Autonomous System
AS8728
Last fetched
AS8728 is operated by UNSPECIFIED - AS INFONET, registered in EE, and announces 7 prefixes to 19 BGP neighbours. AS8728 has a reputation score of 10.5 (NEUTRAL); 9 of its 52,224 announced IPv4 addresses appear on threat feeds.
Nutrition Label
Routing footprint
- Announced prefixes
- 7
- BGP neighbours
- 19
- RPKI ROAs
- 10
- MOAS conflicts
- 0
- CAIDA AS-rank
- 2,923
- Customer-cone ASNs
- 9
- Facilities
- 29
- Internet exchanges
- 8
- Customer degree
- 9
- Peer degree
- 19
- Provider degree
- 2
Infrastructure presence
Internet exchanges (8 total)
Facilities (29 total)
- Equinix FR5 - Frankfurt, KleyerStrasse
- Equinix SK1 - Stockholm, Bromma
- Moscow M9
- Digital Realty Stockholm STO1-6
- Bolshaya Morskaya 18
- Equinix SK2 - Stockholm, Sköndal
- LVRTC TV Tower
- Delska EU North Vilnius LT DC3
- Telia Telehouse KJJ
- Digita Helsinki Pasila Broadcasting Tower
- IVC ORW Saint-Petersburg
- STOKAB KN7, Östermalm
- Tsvetochnaya Data Center
- Raduga-2
- GlobalConnect Sätra
- Glesys Stockholm 1
- Stockholm/C
- Stockholm/B
- Vaultica Data Centers | STO01
- Miran-1
- INFONET DC
- Baltneta TIER3 Datacenter
- Data-Center IMAQLIQ
- BONCH-IT
- Obenet Kista Gate
Route origin authorizations
A sample of 10 of this network’s 10 ROAs.
- 109.235.240.0/21 · max length /32
- 185.200.68.0/22 · max length /32
- 2001:1b28::/32 · max length /128
- 212.7.0.0/19 · max length /32
- 212.7.30.0/24 · max length /32
- 82.147.160.0/19 · max length /32
- 82.147.160.0/21 · max length /32
- 82.147.168.0/21 · max length /32
- 84.52.0.0/18 · max length /32
- 89.235.192.0/18 · max length /32
Upstreams
The networks that most often share an observed BGP path with AS8728.
Blast radius
- Announced IPv4 addresses
- 52,224
- Threat-listed addresses
- 9
- Threat density
- 0.0172 %
- Routed prefixes
- 6
How much of the internet this network is responsible for, and how much of that address space currently appears on a threat feed. Coverage: computed.
Peering ecosystem
A sample of 19 of this network’s 19 BGP neighbours.
- COGENT-174 - Cogent Communications, LLC · AS174
- SWIPNET - Tele2 Sverige AB · AS1257
- HURRICANE - Hurricane Electric LLC · AS6939
- RETN-AS - RETN Limited · AS9002
- RASCOM-AS - CJSC RASCOM · AS20764
- SGGS-AS-AP - SG.GS · AS24482
- GNM-AS - Global Network Management Inc · AS31500
- CORE-BACKBONE - Core-Backbone GmbH · AS33891
- BLIX - Blix Solutions AS · AS50304
- EDS-EE - EDS SYSTEMS OU · AS51103
- NETNOD-ROUTE-SERVER-1 - Netnod AB · AS52005
- EE-AS-STV - AS STV · AS61307
- INFONET-DC - INFONET DC OY · AS205950
- servinga-EE - servinga GmbH · AS207408
- CTE1 - OU CSC Telecom Estonia · AS207872
- GMHOST-EE - GmhostGrupp OU · AS208440
- Virtuaalinfra-AS - Virtuaalinfra OU · AS210671
- NARAYANA - Narayana OU · AS211494
- GBN - LLC DZHIBIEN HOST · AS214719
Reputation
10.5reputation score (NEUTRAL)
AS8728 (UNSPECIFIED - AS INFONET, EE) has a reputation score of 69.0 (NEUTRAL).
- Threat density
- 63.5/100
- Graph metrics
- 90.0/100
- Historical behaviour
- 85.0/100
- Prefix age
- 20.0/100
These are reputation signals about the network as a whole, not a threat-feed verdict about a specific address.
Registration
- Registered to
- AS INFONET
- RIR
- RIPE
- Abuse contact
- abuse@infonet.ee
This is the abuse contact WhisperGraph holds for the network.
Threat-feed evidence
Related pages
Pivot from AS8728 into the prefixes, peers and country it routes for.
Queries
This ASN's full card — routing footprint, peers, conflicts and RIR facts.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_NAME]->(an:ASN_NAME)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_COUNTRY]->(co:COUNTRY)
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:REGISTERED_BY]->(org:ORGANIZATION)
WITH a,
collect(an.name) AS operatorNames,
collect(co.name) AS countries,
collect(org.name) AS organizations
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(prefix:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations,
collect(prefix.name)[0..25] AS samplePrefixes
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(peer:ASN)
OPTIONAL MATCH (peer)-[:HAS_NAME]->(peern:ASN_NAME)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes,
collect({asn: peer.name, operator: peern.name})[0..25] AS samplePeers
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(conflict:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers,
collect(conflict.name)[0..25] AS sampleConflicts
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:HAS_SIGNAL]->(sig:THREAT_SIGNAL_TYPE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
collect(DISTINCT sig.name) AS signals
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(ix:INTERNET_EXCHANGE)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals,
collect({id: ix.id, name: ix.name})[0..25] AS sampleExchanges
OPTIONAL MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(fac:FACILITY)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges,
collect({id: fac.id, name: fac.name})[0..25] AS sampleFacilities
OPTIONAL MATCH (roa:ROA)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]->(a)
WITH a, operatorNames, countries, organizations, samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts, signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities,
collect({prefix: roa.prefix, maxLength: roa.maxLength})[0..10] AS sampleRoas
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROUTES]->(p:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(p) AS prefixCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:BGP_NEIGHBOR]-(n:ASN) RETURN count(n) AS peerCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)<-[:CONFLICTS_WITH]-(c:ANNOUNCED_PREFIX) RETURN count(c) AS conflictCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:ROA_AUTHORIZES_ORIGIN]-(r:ROA) RETURN count(r) AS roaCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:AS_PRESENT_AT]->(f:FACILITY) RETURN count(f) AS facilityCount }
CALL { WITH a MATCH (a)-[:IX_MEMBER]->(x:INTERNET_EXCHANGE) RETURN count(x) AS ixpCount }
RETURN a.name AS name,
a.rir AS rir,
a.orgName AS orgName,
a.asRank AS asRank,
a.coneAsns AS coneAsns,
a.conePrefixes AS conePrefixes,
a.coneAddresses AS coneAddresses,
a.registrationDate AS registrationDate,
a.reputationScore AS reputationScore,
a.reputationCategory AS reputationCategory,
a.overallThreatLevel AS overallThreatLevel,
a.abuseEmail AS abuseEmail,
a.hijackPostureScore AS hijackPostureScore,
a.hijackOriginMismatchCount AS hijackOriginMismatchCount,
a.routeLeakCount AS routeLeakCount,
a.routeLeakTypes AS routeLeakTypes,
a.degreeCustomer AS degreeCustomer,
a.degreePeer AS degreePeer,
a.degreeProvider AS degreeProvider,
operatorNames, countries, organizations,
samplePrefixes, samplePeers, sampleConflicts,
signals, sampleExchanges, sampleFacilities, sampleRoas,
prefixCount, peerCount, conflictCount, roaCount, facilityCount, ixpCountRun yourself →The five networks that most often share this ASN's observed BGP paths.
MATCH (a:ASN {name: $asn})<-[:BGP_PATH]-(b:BGP_PATH_OBSERVATION)
WITH b LIMIT 200
MATCH (b)-[:BGP_PATH]->(up:ASN)
WHERE up.name <> $asn
WITH up.name AS asn, count(*) AS observations
ORDER BY observations DESC
LIMIT 5
RETURN asn, observationsRun yourself →Or query Whisper from your own LLM workflow via the Whisper MCP server.