Autonomous System

AS61335

Last fetched Wed, 07 Oct 2026 18:59:13 GMT

AS61335 is operated by OOO-Sysmedia-as - PE Denis Podolskii, registered in SK, and announces 3 prefixes to 1 BGP neighbour. AS61335 has a reputation score of 23.6 (SUSPICIOUS); 13 of its 512 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.

Nutrition Label

Routing footprint

Announced prefixes: 3
BGP neighbours: 1
RPKI ROAs: 3
MOAS conflicts: 0
CAIDA AS-rank: 54,977
Customer-cone ASNs: 1
Facilities: 0
Internet exchanges: 0
Customer degree: 0
Peer degree: 0
Provider degree: 1

Route origin authorizations

A sample of 3 of this network’s 3 ROAs.

2a00:fd40:c::/48 · max length /48
46.38.153.0/24 · max length /24
91.242.163.0/24 · max length /24

Upstreams

The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS61335.

AS38949 · 32 shared paths
AS6939 · 20 shared paths
AS174 · 11 shared paths
AS57381 · 5 shared paths
AS50304 · 3 shared paths

Blast radius

Announced IPv4 addresses: 512
Threat-listed addresses: 13
Threat density: 2.5391 %
Routed prefixes: 2

How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: computed.

Peering ecosystem

A sample of 1 of this network’s 1 BGP neighbours.

TRESTEL-SK - TRESTEL-SK · AS38949

Reputation

23.6reputation score (SUSPICIOUS)

AS61335 (OOO-Sysmedia-as - PE Denis Podolskii, SK) has a reputation score of 46.4 (SUSPICIOUS). This ASN shows suspicious characteristics.

Threat density: 41.9/100
Graph metrics: 30.0/100
Historical behaviour: 85.0/100
Prefix age: 20.0/100

These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.

Registration

Registered to: PE Denis Podolskii
RIR: RIPE
Registered: Mon, 19 Nov 2012 12:19:27 GMT
Abuse contact: noc@vmserver.sk

This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.

Threat-feed evidence

Pivot from AS61335 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.

Queries

This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.


MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
     collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
     collect(co.name) AS countries,
     collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
     collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
     collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
     collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
     collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
     collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
     collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
     collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
       a.rir AS rir,
       a.orgName AS orgName,
       a.asRank AS asRank,
       a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
       a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
       a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
       a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
       a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
       a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
       a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
       a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
       a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
       a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
       a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
       a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
       a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
       a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
       a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
       operatorNames, countries, organizations,
       samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
       signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
       prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCount

Run yourself →

The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.


MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observations