Autonomous System
AS34577
Last fetched
AS34577 is operated by SKATTV-AS - SKAT TV Ltd., registered in BG, and announces 16 prefixes to 7 BGP neighbours. AS34577 has a reputation score of 15.7 (NEUTRAL); 4 of its 8,960 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 16
- BGP neighbours
- 7
- RPKI ROAs
- 23
- MOAS conflicts
- 0
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 18,090
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 1
- Facilities
- 245
- Internet exchanges
- 2
- Customer degree
- 0
- Peer degree
- 142
- Provider degree
- 2
Infrastructure presence
Facilities (245 total)
- Equinix DC1-DC15,DC21-DC22 - Ashburn
- Equinix DA1 - Dallas
- Equinix SV8 - Silicon Valley, Palo Alto
- Equinix SV1/SV5/SV10 - Silicon Valley, San Jose
- Equinix CH1/CH2/CH4 - Chicago
- Equinix LA1 - Los Angeles
- Equinix NY1 - New York, Newark
- Digital Realty NYC (60 Hudson)
- Equinix TR1 - Toronto
- Equinix MI1 - Miami, NOTA
- Digital Realty NYC (111 8th Ave)
- Telehouse - London (Docklands North)
- Equinix NY2/NY4/NY5/NY6 - New York, Secaucus
- Equinix NY9 - New York, 111 8th Avenue
- Telehouse - London (Docklands East)
- Digital Realty London LHR20
- Digital Realty London LHR19
- Equinix LD8 - London, Docklands
- Digital Realty London LON1-3
- Global Switch London East
- Global Switch London North
- NIKHEF Amsterdam
- Digital Realty VIE1/2 - Vienna
- Equinix DA3 - Dallas
- Digital Realty Seattle SEA10
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 23 ROAs.
- 213.16.56.0/24 · max length /24
- 85.187.19.0/24 · max length /24
- 85.187.19.5/32 · max length /32
- 87.120.0.0/22 · max length /32
- 87.120.12.0/24 · max length /32
- 87.120.14.0/23 · max length /32
- 87.120.178.0/23 · max length /32
- 87.120.180.0/22 · max length /32
- 87.120.184.0/23 · max length /32
- 87.120.190.0/24 · max length /32
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS34577.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 8,960
- Threat-listed addresses
- 4
- Threat density
- 0.0446 %
- Routed prefixes
- 16
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: computed.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 7 of this network’s 7 BGP neighbours.
- HURRICANE - Hurricane Electric LLC · AS6939
- SGGS-AS-AP - SG.GS · AS24482
- NETERRA-AS - Neterra Ltd. · AS34224
- MEER-AS - meerfarbig GmbH & Co. KG · AS34549
- Virtual Technologies & Solutions - Virtual Technologies & Solutions · AS37721
- NetIX - NetIX Communications JSC · AS57463
- SECUREBIT - Securebit AG · AS58057
Reputation
15.7reputation score (NEUTRAL)
AS34577 (SKATTV-AS - SKAT TV Ltd., BG) has a reputation score of 58.6 (NEUTRAL).
- Threat density
- 58.9/100
- Graph metrics
- 65.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 75.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- SKAT TV Ltd.
- RIR
- RIPE
- Registered
- Wed, 16 Feb 2005 15:37:16 GMT
- Abuse contact
- abuse@neterra.net
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS34577 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.