Autonomous System
AS49418
Last fetched
AS49418 is operated by AS-NETSHIELD - NETSHIELD LTD, registered in GB, and announces 13 prefixes to 35 BGP neighbours. AS49418 has a reputation score of 50.0 (HIGHLY_SUSPICIOUS); 0 of its 2,048 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 13
- BGP neighbours
- 35
- RPKI ROAs
- 19
- MOAS conflicts
- 0
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 1,694
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 19
- Facilities
- 62
- Internet exchanges
- 7
- Customer degree
- 15
- Peer degree
- 30
- Provider degree
- 6
Signals
- bulletproof-hostingHosts content other providers routinely take down.
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (7 total)
Facilities (62 total)
- Equinix DC1-DC15,DC21-DC22 - Ashburn
- Telehouse - London (Docklands North)
- Equinix MI1 - Miami, NOTA
- Digital Realty NYC (60 Hudson)
- NIKHEF Amsterdam
- Equinix FR5 - Frankfurt, KleyerStrasse
- Digital Realty Frankfurt FRA1-27
- Digital Realty VIE1/2 - Vienna
- Telehouse - Paris 2 (Voltaire - Léon Frot)
- Digital Realty AMS9 - Amsterdam
- Equinix SK1 - Stockholm, Bromma
- Speedbone Berlin
- Moscow M9
- Digital Realty Marseille MRS1/2/3/4
- Digital Realty Stockholm STO1-6
- CE Colo Prague
- Dataplex Budapest
- Linxdatacenter (Moscow)
- NewTelco Kiev
- NXDATA-1 Bucharest (BUH1)
- Ucomline Kiev
- Sitel Bratislava
- LIM Warsaw
- Equinix WA1 - Warsaw, Centrum LIM
- Bolshaya Morskaya 18
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 19 ROAs.
- 185.184.120.0/22 · max length /22
- 185.218.137.0/24 · max length /24
- 193.233.86.0/24 · max length /24
- 194.153.135.0/24 · max length /24
- 2.27.0.0/24 · max length /24
- 2.27.2.0/24 · max length /24
- 212.192.250.0/24 · max length /24
- 212.192.255.0/24 · max length /24
- 2a01:ecc0:10::/48 · max length /48
- 2a01:ecc0:280::/42 · max length /42
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS49418.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 2,048
- Threat-listed addresses
- 0
- Threat density
- 0.0000 %
- Routed prefixes
- 8
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: clean.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 25 of this network’s 35 BGP neighbours.
- NETROUTING-AS - Netrouting B.V. · AS6206
- HURRICANE - Hurricane Electric LLC · AS6939
- NEO-ASN - Zayo Infrastructure France SA · AS8218
- ROSTELECOM-AS - PJSC Rostelecom · AS12389
- SGGS-AS-AP - SG.GS · AS24482
- IP-Max - IP-Max SA · AS25091
- AUROLOGIC - aurologic GmbH · AS30823
- GNM-AS - Global Network Management Inc · AS31500
- CORE-BACKBONE - Core-Backbone GmbH · AS33891
- iFog-GmbH - iFog GmbH · AS34927
- INETCOM - INETCOM CARRIER LLC · AS35598
- Virtual Technologies & Solutions - Virtual Technologies & Solutions · AS37721
- Matthew - Koshkin Matvey · AS44636
- TRUENETWORK - Truenetwork LLC · AS49673
- Serverius-as - Serverius Holding B.V. · AS50673
- GIGAHOST - Gigahost AS · AS56655
- DPKGSOFT-AS - DpkgSoft International Limited · AS56802
- IQWEB - IQWeb FZ-LLC · AS59692
- AS62000 - SERVERD SAS · AS62000
- BEMYLINK - BiMajLink d.o.o. · AS62255
- tanaka-as - Muskafidi Konstantin Nikolaevich · AS198138
- NETSHIELD-BYOIP - NETSHIELD LTD · AS198981
- DATAPASA-AS - DataPasa Limited · AS199566
- DATABRIDGE - GLOBAL DATA BRIDGE INTERNATIONAL LIMITED · AS200203
- romanov-as - Iurie Romanov · AS200775
Reputation
50.0reputation score (HIGHLY_SUSPICIOUS)
AS49418 (AS-NETSHIELD - NETSHIELD LTD, GB) has a reputation score of 25.0 (HIGHLY_SUSPICIOUS). This ASN shows suspicious characteristics.
- Threat density
- 66.7/100
- Graph metrics
- 90.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 75.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- NETSHIELD LTD
- RIR
- RIPE
- Registered
- Fri, 29 Dec 2023 14:01:03 GMT
- Abuse contact
- abuse@netshield.ltd
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS49418 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.