Autonomous System
AS55286
Last fetched
AS55286 is operated by SERVER-MANIA - B2 Net Solutions Inc., registered in CA, and announces 810 prefixes to 7 BGP neighbours. AS55286 has a reputation score of 20.9 (SUSPICIOUS); 1,940 of its 328,192 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 810
- BGP neighbours
- 7
- RPKI ROAs
- 181
- MOAS conflicts
- 3
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 4,267
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 5
- Facilities
- 8
- Internet exchanges
- 0
- Customer degree
- 4
- Peer degree
- 0
- Provider degree
- 3
- 23.26.0.0/24
- 23.229.0.0/22
- 23.229.4.0/23
- 23.229.6.0/24
- 23.229.7.0/24
- 23.229.8.0/22
- 23.229.12.0/24
- 23.229.13.0/24
- 23.229.14.0/23
- 23.229.16.0/24
- 23.229.19.0/24
- 23.229.20.0/24
- 23.229.22.0/23
- 23.229.24.0/21
- 23.229.32.0/21
- 23.229.40.0/24
- 23.229.41.0/24
- 23.229.43.0/24
- 23.229.44.0/22
- 23.229.48.0/24
- 23.229.49.0/24
- 23.229.50.0/23
- 23.229.52.0/22
- 23.229.56.0/22
- 23.229.60.0/24
Routing posture
- Hijack posture score
- 0.41
- Origin mismatches
- 5
Infrastructure presence
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 181 ROAs.
- 45.249.54.0/23 · max length /23
- 152.232.104.0/24 · max length /24
- 152.232.105.0/24 · max length /24
- 152.232.106.0/24 · max length /24
- 152.232.107.0/24 · max length /24
- 152.232.108.0/24 · max length /24
- 152.232.109.0/24 · max length /24
- 152.232.110.0/24 · max length /24
- 152.232.111.0/24 · max length /24
- 152.232.112.0/24 · max length /24
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS55286.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 328,192
- Threat-listed addresses
- 1,940
- Threat density
- 0.5911 %
- Routed prefixes
- 797
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: computed.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 7 of this network’s 7 BGP neighbours.
- COGENT-174 - Cogent Communications, LLC · AS174
- GTT-BACKBONE - GTT Communications Inc. · AS3257
- SYPTEC-NOC - Syptec · AS29951
- AS-COLOCROSSING - HostPapa · AS36352
- SAEOL-1-ASN - 1st Amendment Encrypted Openness LLC · AS36849
- AS53038 - IDC19 SOLUCOES EM TECNOLOGIA DA INFORMACAO LTDA · AS53038
- AS-VPSHOUSE - VPS House Technology Group LLC · AS399122
MOAS / hijack watch
3 announced prefixes conflict with AS55286 — another network announces the same address space. A sample:
Reputation
20.9reputation score (SUSPICIOUS)
AS55286 (SERVER-MANIA - B2 Net Solutions Inc., CA) has a reputation score of 49.1 (SUSPICIOUS). This ASN shows suspicious characteristics.
- Threat density
- 38.9/100
- Graph metrics
- 55.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 75.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- B2 Net Solutions Inc.
- RIR
- ARIN
- Registered
- Thu, 16 May 2013 19:18:15 GMT
- Abuse contact
- abuse-system@servermania.com
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS55286 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.