Autonomous System
AS7500
Last fetched
AS7500 is operated by M-ROOT-DNS - WIDE Project, registered in JP, and announces 5 prefixes to 10 BGP neighbours. AS7500 has a reputation score of 8.1 (REPUTABLE); 0 of its 1,024 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 5
- BGP neighbours
- 10
- RPKI ROAs
- 8
- MOAS conflicts
- 0
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 7,705
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 3
- Facilities
- 303
- Internet exchanges
- 42
- Customer degree
- 2
- Peer degree
- 102
- Provider degree
- 10
Signals
- critical-infrastructureServes infrastructure the internet depends on operationally.
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (42 total)
Facilities (303 total)
- Digital Realty SFO (200 Paul)
- Equinix SV1/SV5/SV10 - Silicon Valley, San Jose
- NIKHEF Amsterdam
- Digital Realty SFO (365 Main)
- CoreSite - San Jose (SV1)
- Telehouse - London (Docklands North)
- Telehouse - London (Docklands East)
- Digital Realty London LHR20
- Equinix LD8 - London, Docklands
- Telehouse - Paris 2 (Voltaire - Léon Frot)
- ITENOS Frankfurt (FRA1)
- Digital Realty Frankfurt FRA1-27
- Digital Realty Paris PAR1
- Global Switch Amsterdam
- Equinix AM7 - Amsterdam, Kuiperberweg
- Digital Realty AMS17 - Amsterdam
- Equinix FR5 - Frankfurt, KleyerStrasse
- Digital Realty AMS3/5/7/8/10 - Amsterdam
- Digital Realty BRU1 - Brussels
- Digital Realty Paris PAR2
- Equinix PA5 - Paris, Victor Hugo
- Equinix PA7 - Paris, Energy Park
- Equinix AM8 - Amsterdam, Gyroscoopweg
- Digital Realty Dusseldorf DUS1-3
- Digital Realty AMS9 - Amsterdam
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 8 of this network’s 8 ROAs.
- 2001:b000:19e::/64 · max length /64
- 2001:dc3::/32 · max length /32
- 2001:dc3::/48 · max length /48
- 202.12.26.0/23 · max length /23
- 202.12.27.0/24 · max length /24
- 202.39.32.0/28 · max length /28
- 2001:470:123::/48 · max length /48
- 192.50.45.0/24
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS7500.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 1,024
- Threat-listed addresses
- 0
- Threat density
- 0.0000 %
- Routed prefixes
- 4
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: clean.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 10 of this network’s 10 BGP neighbours.
- IIJ - Internet Initiative Japan Inc. · AS2497
- KDDI - KDDI CORPORATION · AS2516
- BIGLOBE - BIGLOBE Inc. · AS2518
- GTT-BACKBONE - GTT Communications Inc. · AS3257
- HURRICANE - Hurricane Electric LLC · AS6939
- IIX-AS-AP - Indonesia Internet Exchange · AS7597
- RETN-AS - RETN Limited · AS9002
- E-DNS-JP - WIDE Project · AS23634
- NEWMEDIAEXPRESS-AS-AP - NewMedia Express Pte Ltd · AS38001
- REPUBLICTELECOM-SG - MyRepublic Ltd. · AS132132
Reputation
8.1reputation score (REPUTABLE)
AS7500 (M-ROOT-DNS - WIDE Project, JP) has a reputation score of 75.8 (REPUTABLE).
- Threat density
- 90.0/100
- Graph metrics
- 90.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 75.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- WIDE Project
- RIR
- APNIC
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS7500 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.