Autonomous System
AS54801
Last fetched
AS54801 is operated by ZILLION-NETWORK - Zillion Network Inc., registered in US, and announces 236 prefixes to 14 BGP neighbours. AS54801 has a reputation score of 50.0 (HIGHLY_SUSPICIOUS); 127 of its 207,104 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 236
- BGP neighbours
- 14
- RPKI ROAs
- 167
- MOAS conflicts
- 0
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 6,081
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 3
- Facilities
- 0
- Internet exchanges
- 0
- Customer degree
- 2
- Peer degree
- 2
- Provider degree
- 14
- 38.4.64.0/19
- 45.194.85.0/24
- 45.195.60.0/24
- 45.195.62.0/24
- 45.195.192.0/24
- 45.195.196.0/24
- 45.195.197.0/24
- 45.197.1.0/24
- 45.197.2.0/24
- 45.197.4.0/24
- 45.197.5.0/24
- 45.199.191.0/24
- 45.200.14.0/24
- 45.200.16.0/24
- 45.200.16.0/23
- 45.200.17.0/24
- 45.200.32.0/19
- 45.200.51.0/24
- 45.201.215.0/24
- 45.201.216.0/24
- 45.201.217.0/24
- 45.201.218.0/23
- 45.201.220.0/23
- 45.201.222.0/23
- 45.201.224.0/23
Routing posture
- Hijack posture score
- 0.02
- Route leaks
- 1
Leak types observed: TYPE4_PEER_TO_PROVIDER.
Signals
- bulletproof-hostingHosts content other providers routinely take down.
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 167 ROAs.
- 154.204.0.0/24 · max length /24
- 154.208.12.0/22 · max length /24
- 154.208.16.0/20 · max length /24
- 154.212.128.0/24 · max length /24
- 154.213.176.0/20 · max length /24
- 154.215.0.0/24 · max length /24
- 154.218.0.0/24 · max length /24
- 154.221.0.0/24 · max length /24
- 154.81.136.0/24 · max length /24
- 154.81.140.0/24 · max length /24
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS54801.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 207,104
- Threat-listed addresses
- 127
- Threat density
- 0.0613 %
- Routed prefixes
- 236
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: computed.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 14 of this network’s 14 BGP neighbours.
- TWELVE99 - Arelion Sweden AB · AS1299
- SEEDNET - Digital United Inc. · AS4780
- HURRICANE - Hurricane Electric LLC · AS6939
- HUTCHISON-AS-AP - HGC Global Communications Limited · AS9304
- CLOUDFLARENET - Cloudflare, Inc. · AS13335
- CMI-INT-HK - China Mobile International Limited · AS58453
- CDSC-AS1 - CDS Global Cloud Co., Ltd · AS63199
- BIH-Global - INTERNET HARBOR INTERNATIONAL CO.,LIMITED · AS64096
- CWCTB-AS-AP - CORE WINNER CO.,LIMITED · AS131273
- TIANFENG-AS-AP - TIANFENG (HONG KONG) COMMUNICATIONS LIMITED · AS137983
- HKBCS-AS-AP - Hong Kong Beecloud System Technology Services Limited · AS140570
- BGPNETPTELTD-AS-AP - BGPNET PTE. LTD. · AS141883
- TIANFENG-AS-AP - TIANFENG (HONG KONG) COMMUNICATIONS LIMITED · AS149416
- TF - Tianfeng (Hong Kong) Communications Limited · AS213802
Reputation
50.0reputation score (HIGHLY_SUSPICIOUS)
AS54801 (ZILLION-NETWORK - Zillion Network Inc., US) has a reputation score of 25.0 (HIGHLY_SUSPICIOUS). This ASN shows suspicious characteristics.
- Threat density
- 54.8/100
- Graph metrics
- 90.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 85.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- Zillion Network Inc.
- RIR
- ARIN
- Registered
- Fri, 22 Dec 2023 11:47:36 GMT
- Abuse contact
- abuse54801@gmail.com
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS54801 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.