Autonomous System
AS3320
Last fetched
AS3320 is operated by DTAG - Deutsche Telekom AG, registered in DE, and announces 968 prefixes to 546 BGP neighbours. AS3320 has a reputation score of 9.6 (REPUTABLE); 3,055 of its 34,197,504 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 968
- BGP neighbours
- 546
- RPKI ROAs
- 744
- MOAS conflicts
- 5
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 20
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 4,298
- Facilities
- 147
- Internet exchanges
- 7
- Customer degree
- 639
- Peer degree
- 83
- Provider degree
- 0
- 2.58.100.0/24
- 2.58.102.0/24
- 2.160.0.0/12
- 5.133.112.0/24
- 5.182.153.0/24
- 5.249.188.0/22
- 13.143.122.0/24
- 31.56.72.0/24
- 31.56.76.0/24
- 31.56.90.0/24
- 31.57.54.0/24
- 31.57.119.0/24
- 31.59.71.0/24
- 31.59.167.0/24
- 31.59.224.0/24
- 31.59.225.0/24
- 31.59.226.0/24
- 31.59.227.0/24
- 31.212.0.0/15
- 31.224.0.0/11
- 37.46.11.0/24
- 37.50.0.0/15
- 37.80.0.0/12
- 43.251.0.0/22
- 45.93.186.0/23
Routing posture
- Hijack posture score
- 0.20
- Route leaks
- 21
Leak types observed: TYPE2_LATERAL_PEER_TO_PEER.
Signals
- critical-infrastructureServes infrastructure the internet depends on operationally.
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (7 total)
Facilities (147 total)
- Equinix DC1-DC15,DC21-DC22 - Ashburn
- Equinix SV8 - Silicon Valley, Palo Alto
- Equinix SV1/SV5/SV10 - Silicon Valley, San Jose
- Equinix LA1 - Los Angeles
- Equinix MI1 - Miami, NOTA
- NIKHEF Amsterdam
- Telehouse - London (Docklands North)
- Telehouse - London (Docklands East)
- Digital Realty London LHR20
- Digital Realty London LHR19
- Equinix LD8 - London, Docklands
- Digital Realty London LON1-3
- Telehouse - Paris 2 (Voltaire - Léon Frot)
- ITENOS Frankfurt (FRA1)
- Digital Realty Frankfurt FRA1-27
- Digital Realty AMS17 - Amsterdam
- Equinix FR5 - Frankfurt, KleyerStrasse
- Global Switch Amsterdam
- Equinix AM7 - Amsterdam, Kuiperberweg
- Digital Realty AMS3/5/7/8/10 - Amsterdam
- Digital Realty VIE1/2 - Vienna
- Digital Realty BRU1 - Brussels
- Equinix FR7 - Frankfurt, Gutleutstrasse
- Digital Realty London LHR21 (closed)
- Equinix AM8 - Amsterdam, Gyroscoopweg
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 744 ROAs.
- 165.49.107.0/24 · max length /24
- 196.44.120.0/22 · max length /24
- 196.44.125.0/24 · max length /24
- 196.44.127.0/24 · max length /24
- 103.12.180.0/23 · max length /23
- 103.140.114.0/23 · max length /23
- 128.121.0.0/22 · max length /24
- 128.241.84.0/22 · max length /24
- 130.94.196.0/22 · max length /24
- 131.143.253.0/24 · max length /24
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS3320.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 34,197,504
- Threat-listed addresses
- 3,055
- Threat density
- 0.0089 %
- Routed prefixes
- 924
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: computed.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 25 of this network’s 546 BGP neighbours.
- WOODYNET-1 - WoodyNet, Inc. · AS42
- COGENT-174 - Cogent Communications, LLC · AS174
- BELWUE - Universitaet Stuttgart · AS553
- Switch - SWITCH · AS559
- DFN - Verein zur Foerderung eines Deutschen Forschungsnetzes e.V. · AS680
- UUNET - Verizon Business · AS701
- UUNET - Verizon Business · AS702
- APPLE-ENGINEERING - Apple Inc. · AS714
- ASN852 - TELUS Communications Inc. · AS852
- KPN - KPN B.V. · AS1136
- SWIPNET - Tele2 Sverige AB · AS1257
- T-CNF-BBC-IPB - IDDQD-AS · AS1271
- CW - IDDQD-AS · AS1273
- TWELVE99 - Arelion Sweden AB · AS1299
- IDK-Network - INTERDNESTRKOM, Sovmestnoe Zakrytoe Aktsionernoe Obshchestvo · AS1547
- PAN-NET - Deutsche Telekom Cloud Services s.r.o. · AS1902
- TELENOR-NORGE-AS - Telenor Norge AS · AS2119
- GSVNET-AS - Santander Global Technology and Operations, S.L. · AS2134
- IIJ - Internet Initiative Japan Inc. · AS2497
- KDDI - KDDI CORPORATION · AS2516
- DTAG-IOT - Deutsche Telekom AG · AS2773
- TERASTREAM-AS - Deutsche Telekom AG · AS2792
- NOS_COMUNICACOES - NOS COMUNICACOES, S.A. · AS2860
- AS-SSI - Netflix Streaming Services Inc. · AS2906
- NTT-DATA-2914 - NTT America, Inc. · AS2914
MOAS / hijack watch
5 announced prefixes conflict with AS3320 — another network announces the same address space. A sample:
Reputation
9.6reputation score (REPUTABLE)
AS3320 (DTAG - Deutsche Telekom AG, DE) has a reputation score of 71.2 (REPUTABLE).
- Threat density
- 77.1/100
- Graph metrics
- 90.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 75.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- Deutsche Telekom AG
- RIR
- RIPE
- Abuse contact
- abuse@telekom.de
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS3320 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.