Autonomous System
AS63969
Last fetched
AS63969 is operated by RACEONLINE-BD - Race Online Limited, registered in BD, and announces 98 prefixes to 18 BGP neighbours. AS63969 has a reputation score of 18.6 (NEUTRAL); 138 of its 18,432 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 98
- BGP neighbours
- 18
- RPKI ROAs
- 219
- MOAS conflicts
- 2
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 1,579
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 21
- Facilities
- 4
- Internet exchanges
- 6
- Customer degree
- 19
- Peer degree
- 0
- Provider degree
- 2
- 45.114.84.0/24
- 45.114.85.0/24
- 59.152.96.0/24
- 59.152.98.0/24
- 59.152.99.0/24
- 59.152.100.0/24
- 59.152.102.0/24
- 59.152.103.0/24
- 59.152.105.0/24
- 59.152.107.0/24
- 59.152.111.0/24
- 103.16.227.0/24
- 103.23.95.0/24
- 103.49.114.0/24
- 103.49.115.0/24
- 103.54.36.0/24
- 103.54.37.0/24
- 103.54.38.0/24
- 103.85.159.0/24
- 103.105.86.0/24
- 103.106.119.0/24
- 103.115.117.0/24
- 103.124.251.0/24
- 103.126.23.0/24
- 103.129.115.0/24
Infrastructure presence
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 219 ROAs.
- 154.89.7.0/24 · max length /24
- 103.105.86.0/24 · max length /24
- 103.106.118.0/23 · max length /24
- 103.115.117.0/24 · max length /24
- 103.124.250.0/23 · max length /23
- 103.124.250.0/24 · max length /24
- 103.124.251.0/24 · max length /24
- 103.126.20.0/22 · max length /23
- 103.126.20.0/24 · max length /24
- 103.126.21.0/24 · max length /24
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS63969.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 18,432
- Threat-listed addresses
- 138
- Threat density
- 0.7487 %
- Routed prefixes
- 74
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: computed.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 18 of this network’s 18 BGP neighbours.
- LGHL-AS-AP - Liasail Global Hongkong Limited · AS17497
- IOT-AS-AP - IoT Techsmart Pte. Ltd. · AS17644
- Taobao - Zhejiang Taobao Network Co.,Ltd · AS24429
- GAZICOMM-AS-AP - GAZI COMMUNICATIONS A TELEPORT OPERATOR · AS38315
- EARTHTELECOMMUNICATION-AS - EARTH TELECOMMUNICATION (Pvt) LTD. · AS58715
- VTS-AS-AP - Nexdecade Technology Pvt. LTD · AS63984
- IBBL-AS-AP - Islami Bank Bangladesh Limited · AS133430
- XEON-BD - XeonBD · AS133938
- NUSRATECHPTELTD-AS-AP - Gotipath · AS138408
- DHAKACOLO-AS-AP - DHAKACOLO (PVT.) LIMITED. · AS140038
- ITE-AS-AP - INNOVATIVE TECHNOLOGY & ENGINEERING · AS140544
- NLSOLUTION-AS-AP - NL Solution · AS141434
- FLAREZENLTD-AS-AP - Flarezen Ltd. · AS147181
- REDDOT-AS-AP - REDDOT DIGITAL LIMITED · AS150132
- BDCALLINGITLTD-AS-AP - bdCalling IT Ltd · AS151215
- INTERNATIONAL-AS-AP - International Trading Services Ltd. · AS152725
- TDMCBL-AS-AP - The Dhaka Mercantile Co-Operative Bank Ltd. · AS152844
- AXENTECPLC-AS-AP - Axentec PLC · AS153551
MOAS / hijack watch
2 announced prefixes conflict with AS63969 — another network announces the same address space. A sample:
Reputation
18.6reputation score (NEUTRAL)
AS63969 (RACEONLINE-BD - Race Online Limited, BD) has a reputation score of 52.9 (NEUTRAL).
- Threat density
- 42.5/100
- Graph metrics
- 55.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 85.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- Race Online Limited
- RIR
- APNIC
- Registered
- Tue, 31 Mar 2015 00:40:05 GMT
- Abuse contact
- ashikuzzaman@race.net.bd
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS63969 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.