Autonomous System
AS50867
Last fetched
AS50867 is operated by ORG-LVA15-AS - HOSTKEY B.V., registered in NL, and announces 89 prefixes to 16 BGP neighbours. AS50867 has a reputation score of 15.9 (NEUTRAL); 95 of its 21,504 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 89
- BGP neighbours
- 16
- RPKI ROAs
- 82
- MOAS conflicts
- 0
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 3,232
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 8
- Facilities
- 61
- Internet exchanges
- 11
- Customer degree
- 7
- Peer degree
- 26
- Provider degree
- 8
- 5.180.174.0/24
- 5.180.174.0/23
- 5.180.175.0/24
- 31.192.104.0/24
- 31.192.105.0/24
- 31.192.106.0/24
- 31.192.107.0/24
- 31.192.104.0/21
- 31.192.108.0/24
- 31.192.109.0/24
- 31.192.110.0/24
- 31.192.111.0/24
- 77.91.72.0/24
- 77.91.73.0/24
- 77.91.74.0/24
- 77.91.75.0/24
- 77.91.91.0/24
- 77.91.92.0/24
- 77.91.93.0/24
- 77.91.94.0/24
- 77.91.95.0/24
- 77.91.112.0/24
- 77.91.113.0/24
- 77.91.114.0/24
- 77.91.115.0/24
Routing posture
- Hijack posture score
- 0.06
- Route leaks
- 3
Leak types observed: TYPE1_HAIRPIN_TURN, TYPE3_PROVIDER_TO_PEER.
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (11 total)
Facilities (61 total)
- NIKHEF Amsterdam
- Telehouse - London (Docklands North)
- Digital Realty VIE1/2 - Vienna
- Equinix FR5 - Frankfurt, KleyerStrasse
- Telehouse - Paris 2 (Voltaire - Léon Frot)
- Digital Realty Frankfurt FRA1-27
- Digital Realty AMS9 - Amsterdam
- Speedbone Berlin
- Equinix SK1 - Stockholm, Bromma
- Moscow M9
- Digital Realty Stockholm STO1-6
- Digital Realty Marseille MRS1/2/3/4
- CE Colo Prague
- Dataplex Budapest
- NewTelco Kiev
- Linxdatacenter (Moscow)
- LIM Warsaw
- Sitel Bratislava
- NXDATA-1 Bucharest (BUH1)
- Ucomline Kiev
- Equinix WA1 - Warsaw, Centrum LIM
- Bolshaya Morskaya 18
- Equinix SK2 - Stockholm, Sköndal
- TELEPOINT Sofia Centre
- LVRTC TV Tower
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 82 ROAs.
- 103.168.217.0/24 · max length /24
- 160.116.216.0/22
- 141.105.64.0/21 · max length /21
- 141.105.64.0/24 · max length /24
- 141.105.65.0/24 · max length /24
- 141.105.66.0/24 · max length /24
- 141.105.66.70/32 · max length /32
- 141.105.67.0/24 · max length /24
- 141.105.68.0/24 · max length /24
- 141.105.69.0/24 · max length /24
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS50867.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 21,504
- Threat-listed addresses
- 95
- Threat density
- 0.4418 %
- Routed prefixes
- 89
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: computed.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 16 of this network’s 16 BGP neighbours.
- TWELVE99 - Arelion Sweden AB · AS1299
- TRANSTELECOM - Joint Stock Company TransTeleCom · AS20485
- SGGS-AS-AP - SG.GS · AS24482
- INTELSOFT-AS - 10G.KZ LLC · AS25534
- CITYTELECOM-AS - Citytelecom LLC · AS29076
- Virtual Technologies & Solutions - Virtual Technologies & Solutions · AS37721
- Serverius-as - Serverius Holding B.V. · AS50673
- GIGAHOST - Gigahost AS · AS56655
- RETNRU-AS - JSC "RetnNet" · AS57304
- IQWEB - IQWeb FZ-LLC · AS59692
- GRAN - OOO "Contact-center GRAN" · AS62316
- ProHoster-AS - IT WEB LTD · AS200313
- team-host - Chernyshov Aleksandr Aleksandrovich · AS202984
- APEIRONGLOBAL - APEIRON GLOBAL Pvt. Ltd. · AS207704
- FLYSERVERS-ASN - Flyservers S.A. · AS209588
- EXAHOST-AS - Umnov Aleksandr Valerevich · AS214872
Reputation
15.9reputation score (NEUTRAL)
AS50867 (ORG-LVA15-AS - HOSTKEY B.V., NL) has a reputation score of 58.1 (NEUTRAL).
- Threat density
- 39.6/100
- Graph metrics
- 90.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 75.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- HOSTKEY B.V.
- RIR
- RIPE
- Registered
- Wed, 30 Dec 2020 11:42:39 GMT
- Abuse contact
- abuse@hostkey.nl
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS50867 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.