Autonomous System
AS983
Last fetched
AS983 is operated by AKARI-NETWORKS - Akari Networks LLC, registered in US, and announces 5 prefixes to 44 BGP neighbours. AS983 has a reputation score of 10.6 (NEUTRAL); 0 of its 768 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 5
- BGP neighbours
- 44
- RPKI ROAs
- 25
- MOAS conflicts
- 0
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 1,410
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 25
- Facilities
- 168
- Internet exchanges
- 13
- Customer degree
- 24
- Peer degree
- 38
- Provider degree
- 10
Routing posture
- Hijack posture score
- 0.03
- Route leaks
- 1
Leak types observed: TYPE1_HAIRPIN_TURN.
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (13 total)
Facilities (168 total)
- Equinix SV1/SV5/SV10 - Silicon Valley, San Jose
- NIKHEF Amsterdam
- Telehouse - London (Docklands North)
- Telehouse - London (Docklands East)
- Digital Realty London LHR20
- Digital Realty London LHR19
- Equinix LD8 - London, Docklands
- Digital Realty London LON1-3
- Telehouse - Paris 2 (Voltaire - Léon Frot)
- Digital Realty Frankfurt FRA1-27
- ITENOS Frankfurt (FRA1)
- Equinix FR5 - Frankfurt, KleyerStrasse
- Digital Realty AMS17 - Amsterdam
- Equinix AM7 - Amsterdam, Kuiperberweg
- Global Switch Amsterdam
- Digital Realty AMS3/5/7/8/10 - Amsterdam
- Digital Realty BRU1 - Brussels
- Digital Realty London LHR21 (closed)
- Equinix AM8 - Amsterdam, Gyroscoopweg
- Digital Realty Zurich ZUR1
- Digital Realty AMS9 - Amsterdam
- Digital Realty Dusseldorf DUS1-3
- Telehouse - Frankfurt
- EdgeConneX Munich (EDCMUC01)
- Equinix EN1 - Enschede
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 25 ROAs.
- 103.160.180.0/23 · max length /24
- 103.172.40.0/23 · max length /24
- 103.248.228.0/23 · max length /24
- 2401:2120::/32 · max length /48
- 2407:cdc0::/32 · max length /48
- 2001:470:21e::/48 · max length /48
- 2001:470:294::/48 · max length /48
- 2001:470:508::/48 · max length /48
- 23.185.208.0/24 · max length /24
- 2602:fbf1::/32 · max length /48
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS983.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 768
- Threat-listed addresses
- 0
- Threat density
- 0.0000 %
- Routed prefixes
- 3
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: clean.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 25 of this network’s 44 BGP neighbours.
- TWELVE99 - Arelion Sweden AB · AS1299
- GTT-BACKBONE - GTT Communications Inc. · AS3257
- PCCWG-APAC-HK - PCCW Global (HK) Ltd. · AS3491
- HKIX-RS1 - Hong Kong Internet Exchange--Route Server 1 · AS4635
- HURRICANE - Hurricane Electric LLC · AS6939
- NEBUSRT - Neburst LLC · AS8143
- Etisalat-AS - EMIRATES TELECOMMUNICATIONS GROUP COMPANY (ETISALAT GROUP) PJSC · AS8966
- RETN-AS - RETN Limited · AS9002
- CTCSCITECHLIMITED-AS-AP - CTCSCI TECH LIMITED · AS9886
- TPIX-AS-TW - Chief Telecom Inc. · AS10133
- JSMSR-LLC - JSMSR Network · AS12198
- RAID-AS-TW - RAID Networks Co., Ltd. · AS18423
- F5 - F5 Networks SARL · AS35280
- NEWMEDIAEXPRESS-AS-AP - NewMedia Express Pte Ltd · AS38001
- AKARI-NETWORKS-AS-AP - Akari Networks · AS38136
- Alanyhq-Networks-AS - Alanyhq Networks Limited · AS41255
- CYANSYN - CYANSYN CO. · AS46365
- HALOCLOUD-NETWORK - HaloCloud Network Limited · AS50385
- AKARI-AS - Akari Networks Ltd · AS56850
- CMI-INT-HK - China Mobile International Limited · AS58453
- AkileCloud - AKILE LTD · AS61112
- KMNIX-AS-AP - KMNIX LLC · AS134413
- GSLNETWORKS-AS-AP - GSL Networks Pty LTD · AS137409
- FGHRSHSTUDIO-AS-HK - FGHRSH STUDIO · AS139299
- YTXC-AS-AP - XINGCHEN DATA HK CO., LIMITED · AS139734
Reputation
10.6reputation score (NEUTRAL)
AS983 (AKARI-NETWORKS - Akari Networks LLC, US) has a reputation score of 68.8 (NEUTRAL).
- Threat density
- 70.2/100
- Graph metrics
- 90.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 75.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- Akari Networks LLC
- RIR
- ARIN
- Registered
- Mon, 27 Jun 2022 17:18:29 GMT
- Abuse contact
- abuse+arin@akari.hk
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS983 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.