Autonomous System
AS58002
Last fetched
AS58002 is operated by SINFORM - JSC Svyazinform, registered in RU, and announces 8 prefixes to 34 BGP neighbours. AS58002 has a reputation score of 12.7 (NEUTRAL); 1 of its 10,240 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 8
- BGP neighbours
- 34
- RPKI ROAs
- 8
- MOAS conflicts
- 0
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 1,121
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 34
- Facilities
- 63
- Internet exchanges
- 12
- Customer degree
- 24
- Peer degree
- 21
- Provider degree
- 5
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (12 total)
Facilities (63 total)
- Telehouse - London (Docklands North)
- NIKHEF Amsterdam
- Digital Realty VIE1/2 - Vienna
- Equinix FR5 - Frankfurt, KleyerStrasse
- Digital Realty Frankfurt FRA1-27
- Telehouse - Paris 2 (Voltaire - Léon Frot)
- Digital Realty AMS9 - Amsterdam
- Equinix SK1 - Stockholm, Bromma
- Speedbone Berlin
- Moscow M9
- Digital Realty Stockholm STO1-6
- Digital Realty Marseille MRS1/2/3/4
- CE Colo Prague
- Dataplex Budapest
- NewTelco Kiev
- Linxdatacenter (Moscow)
- CSS MPS Moscow
- Sitel Bratislava
- LIM Warsaw
- NXDATA-1 Bucharest (BUH1)
- Moscow CSS MPS
- Moscow M10
- Ucomline Kiev
- Equinix WA1 - Warsaw, Centrum LIM
- Bolshaya Morskaya 18
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 8 of this network’s 8 ROAs.
- 2a00:c9c0::/32 · max length /32
- 77.247.232.0/21 · max length /21
- 92.241.0.0/19 · max length /24
- 92.241.0.0/21 · max length /21
- 92.241.12.0/23 · max length /23
- 92.241.14.0/24 · max length /24
- 92.241.18.0/24 · max length /24
- 92.241.8.0/22 · max length /22
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS58002.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 10,240
- Threat-listed addresses
- 1
- Threat density
- 0.0098 %
- Routed prefixes
- 7
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: computed.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 25 of this network’s 34 BGP neighbours.
- HURRICANE - Hurricane Electric LLC · AS6939
- ROSTELECOM-AS - PJSC Rostelecom · AS12389
- SGGS-AS-AP - SG.GS · AS24482
- INETCOM - INETCOM CARRIER LLC · AS35598
- Virtual Technologies & Solutions - Virtual Technologies & Solutions · AS37721
- IT-AS - IT Ltd. · AS42916
- RTODON-AS - RTO-DON LLC · AS43264
- REINFOCOM-AS - ReInfoCom Ltd. · AS43465
- RECOM-OREL-AS - Recom LLC · AS43521
- Dontechsvyaz - Dontechsvyaz LLC · AS45055
- Garant-Park-Internet - Garant-Park-Internet LLC · AS47196
- Inforoom - Inforoom Ltd. · AS48366
- RTS-AS - Regional TeleSystems Ltd. · AS49311
- TRUENETWORK - Truenetwork LLC · AS49673
- TRANSROUTE - Transroute Telecom LTD · AS50509
- Serverius-as - Serverius Holding B.V. · AS50673
- DIDI-AS - LLC Digital Dialogue-Nets · AS51200
- VIDIKON - Vidikon-K, CJSC · AS57214
- ASKOMPANON - Kompanon LLC. · AS57233
- ASINTEGSETISVYAZI - "INTEGRATED COMMUNICATION NETWORKS" LLC · AS57587
- MileTelecom - Konyaev Igor Gennadievich · AS60693
- SigmaTV-AS - SigmaTV LLC · AS61237
- SFERANET-AS - SFERANET-AS · AS61433
- TransAnalitica-AS - LLC "Trans Analitica" · AS62130
- BEMYLINK - BiMajLink d.o.o. · AS62255
Reputation
12.7reputation score (NEUTRAL)
AS58002 (SINFORM - JSC Svyazinform, RU) has a reputation score of 64.6 (NEUTRAL).
- Threat density
- 58.2/100
- Graph metrics
- 90.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 75.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- JSC Svyazinform
- RIR
- RIPE
- Registered
- Fri, 30 Mar 2012 08:19:51 GMT
- Abuse contact
- abuse@s-inform.net
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS58002 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.