Autonomous System
AS36902
Last fetched
AS36902 is operated by Intelvision Ltd - Intelvision Ltd, registered in SC, and announces 42 prefixes to 8 BGP neighbours. AS36902 has a reputation score of 12.5 (NEUTRAL); 4 of its 21,504 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 42
- BGP neighbours
- 8
- RPKI ROAs
- 6
- MOAS conflicts
- 0
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 6,408
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 3
- Facilities
- 17
- Internet exchanges
- 5
- Customer degree
- 2
- Peer degree
- 22
- Provider degree
- 3
- 41.203.240.0/23
- 41.203.242.0/24
- 41.203.244.0/23
- 41.203.246.0/24
- 41.203.247.0/24
- 41.203.240.0/20
- 41.203.251.0/24
- 41.203.252.0/24
- 41.203.253.0/24
- 41.203.254.0/24
- 41.203.255.0/24
- 41.220.96.0/24
- 41.220.97.0/24
- 41.220.98.0/24
- 41.220.99.0/24
- 41.220.100.0/24
- 41.220.101.0/24
- 41.220.96.0/20
- 41.220.104.0/24
- 41.220.109.0/24
- 41.220.110.0/24
- 41.220.111.0/24
- 154.70.160.0/24
- 154.70.162.0/24
- 154.70.163.0/24
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (5 total)
Facilities (17 total)
- OADC CPT3 - Cape Town
- Teraco Johannesburg Campus, South Africa
- Teraco CT1 Cape Town, South Africa
- Djibouti Data Center
- xneelo JNB1 (Formerly Hetzner SA)
- OADC - Parklands
- Zantel
- Africa Data Centres, Johannesburg JHB1, South Africa
- Africa Data Centres, Cape Town CPT1, South Africa
- Africa Data Centres, Johannesburg JHB2, South Africa
- Digital Parks - Samrand
- NTT Johannesburg 1 Data Center (JOH1)
- OADC JNB1 - Johannesburg
- OADC CPT1 - Cape Town
- OADC CPT2 - Brackenfell
- Teraco CT2 Cape Town, South Africa
- Equinix JN1 - Johannesburg
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 6 of this network’s 6 ROAs.
- 154.70.160.0/19 · max length /24
- 196.46.148.0/22 · max length /24
- 197.234.0.0/20 · max length /24
- 2c0f:efa0::/32 · max length /48
- 41.203.240.0/20 · max length /24
- 41.220.96.0/20 · max length /24
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS36902.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 21,504
- Threat-listed addresses
- 4
- Threat density
- 0.0186 %
- Routed prefixes
- 42
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: computed.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 8 of this network’s 8 BGP neighbours.
- HURRICANE - Hurricane Electric LLC · AS6939
- DU-AS1 - Emirates Integrated Telecommunications Company PJSC · AS15802
- CTGNet - CTGNet · AS23764
- LIQUID-AS - Liquid Telecommunications Ltd · AS30844
- Kokonet Ltd - Kokonet Ltd · AS36867
- West Indian Ocean Cable Company - West Indian Ocean Cable Company · AS37662
- Virtual Technologies & Solutions - Virtual Technologies & Solutions · AS37721
- Department of ICT Government of Seychelles - Department of ICT Government of Seychelles · AS327861
Reputation
12.5reputation score (NEUTRAL)
AS36902 (Intelvision Ltd - Intelvision Ltd, SC) has a reputation score of 65.0 (NEUTRAL).
- Threat density
- 62.0/100
- Graph metrics
- 55.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 75.0/100
- Prefix age
- 95.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- Intelvision Ltd
- RIR
- AFRINIC
- Registered
- Thu, 04 May 2006 06:52:00 GMT
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS36902 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.