22
- 2.17.120.0/22
- 2.17.193.0/24
- 2.17.192.0/22
- 2.17.194.0/24
- 2.17.195.0/24
- 2.18.212.0/22
- 2.19.4.0/22
- 2.21.112.0/24
- 2.21.113.0/24
- 2.21.114.0/24
- 2.21.115.0/24
- 2.21.116.0/24
- 2.21.117.0/24
- 2.21.118.0/24
- 2.21.119.0/24
- 2.21.120.0/24
- 2.21.121.0/24
- 2.21.122.0/24
- 2.21.123.0/24
- 2.21.124.0/24
- 2.21.125.0/24
- 2.21.126.0/24
- 2.21.127.0/24
- 2.21.175.0/24
Routing posture
- Hijack posture score
- 0.07
- Route leaks
- 2
Leak types observed: TYPE2_LATERAL_PEER_TO_PEER.
Signals
- ddos-mitigationProvides DDoS scrubbing or absorption for its customers.
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (66 total)
Facilities (505 total)
- Equinix DC1-DC15,DC21-DC22 - Ashburn
- NIKHEF Amsterdam
- Digital Realty NYC (111 8th Ave)
- Equinix MI1 - Miami, NOTA
- Equinix TR1 - Toronto
- Digital Realty NYC (60 Hudson)
- Equinix LA1 - Los Angeles
- Equinix CH1/CH2/CH4 - Chicago
- Equinix SV1/SV5/SV10 - Silicon Valley, San Jose
- Equinix SV8 - Silicon Valley, Palo Alto
- Equinix DA1 - Dallas
- Telehouse - London (Docklands North)
- CoreSite - San Jose (SV1)
- CoreSite - Los Angeles (LA1) One Wilshire
- Digital Realty London LON1-3
- Equinix LD8 - London, Docklands
- Digital Realty London LHR19
- Digital Realty London LHR20
- Telehouse - London (Docklands East)
- Equinix NY9 - New York, 111 8th Avenue
- Equinix NY2/NY4/NY5/NY6 - New York, Secaucus
- Vienna University Computer Center (Wien)
- Digital Realty AMS3/5/7/8/10 - Amsterdam
- Global Switch Amsterdam
- Equinix AM7 - Amsterdam, Kuiperberweg
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 542 ROAs.
- 103.167.152.0/24 · max length /24
- 103.167.153.0/24 · max length /24
- 103.28.24.0/24 · max length /24
- 103.37.228.0/24 · max length /24
- 103.55.52.0/24 · max length /24
- 103.55.53.0/24 · max length /24
- 103.81.102.0/24 · max length /24
- 114.141.73.0/24 · max length /24
- 114.141.74.0/24 · max length /24
- 114.141.75.0/24 · max length /24
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS32787.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 95,744
- Threat-listed addresses
- 0
- Threat density
- 0.0000 %
- Routed prefixes
- 308
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: clean.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 25 of this network’s 767 BGP neighbours.
- COGENT-174 - Cogent Communications, LLC · AS174
- HARRIS-ATD-AS - L3Harris Technologies, Inc. · AS243
- BACOM - Bell Canada · AS577
- WHITE-PLAINS-HOSPITAL - White Plains Hospital · AS836
- ASN852 - TELUS Communications Inc. · AS852
- PUREVOLTAGE - PureVoltage Hosting Inc. · AS971
- SURFNET-NL - SURF B.V. · AS1103
- ASN-TELSTRA - Telstra Limited · AS1221
- SWIPNET - Tele2 Sverige AB · AS1257
- CW - IDDQD-AS · AS1273
- TWELVE99 - Arelion Sweden AB · AS1299
- BARRA-NET-AS - Barra International, LLC · AS1311
- CHARLES-SCHWAB-2 - Charles Schwab & Co., Inc. · AS1399
- EBOX - EBOX · AS1403
- IDK-Network - INTERDNESTRKOM, Sovmestnoe Zakrytoe Aktsionernoe Obshchestvo · AS1547
- OKOBANK-AS - OP Osuuskunta · AS1738
- NEXTLAYER-AS - Next Layer Telekommunikationsdienstleistungs- und Beratungs GmbH · AS1764
- GREEN - green.ch AG · AS1836
- WELLSFARGO-2011 - Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. · AS2011
- GSVNET-AS - Santander Global Technology and Operations, S.L. · AS2134
- INS-AS - AT&T Enterprises, LLC · AS2386
- DHLNET - DHL Information Services (Europe) s.r.o · AS2571
- DB-NA-1 - Deutsche Bank AG · AS2824
- NTT-DATA-2914 - NTT America, Inc. · AS2914
- AS-TIAA-NET - TIAA-CREF · AS2923
MOAS / hijack watch
1 announced prefix conflict with AS32787 — another network announces the same address space. A sample:
Reputation
9.4reputation score (REPUTABLE)
AS32787 (PROLEXIC-TECHNOLOGIES-DDOS-MITIGATION-NETWORK - Akamai Technologies, Inc., US) has a reputation score of 71.9 (REPUTABLE).
- Threat density
- 89.7/100
- Graph metrics
- 90.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 60.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- Akamai Technologies, Inc.
- RIR
- ARIN
- Registered
- Fri, 23 Jul 2004 13:32:05 GMT
- Abuse contact
- abuse@akamai.com
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS32787 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.