Autonomous System
AS37739
Last fetched
AS37739 is operated by Abantu Cloud Africa (Pty) Ltd - Abantu Cloud Africa (Pty) Ltd, registered in ZA, and announces 15 prefixes to 16 BGP neighbours. AS37739 has a reputation score of 11.6 (NEUTRAL); 0 of its 2,304 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 15
- BGP neighbours
- 16
- RPKI ROAs
- 14
- MOAS conflicts
- 0
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 2,751
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 10
- Facilities
- 71
- Internet exchanges
- 8
- Customer degree
- 8
- Peer degree
- 64
- Provider degree
- 3
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (8 total)
Facilities (71 total)
- Telehouse - London (Docklands North)
- Telehouse - London (Docklands East)
- NIKHEF Amsterdam
- Equinix FR5 - Frankfurt, KleyerStrasse
- Equinix AM7 - Amsterdam, Kuiperberweg
- Digital Realty AMS17 - Amsterdam
- Global Switch Amsterdam
- Equinix FR7 - Frankfurt, Gutleutstrasse
- Equinix PA5 - Paris, Victor Hugo
- Telehouse - Paris 2 (Voltaire - Léon Frot)
- UltraEdge Lyon-Venissieux
- Digital Realty AMS9 - Amsterdam
- Equinix AM8 - Amsterdam, Gyroscoopweg
- Equinix ZH2 - Zurich
- Digital Realty Marseille MRS1/2/3/4
- UltraEdge Bordeaux
- NTT Frankfurt 1 Data Center (FRA1)
- Equinix PA2 - Paris, Saint-Denis
- Equinix AM1/AM2 - Amsterdam, Luttenbergweg
- CERN Geneva
- Telehouse - Paris 3 (Magny)
- OPCORE - DC2 / PAR2
- nLighten Amsterdam AMS1
- Equinix FR4 - Frankfurt, West
- Equinix PA3 - Paris, Saint-Denis
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 14 ROAs.
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS37739.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 2,304
- Threat-listed addresses
- 0
- Threat density
- 0.0000 %
- Routed prefixes
- 9
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: clean.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 16 of this network’s 16 BGP neighbours.
- PCCWG-APAC-HK - PCCW Global (HK) Ltd. · AS3491
- INTERDOTLINK - Inter.link GmbH · AS5405
- HURRICANE - Hurricane Electric LLC · AS6939
- ABANTU - NCRYPTD LLC · AS11938
- AADS - NCRYPTD LLC · AS26701
- Virtual Technologies & Solutions - Virtual Technologies & Solutions · AS37721
- EUTPNET - Marcin Gondek · AS56662
- SECUREBIT - Securebit AG · AS58057
- NETONE-NL - Peter-Paul Maria Kurstjens · AS200132
- NDT3-AS - Nicholis du Toit · AS211869
- The Computer Hut cc - The Computer Hut cc · AS328178
- Intaweb (Pty) Ltd. - Intaweb (Pty) Ltd. · AS328711
- Dolphin Coast Wireless Pty Ltd - Dolphin Coast Wireless Pty Ltd · AS329249
- JNCS PTY LTD - JNCS PTY LTD · AS329369
- Neurotel Communications - Neurotel Communications · AS329386
- Cosmiq Broadband - Cosmiq Broadband · AS329391
Reputation
11.6reputation score (NEUTRAL)
AS37739 (Abantu Cloud Africa (Pty) Ltd - Abantu Cloud Africa (Pty) Ltd, ZA) has a reputation score of 66.8 (NEUTRAL).
- Threat density
- 57.2/100
- Graph metrics
- 90.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 85.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- Abantu Cloud Africa (Pty) Ltd
- RIR
- AFRINIC
- Registered
- Fri, 09 Feb 2024 13:01:00 GMT
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS37739 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.