Autonomous System
AS38136
Last fetched
AS38136 is operated by AKARI-NETWORKS-AS-AP - Akari Networks, registered in HK, and announces 183 prefixes to 7 BGP neighbours. AS38136 has a reputation score of 19.4 (NEUTRAL); 990 of its 28,672 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 183
- BGP neighbours
- 7
- RPKI ROAs
- 607
- MOAS conflicts
- 0
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 15,634
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 1
- Facilities
- 22
- Internet exchanges
- 1
- Customer degree
- 0
- Peer degree
- 4
- Provider degree
- 3
- 5.34.216.0/24
- 5.34.217.0/24
- 5.34.216.0/22
- 5.34.218.0/24
- 5.34.219.0/24
- 5.34.220.0/24
- 5.34.220.0/23
- 5.34.221.0/24
- 5.34.222.0/24
- 5.34.222.0/23
- 5.34.223.0/24
- 5.226.48.0/24
- 5.226.49.0/24
- 5.226.48.0/22
- 5.226.50.0/24
- 23.185.208.0/24
- 43.255.118.0/24
- 43.255.118.0/23
- 43.255.119.0/24
- 45.137.180.0/24
- 45.137.180.0/23
- 45.137.181.0/24
- 45.137.182.0/24
- 45.137.182.0/23
- 45.137.183.0/24
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (1 total)
Facilities (22 total)
- Equinix SV1/SV5/SV10 - Silicon Valley, San Jose
- Equinix SE2/SE3 - Seattle
- Digital Realty Seattle SEA10
- MEGA-i (iAdvantage Hong Kong)
- NewColo Frankfurt
- CoreSite - Los Angeles (LA2)
- KOMO Plaza Seattle (Formerly Fisher Plaza)
- Intergate West / Digital.forest / Fortress
- Cologix MIN1
- Equinix HK2 - Hong Kong
- Cologix MIN2
- MEGA Two (iAdvantage Hong Kong)
- Centersquare Seattle (SEA1-B)
- H5 Data Centers Seattle
- Cologix MIN3
- Cologix MIN4
- Sabey Intergate East Building 4
- WowRack
- 1530 SWIFT - NOCIX
- HKBN Edwick Industrial Centre
- Arrow Calgary DC2
- DataBank Minneapolis (MSP4)
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 607 ROAs.
- 45.196.98.0/23 · max length /24
- 103.100.176.0/23 · max length /24
- 103.135.100.0/22 · max length /24
- 103.142.130.0/23 · max length /24
- 103.149.145.0/24 · max length /24
- 103.150.214.0/23 · max length /24
- 103.160.180.0/23 · max length /24
- 103.167.134.0/23 · max length /24
- 103.172.40.0/23 · max length /24
- 103.188.234.0/23 · max length /24
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS38136.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 28,672
- Threat-listed addresses
- 990
- Threat density
- 3.4528 %
- Routed prefixes
- 149
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: computed.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 7 of this network’s 7 BGP neighbours.
- AKARI-NETWORKS - Akari Networks LLC · AS983
- SWISSCOM - Swisscom (Schweiz) AG · AS3303
- HURRICANE - Hurricane Electric LLC · AS6939
- RETN-AS - RETN Limited · AS9002
- ANTI-DDOS - NetLab Global · AS35251
- SPARTANHOST - Spartan Host Ltd · AS50131
- SYICT-AS-KR - SY ICT · AS152911
Reputation
19.4reputation score (NEUTRAL)
AS38136 (AKARI-NETWORKS-AS-AP - Akari Networks, HK) has a reputation score of 51.2 (NEUTRAL).
- Threat density
- 37.7/100
- Graph metrics
- 65.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 75.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- Akari Networks Limited
- RIR
- APNIC
- Registered
- Mon, 19 Jul 2021 06:03:02 GMT
- Abuse contact
- noc+apnic@akari.hk
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS38136 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.