Autonomous System
AS50272
Last fetched
AS50272 is operated by AVUR - AVUR AS, registered in NO, and announces 16 prefixes to 8 BGP neighbours. AS50272 has a reputation score of 13.2 (NEUTRAL); 1 of its 12,544 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 16
- BGP neighbours
- 8
- RPKI ROAs
- 18
- MOAS conflicts
- 0
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 8,986
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 2
- Facilities
- 102
- Internet exchanges
- 19
- Customer degree
- 1
- Peer degree
- 113
- Provider degree
- 2
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (19 total)
Facilities (102 total)
- NIKHEF Amsterdam
- Telehouse - Paris 2 (Voltaire - Léon Frot)
- Global Switch Amsterdam
- Equinix AM7 - Amsterdam, Kuiperberweg
- Digital Realty AMS17 - Amsterdam
- Equinix FR5 - Frankfurt, KleyerStrasse
- Digital Realty Frankfurt FRA1-27
- Digital Realty Zurich ZUR1
- Equinix AM8 - Amsterdam, Gyroscoopweg
- Digital Realty VIE1/2 - Vienna
- Digital Realty AMS3/5/7/8/10 - Amsterdam
- Equinix FR7 - Frankfurt, Gutleutstrasse
- Digital Realty AMS9 - Amsterdam
- Equinix SK1 - Stockholm, Bromma
- Moscow M9
- CE Colo Prague
- Digital Realty Stockholm STO1-6
- Digital Realty Marseille MRS1/2/3/4
- NTT Frankfurt 1 Data Center (FRA1)
- colozueri.ch Zurich
- Forskningsparken Oslo
- Vaultica Data Centers | OSL01
- Equinix AM1/AM2 - Amsterdam, Luttenbergweg
- Iron Mountain Data Center - Amsterdam (AMS-1)
- NewTelco Kiev
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 18 ROAs.
- 185.155.140.0/22 · max length /24
- 185.155.140.0/24 · max length /24
- 185.155.141.0/24 · max length /24
- 185.155.142.0/24 · max length /24
- 185.155.143.0/24 · max length /24
- 185.41.64.0/22 · max length /24
- 185.41.64.0/24 · max length /24
- 185.41.65.0/24 · max length /24
- 185.41.66.0/24 · max length /24
- 195.238.234.0/24 · max length /24
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS50272.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 12,544
- Threat-listed addresses
- 1
- Threat density
- 0.0080 %
- Routed prefixes
- 13
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: computed.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 8 of this network’s 8 BGP neighbours.
- TWELVE99 - Arelion Sweden AB · AS1299
- HURRICANE - Hurricane Electric LLC · AS6939
- CORE-BACKBONE - Core-Backbone GmbH · AS33891
- Servperso_Systems - Sarah Rossius trading as Servperso Systems · AS34872
- Virtual Technologies & Solutions - Virtual Technologies & Solutions · AS37721
- TKSWF-AS - Stadtwerke Feldkirch · AS48362
- SECUREBIT - Securebit AG · AS58057
- BOFIBER - Bofiber AS · AS59720
Reputation
13.2reputation score (NEUTRAL)
AS50272 (AVUR - AVUR AS, NO) has a reputation score of 63.7 (NEUTRAL).
- Threat density
- 73.3/100
- Graph metrics
- 65.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 75.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- AVUR AS
- RIR
- RIPE
- Registered
- Mon, 14 Dec 2009 12:07:06 GMT
- Abuse contact
- abuse@avur.no
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS50272 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.