Autonomous System
AS50928
Last fetched
AS50928 is operated by SYNTSIB-AS - PJSC MegaFon, registered in RU, and announces 48 prefixes to 24 BGP neighbours. AS50928 has a reputation score of 16.8 (NEUTRAL); 10 of its 10,752 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 48
- BGP neighbours
- 24
- RPKI ROAs
- 49
- MOAS conflicts
- 0
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 1,192
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 31
- Facilities
- 0
- Internet exchanges
- 0
- Customer degree
- 23
- Peer degree
- 0
- Provider degree
- 1
- 31.173.248.0/24
- 31.173.249.0/24
- 31.173.250.0/24
- 31.173.251.0/24
- 31.173.248.0/21
- 31.173.252.0/24
- 31.173.253.0/24
- 31.173.254.0/24
- 37.29.80.0/24
- 37.29.81.0/24
- 37.29.80.0/22
- 37.29.82.0/24
- 37.29.83.0/24
- 46.29.194.0/24
- 46.29.195.0/24
- 46.29.192.0/21
- 46.29.196.0/24
- 46.29.199.0/24
- 178.23.144.0/21
- 178.23.148.0/24
- 178.23.149.0/24
- 178.23.150.0/24
- 178.23.151.0/24
- 178.176.248.0/24
- 178.176.249.0/24
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 49 ROAs.
- 178.176.248.0/24 · max length /24
- 178.176.249.0/24 · max length /24
- 178.176.250.0/24 · max length /24
- 178.176.251.0/24 · max length /24
- 178.176.252.0/24 · max length /24
- 178.176.253.0/24 · max length /24
- 178.176.254.0/24 · max length /24
- 178.178.78.0/24 · max length /24
- 178.23.144.0/21 · max length /21
- 178.23.148.0/24 · max length /24
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS50928.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 10,752
- Threat-listed addresses
- 10
- Threat density
- 0.0930 %
- Routed prefixes
- 38
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: computed.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 24 of this network’s 24 BGP neighbours.
- AS5567 - National Research Tomsk Polytechnic University · AS5567
- ASSTRATEGIYA - Novaya Strategia Ltd. · AS8279
- SIBIS-AS - Sibirskie Innovacionnye Sistemy Ltd · AS9078
- RU-SATSVYAZ-AS - Sputnikovaya svyaz LLC · AS29071
- MF-MGSM-AS - PJSC MegaFon · AS31133
- TOMSKNEFTEHIM-AS - Tomskneftehim Ltd. · AS34671
- AXIOMA - Axioma, LLC · AS39785
- CSIT-AS - Center of Connection, Informatic and Telecommunication LLC · AS41311
- TUSUR-AS - Federal State Budget Educational Institution of Higher Professional Education "Tomsk State University of Control Systems and Radio Electronics" · AS41566
- SFU-AS - Siberian Federal University · AS42048
- INFOLINE-AS - CIT Ltd. · AS44420
- SIBLINE-AS - Sibline Ltd. · AS47117
- RCAIR-AS - Regional State Institution "Regional Center of automated information resource of Tomsk Region" · AS48316
- R19-AS - State Autonomous Institution of Khakass Republic Center of Informatization and New Technologies of Khakass Republic · AS49932
- TSPU-AS - State educational institution of higher professional education "Tomsk State Pedagogical University" · AS50433
- KRAZ-AS - Sibinfosoft LLC · AS51067
- ISTOK-AS - Istok Ltd. · AS51291
- WIRENET_AS - WIRENET LLC · AS59591
- CIT-KUZBASSA-AS - GKU CIT Kuzbassa · AS60862
- Kurort_Manzherok - LLC KURORT MANZHEROK · AS197420
- DGIS - DoubleGIS LLC · AS197482
- FiberTelecom-AS - Fiber Telecom Ltd · AS203784
- finsib - FinSib SD LLC · AS206871
- NOOSPHERE - Joint-Stock Commercial Bank "NOOSPHERE" (Joint-Stock Company) · AS214395
Reputation
16.8reputation score (NEUTRAL)
AS50928 (SYNTSIB-AS - PJSC MegaFon, RU) has a reputation score of 56.5 (NEUTRAL).
- Threat density
- 63.5/100
- Graph metrics
- 55.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 70.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- PJSC MegaFon
- RIR
- RIPE
- Registered
- Mon, 26 Apr 2010 10:03:04 GMT
- Abuse contact
- abuse-mailbox@megafon.ru
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS50928 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.