Autonomous System
AS48347
Last fetched
AS48347 is operated by MTW-AS - MTW-AS, registered in RU, and announces 91 prefixes to 29 BGP neighbours. AS48347 has a reputation score of 15.4 (NEUTRAL); 193 of its 32,000 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 91
- BGP neighbours
- 29
- RPKI ROAs
- 34
- MOAS conflicts
- 0
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 1,257
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 29
- Facilities
- 19
- Internet exchanges
- 5
- Customer degree
- 24
- Peer degree
- 10
- Provider degree
- 6
- 31.129.122.0/24
- 37.228.88.0/22
- 37.228.92.0/24
- 37.228.93.0/24
- 37.228.94.0/24
- 45.8.230.0/24
- 45.10.52.0/24
- 45.10.53.0/24
- 45.10.54.0/24
- 45.10.55.0/24
- 45.15.252.0/24
- 45.81.253.0/24
- 45.81.255.0/24
- 45.132.18.0/23
- 45.135.164.0/24
- 45.138.157.0/24
- 45.141.100.0/22
- 45.142.36.0/24
- 45.143.93.0/24
- 46.29.114.110/32
- 46.29.114.0/23
- 77.81.5.0/24
- 80.64.31.0/24
- 80.66.64.0/24
- 85.204.240.0/24
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (5 total)
Facilities (19 total)
- Equinix FR5 - Frankfurt, KleyerStrasse
- Moscow M9
- NewTelco Kiev
- Bolshaya Morskaya 18
- LVRTC TV Tower
- Telia Telehouse KJJ
- Digita Helsinki Pasila Broadcasting Tower
- NewTelco Frankfurt
- IVC ORW Saint-Petersburg
- Tsvetochnaya Data Center
- Moscow TehnoGorod
- Raduga-2
- IXcellerate MOS1
- Miran-1
- MTW.RU
- INFONET DC
- Data-Center IMAQLIQ
- BONCH-IT
- DC Bunker Korolev
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 34 ROAs.
- 170.168.112.0/24 · max length /24
- 178.22.24.0/24 · max length /24
- 185.148.36.0/24 · max length /24
- 185.148.37.0/24 · max length /24
- 185.148.38.0/24 · max length /24
- 185.148.39.0/24 · max length /24
- 185.40.105.0/24 · max length /24
- 185.41.185.0/24 · max length /24
- 185.41.186.0/24 · max length /24
- 185.41.187.0/24 · max length /24
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS48347.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 32,000
- Threat-listed addresses
- 193
- Threat density
- 0.6031 %
- Routed prefixes
- 89
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: computed.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 25 of this network’s 29 BGP neighbours.
- EAST-AS - East Telecom Ltd. · AS8395
- ERTH-TRANSIT-AS - JSC "ER-Telecom Holding" · AS9049
- SGGS-AS-AP - SG.GS · AS24482
- IVSTARNET-AS - Ivstar Ltd · AS29588
- INETCOM - INETCOM CARRIER LLC · AS35598
- Virtual Technologies & Solutions - Virtual Technologies & Solutions · AS37721
- INCOMSV-AS - Limited Liability Company Incomsvyaz · AS41639
- BEIREL-AS - Beirel Telecom LLC · AS42148
- VRMNT-AS - Vermont-IT Limited Liability Company · AS43667
- INTEK-M-AS - Intek-M LLC · AS43865
- KETRA-AS - IK-Servis Ltd. · AS49155
- TRANSROUTE - Transroute Telecom LTD · AS50509
- DIALOGK-AS - Dialog-K LLC · AS50668
- NICOS-MSK - LLC Company NICOS · AS51009
- CORP-PARTNER-AS - CORP-PARTNER-AS · AS51579
- IQWEB - IQWeb FZ-LLC · AS59692
- ENGINETPLUS-AS - LLC Enginet+ · AS61380
- BEMYLINK - BiMajLink d.o.o. · AS62255
- ITNOVATION-AS - JSC Mediasoft ekspert · AS62356
- VIRTAL - Virtal LLC · AS62444
- NEWLINE-AS - OOO New Line · AS204623
- MEDIASOFT-AS - JSC Mediasoft ekspert · AS206764
- BEST-LINE-AS - Best Line Ltd. · AS207676
- cs - LLC "Complex Systems" · AS210028
- SETI - JSC Mediasoft ekspert · AS212490
Reputation
15.4reputation score (NEUTRAL)
AS48347 (MTW-AS - MTW-AS, RU) has a reputation score of 59.2 (NEUTRAL).
- Threat density
- 42.6/100
- Graph metrics
- 90.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 75.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- MNT-MTW-HOSTING
- RIR
- RIPE
- Registered
- Mon, 17 Nov 2008 11:11:49 GMT
- Abuse contact
- abuse@mtw.ru
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS48347 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.