Autonomous System

AS45718

Last fetched Wed, 21 Oct 2026 03:32:58 GMT

AS45718 is operated by JURAGAN-AS-ID - PT Surya Global Teknologi, registered in ID, and announces 4 prefixes to 3 BGP neighbours. AS45718 has a reputation score of 21.2 (SUSPICIOUS); 0 of its 1,024 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.

Nutrition Label

Routing footprint

Announced prefixes: 4
BGP neighbours: 3
RPKI ROAs: 6
MOAS conflicts: 0
CAIDA AS-rank: 11,852
Customer-cone ASNs: 2
Facilities: 35
Internet exchanges: 7
Customer degree: 1
Peer degree: 0
Provider degree: 1

Route origin authorizations

A sample of 6 of this network’s 6 ROAs.

103.198.93.0/24 · max length /24
103.31.204.0/23 · max length /24
103.31.206.0/24 · max length /24
117.103.66.0/23 · max length /24
2001:df0:b3::/48 · max length /48
203.79.29.0/24 · max length /24

Upstreams

The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS45718.

AS24534 · 15 shared paths
AS6939 · 10 shared paths
AS139404 · 7 shared paths
AS328840 · 3 shared paths
AS327727 · 3 shared paths

Blast radius

Announced IPv4 addresses: 1,024
Threat-listed addresses: 0
Threat density: 0.0000 %
Routed prefixes: 4

How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: clean.

Peering ecosystem

A sample of 3 of this network’s 3 BGP neighbours.

TRANSHYBRID-AS-ID - PT. Transhybrid Communication · AS24534
JOS-AS-ID - PT JURAGAN ONLINE SOLUSI · AS139404
IDNIC-ZOOM-AS-ID - PT Zoom Infotek Telesindo · AS140430

Reputation

21.2reputation score (SUSPICIOUS)

AS45718 (JURAGAN-AS-ID - PT Surya Global Teknologi, ID) has a reputation score of 48.8 (SUSPICIOUS). This ASN shows suspicious characteristics.

Threat density: 48.6/100
Graph metrics: 30.0/100
Historical behaviour: 85.0/100
Prefix age: 20.0/100

These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.

Registration

Registered to: PT JURAGAN ONLINE SOLUSI

Threat-feed evidence

Pivot from AS45718 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.

Queries

This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.


MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
     collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
     collect(co.name) AS countries,
     collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
     collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
     collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
     collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
     collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
     collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
     collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
     collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
       a.rir AS rir,
       a.orgName AS orgName,
       a.asRank AS asRank,
       a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
       a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
       a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
       a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
       a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
       a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
       a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
       a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
       a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
       a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
       a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
       a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
       a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
       a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
       a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
       operatorNames, countries, organizations,
       samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
       signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
       prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCount

Run yourself →

The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.


MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observations