Autonomous System
AS55943
Last fetched
AS55943 is operated by ONATI-AS-AP - ONATI, registered in PF, and announces 7 prefixes to 8 BGP neighbours. AS55943 has a reputation score of 10.2 (NEUTRAL); 0 of its 5,376 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 7
- BGP neighbours
- 8
- RPKI ROAs
- 27
- MOAS conflicts
- 0
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 3,436
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 7
- Facilities
- 23
- Internet exchanges
- 4
- Customer degree
- 6
- Peer degree
- 0
- Provider degree
- 4
Routing posture
- Hijack posture score
- 0.02
- Route leaks
- 1
Leak types observed: TYPE1_HAIRPIN_TURN.
Signals
- critical-infrastructureServes infrastructure the internet depends on operationally.
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (4 total)
Facilities (23 total)
- CoreSite - Los Angeles (LA1) One Wilshire
- CoreSite - San Jose (SV1)
- Equinix LA1 - Los Angeles
- Telehouse - Paris 2 (Voltaire - Léon Frot)
- Equinix LA2 - Los Angeles
- Equinix SY1/SY2 - Sydney
- Equinix LA3/LA4 - Los Angeles, El Segundo
- CoreSite - Los Angeles (LA2)
- Coresite - Milpitas (SV2)
- Equinix SY3 - Sydney
- CoreSite - Santa Clara (SV4)
- Flexential - Portland/Hillsboro 2 (PDX02)
- Equinix SY6 - Sydney (formerly Metronode Sydney 2)
- DRFortress HNL
- CoreSite - Santa Clara (SV3)
- Equinix SY4 - Sydney
- CoreSite - Santa Clara (SV7)
- Equinix SY7 - Sydney (formerly Metronode Illawara 1)
- Equinix SY5 - Sydney
- CoreSite - Santa Clara (SV8)
- Equinix CA1 - Canberra
- CoreSite - Los Angeles (LA3)
- CoreSite - Santa Clara (SV9)
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 27 ROAs.
- 103.4.72.0/22 · max length /23
- 113.197.68.0/22 · max length /23
- 43.249.176.0/22 · max length /23
- 2001:470:28a::/48 · max length /48
- 103.254.224.0/22
- 103.254.224.0/23
- 103.254.224.0/24
- 103.254.225.0/24
- 103.254.226.0/23
- 103.254.226.0/24
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS55943.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 5,376
- Threat-listed addresses
- 0
- Threat density
- 0.0000 %
- Routed prefixes
- 5
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: clean.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 8 of this network’s 8 BGP neighbours.
- GTT-BACKBONE - GTT Communications Inc. · AS3257
- HURRICANE - Hurricane Electric LLC · AS6939
- ONATI-AS-AP - ONATI · AS9471
- CKTELECOM-CK-AP - Telecom Cook Islands · AS10131
- CLOUDFLARENET - Cloudflare, Inc. · AS14789
- HAWAIIAN-TELCOM - Hawaiian Telcom Services Company, Inc. · AS36149
- ISP-NU - No. 1 Commercial Center · AS55885
- PMT-AS-AP - PACIFIC MOBILE TELECOM · AS138179
Reputation
10.2reputation score (NEUTRAL)
AS55943 (ONATI-AS-AP - ONATI, PF) has a reputation score of 69.5 (NEUTRAL).
- Threat density
- 90.0/100
- Graph metrics
- 55.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 85.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- ONATI
- RIR
- APNIC
- Registered
- Tue, 20 Aug 2019 01:21:36 GMT
- Abuse contact
- abuse@onati.pf
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS55943 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.