Autonomous System
AS36944
Last fetched
AS36944 is operated by Ubuntunet Alliance For Research and Education Networking - Ubuntunet Alliance For Research and Education Networking, registered in MW, and announces 2 prefixes to 44 BGP neighbours. AS36944 has a reputation score of 9.3 (REPUTABLE); 0 of its 2,048 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 2
- BGP neighbours
- 44
- RPKI ROAs
- 2
- MOAS conflicts
- 0
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 1,747
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 18
- Facilities
- 38
- Internet exchanges
- 4
- Customer degree
- 10
- Peer degree
- 135
- Provider degree
- 7
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (4 total)
Facilities (38 total)
- Telehouse - London (Docklands North)
- Telehouse - London (Docklands East)
- Digital Realty London LHR20
- Digital Realty London LHR19
- Equinix LD8 - London, Docklands
- Digital Realty London LON1-3
- NIKHEF Amsterdam
- Digital Realty AMS3/5/7/8/10 - Amsterdam
- Digital Realty London LHR21 (closed)
- Digital Realty AMS17 - Amsterdam
- Global Switch Amsterdam
- Equinix AM7 - Amsterdam, Kuiperberweg
- Digital Realty AMS9 - Amsterdam
- Equinix LD4 - London, Slough
- Equinix AM1/AM2 - Amsterdam, Luttenbergweg
- Iron Mountain Data Center - Amsterdam (AMS-1)
- Equinix LD9 - London, Powergate
- Equinix LD5 - London, Slough
- Telehouse - London (Docklands West)
- Smartdc Rotterdam
- Teraco Johannesburg Campus, South Africa
- NorthC Amsterdam 1
- Equinix AM5 - Amsterdam, Schepenbergweg
- Equinix AM3 - Amsterdam, Science Park
- Africa Data Centres, Nairobi NBO1, Kenya
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 2 of this network’s 2 ROAs.
- 196.32.208.0/21 · max length /21
- 2001:43f8:20::/48 · max length /48
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS36944.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 2,048
- Threat-listed addresses
- 0
- Threat density
- 0.0000 %
- Routed prefixes
- 1
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: clean.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 25 of this network’s 44 BGP neighbours.
- SURFNET-NL - SURF B.V. · AS1103
- SOVAM-AS - PJSC "Vimpelcom" · AS3216
- GTT-BACKBONE - GTT Communications Inc. · AS3257
- SWISSCOM - Swisscom (Schweiz) AG · AS3303
- STARHUB-INTERNET - StarHub Ltd · AS4657
- INTERDOTLINK - Inter.link GmbH · AS5405
- NETROUTING-AS - Netrouting B.V. · AS6206
- SEABONE-NET - TELECOM ITALIA SPARKLE S.p.A. · AS6762
- HURRICANE - Hurricane Electric LLC · AS6939
- MTS - MTS PJSC · AS8359
- Etisalat-AS - EMIRATES TELECOMMUNICATIONS GROUP COMPANY (ETISALAT GROUP) PJSC · AS8966
- INTERNET2-RESEARCH-EDU - Internet2 · AS11537
- ITGATE - IT.Gate S.p.A. · AS12779
- NL-BIT - BIT BV · AS12859
- CONVERGE-AS - Converge ICT Solutions Inc. · AS17639
- AMPATH - Florida International University · AS20080
- GITOYEN-MAIN-AS - Association "Gitoyen" · AS20766
- GEANT - GEANT Vereniging · AS20965
- SGGS-AS-AP - SG.GS · AS24482
- IP-Max - IP-Max SA · AS25091
- IELO - IELO-LIAZO SERVICES SAS · AS29075
- GANDI-AS - GANDI SAS · AS29169
- LIQUID-AS - Liquid Telecommunications Ltd · AS30844
- GNM-AS - Global Network Management Inc · AS31500
- CORE-BACKBONE - Core-Backbone GmbH · AS33891
Reputation
9.3reputation score (REPUTABLE)
AS36944 (Ubuntunet Alliance For Research and Education Networking - Ubuntunet Alliance For Research and Education Networking, MW) has a reputation score of 72.0 (REPUTABLE).
- Threat density
- 90.0/100
- Graph metrics
- 90.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 60.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- RIR
- AFRINIC
- Registered
- Fri, 20 Apr 2007 10:48:00 GMT
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS36944 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.