Autonomous System
AS4229
Last fetched
AS4229 is operated by ZEN-NET - Zenlayer Inc, registered in US, and announces 35 prefixes to 101 BGP neighbours. AS4229 has a reputation score of 16.3 (NEUTRAL); 381 of its 7,936 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 35
- BGP neighbours
- 101
- RPKI ROAs
- 19
- MOAS conflicts
- 2
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 65
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 1,000
- Facilities
- 389
- Internet exchanges
- 21
- Customer degree
- 43
- Peer degree
- 265
- Provider degree
- 11
- 23.91.109.0/24
- 23.91.110.0/23
- 82.38.180.0/24
- 84.75.148.0/24
- 84.75.150.0/24
- 84.75.155.0/24
- 84.75.158.0/24
- 98.98.98.0/24
- 98.98.230.0/23
- 103.140.146.0/23
- 128.14.86.0/24
- 129.227.160.0/24
- 129.227.161.0/24
- 129.227.163.0/24
- 129.227.160.0/21
- 129.227.164.0/24
- 129.227.165.0/24
- 129.227.166.0/24
- 129.227.167.0/24
- 162.128.0.0/23
- 162.128.2.0/23
- 162.128.41.0/24
- 162.128.42.0/24
- 162.128.193.0/24
- 162.128.226.0/24
Routing posture
- Hijack posture score
- 0.03
- Route leaks
- 1
Leak types observed: TYPE2_LATERAL_PEER_TO_PEER.
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (21 total)
Facilities (389 total)
- Equinix DA1 - Dallas
- Equinix DC1-DC15,DC21-DC22 - Ashburn
- Equinix CH1/CH2/CH4 - Chicago
- Equinix LA1 - Los Angeles
- Equinix SV8 - Silicon Valley, Palo Alto
- Equinix SV1/SV5/SV10 - Silicon Valley, San Jose
- Equinix TR1 - Toronto
- Equinix NY1 - New York, Newark
- Digital Realty NYC (60 Hudson)
- Equinix MI1 - Miami, NOTA
- Digital Realty NYC (111 8th Ave)
- CoreSite - Los Angeles (LA1) One Wilshire
- NIKHEF Amsterdam
- Equinix NY2/NY4/NY5/NY6 - New York, Secaucus
- Telehouse - London (Docklands North)
- Telehouse - London (Docklands East)
- Digital Realty London LHR20
- Equinix NY9 - New York, 111 8th Avenue
- Digital Realty London LHR19
- Global Switch London East
- Global Switch London North
- Equinix LD8 - London, Docklands
- Digital Realty London LON1-3
- Telehouse - Paris 2 (Voltaire - Léon Frot)
- Telehouse - Paris 1 (Jeûneurs)
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 19 ROAs.
- 162.128.0.0/23 · max length /23
- 162.128.2.0/23 · max length /24
- 162.128.226.0/24 · max length /24
- 162.128.227.0/24 · max length /24
- 162.128.41.0/24 · max length /24
- 162.128.42.0/24 · max length /24
- 128.14.86.0/24 · max length /24
- 23.91.104.0/24 · max length /24
- 23.91.109.0/24 · max length /24
- 23.91.110.0/23 · max length /23
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS4229.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 7,936
- Threat-listed addresses
- 381
- Threat density
- 4.8009 %
- Routed prefixes
- 26
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: computed.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 25 of this network’s 101 BGP neighbours.
- SURFNET-NL - SURF B.V. · AS1103
- TWELVE99 - Arelion Sweden AB · AS1299
- GREEN - green.ch AG · AS1836
- NTT-DATA-2914 - NTT America, Inc. · AS2914
- GTT-BACKBONE - GTT Communications Inc. · AS3257
- RIPE-NCC-AS - Reseaux IP Europeens Network Coordination Centre (RIPE NCC) · AS3333
- PACIFICINTERNET-AS-AP - Pacific Internet Pte Ltd · AS4628
- STARHUB-INTERNET - StarHub Ltd · AS4657
- NETROUTING-AS - Netrouting B.V. · AS6206
- AS6453 - TATA COMMUNICATIONS (AMERICA) INC · AS6453
- ZAYO-6461 - Zayo Bandwidth · AS6461
- VERIXI - VERIXI SA · AS6696
- HURRICANE - Hurricane Electric LLC · AS6939
- SINGTEL-AS-AP - Singapore Telecommunications Ltd · AS7473
- SKYCLOUD-NET - Skycloud Computing co., Ltd. · AS7483
- CDNEXIS-NET - chiaochiao ltd. · AS7536
- NORDA-NET - 10F No 33 Sec 2 Zhongshan Rd Zhonghe Dist · AS7538
- VIETEL-AS-AP - Viettel Group · AS7552
- telkomnet-as-ap - PT Telekomunikasi Indonesia · AS7713
- Etisalat-AS - EMIRATES TELECOMMUNICATIONS GROUP COMPANY (ETISALAT GROUP) PJSC · AS8966
- RETN-AS - RETN Limited · AS9002
- HUTCHISON-AS-AP - HGC Global Communications Limited · AS9304
- TWGATE-AP - Taiwan Internet Gateway · AS9505
- SAKURALINK-AS-AP - SAKURA LINK LIMITED · AS9516
- ETPI-IDS-AS-AP - Eastern Telecoms Phils., Inc. · AS9658
MOAS / hijack watch
2 announced prefixes conflict with AS4229 — another network announces the same address space. A sample:
Reputation
16.3reputation score (NEUTRAL)
AS4229 (ZEN-NET - Zenlayer Inc, US) has a reputation score of 57.3 (NEUTRAL).
- Threat density
- 37.4/100
- Graph metrics
- 90.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 75.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- Zenlayer Inc
- RIR
- ARIN
- Registered
- Wed, 20 May 2020 20:32:15 GMT
- Abuse contact
- abuse@zenlayer.com
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS4229 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.