Autonomous System
AS48729
Last fetched
AS48729 is operated by Serverking-AS - ServerKing B.V., registered in NL, and announces 19 prefixes to 19 BGP neighbours. AS48729 has a reputation score of 14.5 (NEUTRAL); 2 of its 4,352 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 19
- BGP neighbours
- 19
- RPKI ROAs
- 25
- MOAS conflicts
- 0
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 2,676
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 10
- Facilities
- 24
- Internet exchanges
- 3
- Customer degree
- 9
- Peer degree
- 5
- Provider degree
- 4
Infrastructure presence
Facilities (24 total)
- NIKHEF Amsterdam
- Equinix AM8 - Amsterdam, Gyroscoopweg
- Equinix FR7 - Frankfurt, Gutleutstrasse
- Global Switch Amsterdam
- Equinix AM7 - Amsterdam, Kuiperberweg
- Digital Realty AMS17 - Amsterdam
- Equinix FR5 - Frankfurt, KleyerStrasse
- Digital Realty Frankfurt FRA1-27
- Digital Realty AMS9 - Amsterdam
- Equinix AM1/AM2 - Amsterdam, Luttenbergweg
- euNetworks Amsterdam
- nLighten Amsterdam AMS1
- Equinix FR4 - Frankfurt, West
- NorthC Amsterdam 1
- Equinix AM5 - Amsterdam, Schepenbergweg
- Equinix AM3 - Amsterdam, Science Park
- DFDC The Hague
- Equinix AM6 - Amsterdam, Duivendrechtsekade
- Equinix AM4 - Amsterdam, Science Park
- Equinix FR6 - Frankfurt, West
- Penta Infra Leeuwarden LEE01
- NorthC Nieuwegein
- Equinix FR8 - Frankfurt, West
- Qupra DC
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 25 ROAs.
- 2001:470:5f7::/48 · max length /48
- 177.28.0.0/24 · max length /24
- 177.28.1.0/24 · max length /24
- 177.28.5.0/24 · max length /24
- 177.29.192.0/24 · max length /24
- 177.29.193.0/24 · max length /24
- 177.29.194.0/24 · max length /24
- 177.29.225.0/24 · max length /24
- 177.29.240.0/24 · max length /24
- 177.29.241.0/24 · max length /24
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS48729.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 4,352
- Threat-listed addresses
- 2
- Threat density
- 0.0460 %
- Routed prefixes
- 17
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: computed.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 19 of this network’s 19 BGP neighbours.
- COGENT-174 - Cogent Communications, LLC · AS174
- SURFNET-NL - SURF B.V. · AS1103
- INTERDOTLINK - Inter.link GmbH · AS5405
- GITOYEN-MAIN-AS - Association "Gitoyen" · AS20766
- SGGS-AS-AP - SG.GS · AS24482
- IP-Max - IP-Max SA · AS25091
- GNM-AS - Global Network Management Inc · AS31500
- Virtual Technologies & Solutions - Virtual Technologies & Solutions · AS37721
- FORTIS-AS - Baykov Ilya Sergeevich · AS41745
- IXP-1-IX-EU - A-Systems Sp. z o.o. · AS50263
- HOSTKEY-AS - HOSTKEY B.V. · AS57043
- INC-PARTNERS-365 - 365.partners INC · AS198178
- AS-1-NL - A-Systems Sp. z o.o. · AS202580
- host-industry - HOSTING INDUSTRY LIMITED · AS207461
- VPS1 - Digital City FZE · AS214798
- retzor-as - Mastersoft S.R.L. · AS215305
- GuardNetwork-AS - SEBEK sp. z o.o · AS216129
- nktelecom - NKtelecom INC · AS216475
- HOSTKEY-USA - HOSTKEY · AS395839
Reputation
14.5reputation score (NEUTRAL)
AS48729 (Serverking-AS - ServerKing B.V., NL) has a reputation score of 61.1 (NEUTRAL).
- Threat density
- 40.9/100
- Graph metrics
- 90.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 85.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- ServerKing B.V.
- RIR
- RIPE
- Registered
- Mon, 06 Mar 2023 08:36:46 GMT
- Abuse contact
- abuse@serverking.nl
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS48729 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.