Autonomous System
AS34837
Last fetched
AS34837 is operated by IRANET-IPM - Institute for Research in Fundamental Sciences, registered in IR, and announces 31 prefixes to 28 BGP neighbours. AS34837 has a reputation score of 9.7 (REPUTABLE); 2 of its 119,552 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 31
- BGP neighbours
- 28
- RPKI ROAs
- 40
- MOAS conflicts
- 16
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 20,709
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 1
- Facilities
- 0
- Internet exchanges
- 0
- Customer degree
- 0
- Peer degree
- 8
- Provider degree
- 1
- 46.38.129.0/24
- 46.38.131.0/24
- 79.127.65.0/24
- 94.184.64.0/19
- 94.184.64.0/18
- 94.184.96.0/19
- 94.184.128.0/18
- 94.184.128.0/17
- 94.184.192.0/18
- 193.104.212.0/24
- 194.225.0.0/17
- 194.225.0.0/16
- 194.225.130.0/23
- 194.225.144.0/24
- 194.225.151.0/24
- 194.225.128.0/17
- 212.16.64.0/24
- 212.16.65.0/24
- 212.16.67.0/24
- 212.16.72.0/24
- 212.16.75.0/24
- 212.16.82.0/24
- 212.16.83.0/24
- 212.16.88.0/24
- 212.16.90.0/24
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 40 ROAs.
- 193.104.212.0/24 · max length /24
- 194.225.0.0/16 · max length /24
- 194.225.130.0/23 · max length /24
- 212.16.64.0/19 · max length /19
- 212.16.64.0/24 · max length /24
- 212.16.65.0/24 · max length /24
- 212.16.66.0/24 · max length /24
- 212.16.67.0/24 · max length /24
- 212.16.68.0/24 · max length /24
- 212.16.69.0/24 · max length /24
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS34837.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 119,552
- Threat-listed addresses
- 2
- Threat density
- 0.0017 %
- Routed prefixes
- 31
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: computed.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 25 of this network’s 28 BGP neighbours.
- IRANET-IPM - Institute for Research in Fundamental Sciences · AS6736
- SHARIF-EDU-NET - Sharif University Of Technology · AS12660
- IROST-AS - Iranian Research Organization for Science & Technology · AS15611
- NIOPDC - Melli Pakhsh Faravardehay Nafti Iran PJSC · AS24707
- INSTITUTE-ISIRAN - IsIran · AS25306
- UT-AS - University of Tehran · AS29068
- seo - Securities and Exchange Organization · AS31175
- IUSTCC-AS - Iran University Of Science and Technology · AS41620
- RESPINA-AS - Respina Networks & Beyond PJSC · AS42337
- SAPCO-AS - Engeneering Designing and Supply the parts of Iran Khodro PJSC · AS42915
- Saderat-Bank - Bank Saderat Iran PJSC · AS42990
- EIRIB - EIRIB · AS43135
- TUMS-IR-AS - TUMS-IR-AS · AS43965
- kntu-AS - Kajeh Nasir Toosi University of Technology · AS47558
- IUMS-AS - Iran University of Medical Sciences · AS47981
- Tebyan - Tebyan-e-Noor Cultural-Artistic Institute · AS48434
- IBTO - Iranian Blood Transfusion Organization (IBTO) · AS50460
- sina-as - Sina Bank · AS51460
- SBU-AS - Shahid Beheshti university · AS56765
- MaskanBank - Maskan Bank · AS57241
- TMU-ASN - Tarbiat Modares University · AS57745
- UI - University of Isfahan · AS58104
- ISC-Net - Informatics Services PJSC · AS60638
- kharazmi-AS - Kharazmi University · AS202571
- BehPardakhtMelat - Beh Pardakht Melat Co PJS · AS203694
MOAS / hijack watch
16 announced prefixes conflict with AS34837 — another network announces the same address space. A sample:
Reputation
9.7reputation score (REPUTABLE)
AS34837 (IRANET-IPM - Institute for Research in Fundamental Sciences, IR) has a reputation score of 70.8 (REPUTABLE).
- Threat density
- 75.8/100
- Graph metrics
- 80.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 85.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- Institute for Research in Fundamental Sciences
- RIR
- RIPE
- Registered
- Tue, 02 Mar 2010 09:55:17 GMT
- Abuse contact
- abuse@ipm.ir
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS34837 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.